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SPEED AND BECOMING IN THE URBAN PUBLIC SPHERE 
ABSTRACT 
Concerns about speed and politics focus on the loss of the self-present political subject, 
whose critical will can direct and legitimate political discourse. The hope of sustaining 
such a subject is understood to be threatened by the erosion of the ideal-normative 
grounds that are said to support critical subjectivity (e.g. the city, the community, public 
space). While the concerns about the character and control of public space are certainly 
to be taken seriously, it is not clear why we should attach these concerns to a loss of a 
critical political subjectivity and an erosion of public debate. The argument here begins 
by acknowledging that speed is an ambivalent quality in politics, both creating a 
potential to open debate to new identities, and posing the risk that appositional politics 
will stall in hard oppositions, or in a failure to recognize that which is truly novel in an 
event. Both of these risks require that recognized identities begin to 'leak', and become 
open to a world whose potential exceeds the recognized permutations of the possible. 
This thesis explores how a public, and its implied subjectivities, are maintained 'at 
speed', within the multiple timespaces of the contemporary city. Instead of an objective 
speed that comes from without, and overwhelms the subject, time is conceptualized as 
duration; an immanent view of time in which speed is characterized as repeated 
disruptions. A public can form around these repeated disruptions. The public is 
understood to be an assemblage, in Deleuze and Guattari's use of the term, which is 
sustained by the circulation of texts. A public actualizes wherever, and whenever, there 
is a successful conjunction of text and context. These conjunctions are not determined, 
but are only determinable in the event of their actualization. However, it is possible to 
create a diagram of the assemblage which highlights the potential that exists for the 
forn1ation of a public, as well as the potential to go beyond recognized subjectivities and 
open the assemblage to a process of becoming. This thesis creates such a diagram for 
the smog-event in Toronto, Canada, and engages in an 'experimental critique'. An 
experimental critique seeks to explore how the event has been placed into circulation in 
the public sphere, and to encourage experimentation with the limits of recognized 
identities and possibilities that are sustained in the public assemblage. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine for a moment the following scenario: 
It's 30 degrees Celsius and the humidity makes it fee/like 3 7; yet another 
heat wave in what has been one of the hottest summers on record in Toronto. 
Looking to the horizon the office towers in the city centre are shrouded in a 
smoggy haze, the landmark CN tower a dull grey in the morning sun. There 
has been a record number of air quality alerts issued this summer and 
another one has been issued today. Is the air getting worse? Are my 
children's health at risk? Is this climate change? 
These kinds of observations and questions might pass through a commuter's mind as 
they sit in traffic, but they are not likely to occupy more than a few seconds of their time 
before they are pushed aside by more mundane and pressing concerns. To some activist 
and academics concerned with the fate ofthe political in contemporary society, this kind 
of 'inattention' is a serious problem that reflects how mobility and speed are eroding the 
conditions for political reflection and action. Critically theory has traditionally sought to 
overcome this erosion by trying to recreate the conditions that will support a self-present 
political subject, one who can engage critically in the world around them. The absence 
of such a subject in practice, however, has created an uneasy oscillation between a 
lament for lost citizen-subject, and a condemnation of the apathetic masses. Adopting 
the latter strategy, some anonymous culture-jammers were not going to let 'the public' 
off the hook with a shrug of incredulity- in the summer of 2002, on one of Toronto's 
busier downtown commuter arteries, they commandeered two large billboards and 
painted in large scrawling letters the accusation APATHY LETHARGY (Figure one, 
next page). 
Figure I: Billboard accusations, Bathurst St. Toronto, Canada. Summer 2002 (author's photo). 
The gloves were off-- the accusation that so often lies hidden behind concerns about the 
political was made public, labelling the commuters stuck in traffic on this smoggy day, 
passing a verdict on this whole messed-up world that ' chooses' to look the other way 
when the sky is falling. I don't mean to slip towards hyperbole here, but I want to 
preserve the affect of these billboards, the indignant mixture of anger and impotence they 
express, because I think it points towards weaknesses in how we critique 'actually 
existing democracy'(Fraser 1994). I want to argue against these sentiments, or better, I 
want to think through the ambiguity they provoke - who is being targeted in these 
bil lboards, who is apathetic, and what shou ld they do? 
We could argue that the accusation is simp ly over-strident hyperbo le by pointing to the 
political economic constraints that restrict individual choice and action, or the corporate 
control that distorts democratic process etc. But this only disp laces the righteous 
indignation ' upwards', rather than addressing it. In particular, it still targets a subject 
(albeit an institutional or corporate subject) who has failed to uphold the normative ideals 
of social responsibility. What is compelling about the billboard accusation is that it 
provides no clear indication of who is being addressed. In the middle of mobile and 
temporary passage it simply accuses everybody. This is not to suggest it points to some 
form of Original Sin shared by all , which lamely dissipates the sentiments expressed on 
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the billboard. Instead, I want to argue that the ambiguity points to the fact that a world 
characterized by speed and mobility is also a world characterized by a loss of control. 
However, critical discourse is ill-equipped to deal with this loss of control so long as it 
premises critical intervention on first regaining control in order to develop a critical 
distance from the event. Therefore, from a critical perspective 'things always happen too 
early, understanding always comes too late', and so critical thought always seems to be 
'too slow' (Bielik-Robson 2000 p.72). 
In what follows I explore how we can critically engage in public discourse without 
premising critically intervention on first regaining control. It is argued that with the loss 
of a self-present critical subject, there is a need to develop an affirmative, or 
experimental, critique that diffuses the appositional dynamics of political struggle by 
making visible, and experimenting with, the limits of recognized political identities. In 
doing so an affirmative and experimental critique aims to make visible the conditions, 
and potential, for critically intervention (or better, experimentation) in a public sphere 
that has little time to pause for reflection, and which is continually in a process of 
becoming. 
At speed normative judgment becomes problematic, it is not always easy to provide clear 
answers to the question of who is to blame, nor what should be done. In response to such 
a predicament, it is perhaps understandable that some would express the sentiment that 
'we' need to 'slow down'. Thus Wolin writes: 
Starkly put, political time is out of synch with the temporalities, rhythms, 
and pace of governing economy and culture. Political time, especially in 
societies with pretensions to democracy, requires an element of leisure, 
not in the sense of a leisure class .... but in the sense, say, of a leisurely 
pace. This is owing to the needs of political action to be preceded by 
deliberation and deliberation, as its 'deliberate' part suggests, takes time 
because, typically, it occurs in a setting of competing or conflicting but 
legitimate considerations .... Political time is conditioned by the presence 
of differences and the attempt to negotiate them. The results of 
negotiations, whether successful or not, preserves time ... That political 
time has a preservative function, is not surprising. Since time immemorial 
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poltical authorities have been charged with preserving bodies, goods 
souls, practices, an circumscribed ways of life (Wolin 1997 prg. 1.4). 
This call to slow-down reflects a view of politics in which democracy depends on the 
considered reflection of a self-present political subject, the democratic will is what 
governs and directs time, or as Wolin says 'preserves time'. In this view ofpolitics, 
democratic debate progresses through opposition, recognition and inclusion- a familiar 
dialectic rhythm. The political body, and the political subject, are understood in the first 
instance to resist change, only opening their 'circumscribed ways of life' to 'good souls'. 
However, the call to slow down is inadequate, both from a pragmatic and a normative 
standpoint. First, from a pragmatic standpoint, it is not clear how a democratic polity 
would 'slow down' (what would that mean?). Presumably there would have to be some 
form of agreement to slow down, which would take deliberation, for which we would 
have to slow down to do it adequately. We would be caught in double bind. In short, it 
is necessary that we think about how to act 'at speed', and not at some ideal speed. 
Second, it is not at all clear that it is desirable to slow down (Chesneaux 2000). As 
Conolly (2002) argues, speed is also what disrupts unjust and exclusionary social 
relations, and so it brings with it the opportunity for progressive change. Speed is a force 
that opens up the 'concentric circles' of identity to a process of becoming, which it turn 
makes possible the formation of new identities: 
The cultural logic of recognition [e.g. Wolin c.o] purports to recall things 
that are there intrinsically but have been forgotten, occluded, repressed or 
oppressed, while the groan of becoming is the uncertain process by which 
new events and identities reconfigure established logic of recognition in 
ways that cannot be captured entirely by tight models of explanation or 
dialectic advance (ibid. p.l59). 
Once again, we see the ambiguity of speed, which calls on us to figure out how 
democratic societies can live with speed, somewhere between a regressive stability and 
destructive fluidity. Therefore, Connolly calls on individuals to nurture a 'critical 
responsiveness', "not merely to already existing identities but to the politics of becoming 
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by which new constituencies periodically surge into being from the opaque netherworld 
of difference, injury and energy" (ibid. p.l71 ). 
I agree with Connolly's normative response to speed- a need to open the appositional 
identities of a politics of recognition to an awareness of their own becoming, a process 
that moves beyond the will of the subject to control and preserve. In what follows, I 
want to explore what a politics of becoming would look like in practice. I take up the 
challenge where Connolly leaves off, for while Connolly posits the normative need for a 
politics of becoming, he offers little guidance on how such a politics might emerge, and 
how becoming can be harnessed to desirable ends. Becoming does not promise a better 
future- a better future must created from becoming. It is not simply a matter of what 
political subjects 'should' do in response to speed, but of understanding how to open 
public discourse to the kind ethical norms that Connolly identifies, to develop a critical 
practice and not just leave it as a theoretical norm. There is a risk that in saying we 
'should' be open to becoming, we will turn becoming into something that can be 
recognized by the subject, which would simply return us to a politics of (attentive) 
recognition. However, becoming is precisely that which cannot be represented, it is 
instead a process that can only sensed at the limits of recognized identities and which 
moves between recognized identities (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p. 237-239). 
Pragmatically it is not a question of representing becoming, but of engaging in politics in 
such a way as to re-activate the force with which we (i.e. those engaging critically in 
politics) were ourselves pulled into becoming, in order to legitimate experimentation 
with changing circumstances. 
The bridge I use to cross the gap between a politics of recognition, and a politics of 
becoming, is a critical appraisal ofthe role of the public sphere in contemporary politics. 
The public sphere is not a realm of decision-making, but a process whereby decisions 
and claims gain legitimacy and are sustained in a democratic polity. A theoretically ideal 
public sphere would be one which provides the grounds on which claims could be made 
public, given 'legitimate consideration', and synthesized into a more just outcome 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Habermas 1992). In relation to this idea, a faltering public 
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sphere legitimates unjust outcomes, and concerns with speed are often expressed as part 
of a critique of contemporary ideologies that forego any vision for the future and which 
encourage an a-social individualism (Bertman 1998; Sennett 1998; Bauman 2000; 
Zawadzki 2002). The dominance of such ideologies of 'presentism' and 'individualism' 
are understood to be not just the result of a distortion or capture of the public discourse 
by powerful interests, but more problematically an exhaustion of critical thought in the 
public sphere, an inability or unwillingness of political subjects to 'believe' counter-
ideology. It is for this reason that purely normative responses about how the public 
should respond to speed are weak, because they simply draw attention to the fact that 'the 
public' doesn't appear to be present or listening. Therefore, the apparent weakness of 
counter-ideology is explained in terms of the erosion ofthe conditions that would create 
a critical and self-aware political subject, and so support a critical public sphere. Speed 
is central to these narratives of decline. 
The impact of speed is characterized in two ways- in terms of an erosion or control of 
public space, and in terms of an experience of fragmentation, disruption and 
disorientation. With regard to the first, it is argue that high-speed technologies allow for 
the creation of a more dispersed and exclusive urban form, which allows for separation 
of ditTerence, an exclusionary withdrawal of the privileged from social responsibility, 
and militaristic control of movement by the State (e.g. Virilio 1987; Mitchell 1995; 
Sennett 1998; 1998; Davis 1999; 1999 ). There is not just a normative concern with 
exclusion and control, but with how these controlled spaces provide no opportunities for 
encounters with difference, which it is argued invigorate the public sphere by making 
subjects more aware and accepting of difference. The second concern, about 
fragmentation of experience, argues that a constant influx and fragmentation of 
information leads to sense of being overwhelmed, and an inability (or unwillingness) for 
the average person to decide between, and commit to, competing claims (e.g.Bertman 
1998; Sennett 1998; Bauman 2000; Melucci 2000; Virilio 2000; Zawadzki 2002). These 
concerns paint a picture of a pub! ic sphere that, for the majority of people, remains a 
spectator sport, over which they have little influence. However, it needs to be stressed, 
that these commentaries are largely speculative, and so we can also reverse their 
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normative assessment. With regard to the high-speed technologies and control, we need 
to also consider that such technologies can allow for a coordination and control that 
challenges State control, or as Connolly has noted, allow for the intrusion of new 
identities (Connolly 2000; Barry 2001; Porter 2001). Similarly, while 'fragmentation' 
may create a sense of being overwhelmed, it also creates a 'healthy' scepticism towards 
truth claims, one that Beck, Lash and Giddens for example, have argued can have 
progressive potential in a 'reflexive' modernity (Beck, Giddens et al. 1994). Once again, 
we see that speed and control need to be treated with ambivalence rather than 
condemnation. However, what we can say unambiguously, is that the ideal conditions 
hoped for in critical theorizing of the public sphere are definitely absent. Critical theory 
then finds itself at an impasse, because with the absence of ideal conditions to create the 
political subject, it must fall back on the will of an exceptional critical subject who can 
transcends these imperfect conditions and recognizes his or her predicament. 
Whenever critical theory forgets that it is a normative exercise, it oversteps its limits and 
risks becoming an over-strident and moralizing critique that laments the loss of an 
engaged citizenry, and lambastes those with power for their greedy manipulation and 
control of the masses. In doing so, it forgets that the task is not to simply represent an 
already existing public, but to also call that public into being. Therefore, when it fails in 
this task it is perhaps tempting for the disillusioned critic to say that people are 
overwhelmed by 'speed' or 'power'. But such a lament cannot be taken seriously for too 
long in case it lulls us into a lamenting apathy that recreates the very conditions it seeks 
to critique by suggesting that there is 'a speed' after which a certain group of people 
become confused, while a privileged few remain able to see through confusion (for a 
critique of this kind of 'threshold' thinking see Derrida 1984; Prendergast 1995 p.190; 
and Bertman 1998 for an example). Such a lament forgets that the critic has to do some 
hard labour to call a public into being under non-ideal conditions, i.e. at speed. We need 
to then return to those non-ideal conditions and ask how a public takes shape, how 
identities form, within spaces that are controlled by high-speed technologies, and within 
everyday routines characterized by fragmentation and change. 
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When we pay attention to how we will call a public into being, rather than thinking about 
the ideal conditions that would maintain a certain kind of public, we are forced to deal 
seriously with the question of mediation. Although mediation is recognized as a key 
characteristic of the modern public sphere, it is often treated as simple transmission of 
information between already existing subjects (Carpignano 1993; Habermas 1994; 
Hartley 1997). This accounts for why mediation is often treated with ambivalence, or 
outright condemnation, as a distortion of communication that that ideally takes place in a 
'Agora-like' setting (even if mediated) (Habermas 1992; Stevenson 1998). However, 
this ambivalence is quickly repressed whenever distortion is understood simply as a 
product of ideological control of the communication networks- i.e. an exclusion from 
the public sphere. In doing so, we retain the agora-like notion of the public sphere, we 
have simply placed a TV or phone in between all participants in the debate. However, as 
Derrida's critique of the primacy of speech over writing (mediation) makes clear, 
mediation is not a distortion of communication, but the very condition of communication 
-even face-to-face communication (Derrida 1998). Communication is always a 
contextual event, it is always sent and received in a medium that takes it beyond the 
intentions of either sender or receiver. There is an intrinsic loss of control. 
This insight into the essentially mediated character of communication has very profound 
implications for our understanding of how the public sphere creates legitimacy, and for 
our understanding of the role ofthe subject and speed in this process. It becomes clear 
that the subject does not exist prior to the reception of the message, which is to say that 
receiving and responding to a piece of information in a given context (a given medium), 
is itself a moment of subjectification. This means, as Warner (2002) argues, a public 
does not exist outside of its circulation. However, mediation must be understood in the 
broadest sense ofthe medium, or space, in which a person encounters a text, image or 
sound (Cavell 2002 p.24,66). This means that there is an inhuman element to the 
formation of public, a conjunction of forces that exceed any given human intention. As a 
result, communication, and the formation of subjectivity, is characterized by 
indeterminacy -all the more so in an age of mass and instantaneous communication. 
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The focus on the medium does not mean that content of a message is irrelevant, nor is it 
to dismiss the ideological restrictions on content, but it does draw out that critical thought 
must consider how changes in mediation changes the kind of subject that emerges, and so 
the role that ideology and belief will play in control. Historical studies of technology and 
culture have powerfully demonstrated how the subject emerges and changes in 
conjunction with different kinds of technology (e.g. Eisenstein 1983 on the printer press; 
Kittler 1986 on typewriters and computers; Crary 1992 on photography). Since the late 
19111 C, in the wake of scientific studies of the psychology of perception, as well as the 
growing popularity oftechnologies of perception such as photography, the stereoscope, 
and eventually film, there has been a cultural awareness that the subject is no longer 
present to themselves, i.e. that there are flows of energy and sensation that run beyond 
conscious perception, but which can nevertheless be harnessed to control the subject 
(Crary 1992; 1999). The technologies used to communicate information are never 
independent ofwhat kind of knowledge is communicated (Eisenstein, 1983; Kittler, 
1986). Today if we consider the life of a particular political claim, we can see that the 
success or failure of a claim to become legitimate is not simply undermined by the 
control of a particular communication medium (e.g. TV) by a particular group, but by the 
failure to control as well. This is a problem for all ideology, no matter what the political 
inclination. Ideology keeps being 'exposed' -a tape gets misplaced revealing an outright 
manipulation of facts, a 'safe' nuclear power plant leaks and contaminates ground water, 
a new scientific paradigm undermines 'fact' (Spinks 2000). These are familiar dynamics 
in a mass mediated society, and it gives rise to a healthy scepticism in all subjects. 
As was noted at the outset, one of symptoms of a public sphere characterized by 'speed' 
is scepticism towards ideology, and a perceived growth in the legitimacy of ideology of 
presentism and individualism. Leaving aside the question of whether or not particular 
ideologies are gaining predominance, we can see now that the scepticism is not strictly 
an outcome of objective speed per se, but of the volatility of subjectivity in a world 
characterized by increasing mediation.' Therefore, it is useful to think in terms oftwo 
1 I prefer the adjective volatile, to the characterization of the subject as fluid or flexible, which still 
connotes a kind of self-present mastery. Similarly volatile is not as definite as absent, the latter claims too 
much and puts us on the road towards a nightmare of cybernetic control. 
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kinds of speed, or better, two different aspects of speed -the actual, or objective speed, 
and the virtual speed of emergence. This distinction is taken from a Deleuzian 
interpretation of Bergson 's notion of time as duration (Anseii-Pearson 2002; Deleuze 
2004 p.22-50). Time as duration is conceived as a continual flow that opens the 
objective bodies of the world to the chaotic, or open, multiplicity from which they 
emerge and are continually returning. In short, any object is but a temporary stability. A 
subjective identity then, is also always only a temporary stability, and it is a matter of 
understanding its conditions of emergence and repetition. 
If we think then, in terms the objective speeds present in the public sphere- e.g. the 
speed of transport, or the transmission of electromagnetic signal - we can see that these 
speeds are dependent on a smooth functioning technical network that maintains a smooth 
passage, and so maintains the integrity of the identity of that which moves within it 
(Latour 1997). Our world is in fact formed of many such networks, and so many speeds; 
the successful coordination of different networks is what allows for a particular 
subjective experience of time (rushed, leisurely, nostalgic etc.). Rather than a subject 
who moves through space and in time, then, we have a subject whose time is assembled 
as a passage through space- we need to talk of an emerging timespace, or temporalized 
space (Crang 2001). If we then return to our consideration ofthe public sphere as 
mediated communication, and keep in mind our understanding of mediation in its 
broadest sense ofthe timespace in which a person moves, we can see that subjectivity, 
and so a public, emerges only temporarily and in repetition, at a conjunction of numerous 
speeds. Here it is clear that 'fast' speeds are crucial for maintaining contemporary 
subjectivities- e.g. the high-speed of telecommunication and transport- as well as for 
insulating them from 'others', but they only do so in conjunction with 'slower' speeds. 
Control is always the control of speeds, in the plural, never a singular dominant speed-
but it is, nevertheless, often an effective control. This is where the virtual speed of 
emergence, or the accident, becomes important. 
A complex temporalized space becomes prone to accidents. Unlike objective speed, 
which can measured, predicted, and often controlled, the accident has a 'virtual speed of 
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emergence' that is 'infinite' and exceeds all objective speeds with its unexpected 
disruption (Virilio 2003). However, an accident is not merely technical, nor is it 
necessarily a negative occurrence- we can have accidents of knowledge (a crisis of faith, 
or a flash of insight, intrusions of memory). What defines an accident is a disruption of 
already recognized, and more or less entrenched, subjectivities and the networks that 
support them. The accident is important because it presents us with a problem and forces 
us to think (Massumi 2002b; Virilio 2003). What the accident signals is that a new set of 
connections has emerged from the chaotic, or open, multiplicity from which recognized 
identities have been formed and stabilized in actual assemblages. This disruption is 
crucial for a critical politics, because it can be used to draw attention to the fact that all 
recognized, or actual, identities are reductions of a much more complex, and virtual, 
reality of which they are only one expression. This does not mean only that the new 
connection needs to be recognized, which would return us to a politics of recognition and 
opposition, but that we need to open subjectivity to a process of becoming by which what 
is, is always becoming-other. A better term, then, for the accident is the event (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994 p.III-113; Stengers 2000 p.66-67). The event is a conjunction of 
virtual forces that is expressed in a particular state of affairs, but is never exhausted, or 
wholly represented by this state of affairs. Therefore, any given occurrence of the event 
signals a much larger potential that cannot be represented - because it does not exist as a 
thing in the real world- but which is nevertheless actually present and opens all 
recognized identities to further becoming. The event does not reveal a problem for 
which there is a solution, but instead makes us aware of a problematic situation for which 
there is not one adequate solution, but which will instead require continual 
experimentation. 
We are now better able to articulate the challenge that faces a politics of becoming. It is 
a question of exploring and engaging in the process by which claims are assembled from 
the event and put into circulation. Chapter two deals with the conceptualization of this in 
detail, but in brief we can consider the public sphere in terms of what Deleuze and 
Guattari ( 1988; Deleuze 1999) call an 'assemblage' that is animated by an 'abstract 
machine', or 'diagram', that translates the event into a text that can be circulated and 
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used in different contexts. The public sphere as 'abstract machine' produces publics-
not just discourse, but subjectivities and spaces brought together in an assemblage that 
sustains a claim, and so makes it legitimate. However, the machine is abstract because it 
exists in the virtual, and because the connections it draws are not pre-determined, but are 
themselves an event. This means that any expression of the public, and its subjectivities, 
are continually prone to disruption. Therefore, for critical thought that seeks to work at 
speed, in the midst of this ongoing assemblage, it is a question of how the continued 
disruption of the event can be used to encourage experimentation with existing identities 
and so draw individuals beyond themselves and into and engagement with their own 
becoming. Becoming signals the continued disruption and reactivation of the event 
beyond any recognized identities, which creates a potential to move beyond what we are, 
and calls on us to become with the event, to respond to it in an ethical manner. 
However, it needs to be stressed that this is not a simple matter of recognition on the part 
of the subject. Becoming is an involuntary process that takes the subject beyond 
themselves despite what their intentions might be- as critics, as embodied humans, we 
do not recognize becoming, but sense its excessive presence above and beyond any 
recognized identity (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 chap. I 0). Therefore, it is never just a 
matter of representing or communicating facts or truth, but of re-activating the event. 
The critic is a witness to the event, and his or her task is to craft a text that will re-
activate the event in different contexts (Massumi 2002a; Dewsbury 2003). However, 
because becoming and the event are nonrepresentable (by definition they are that which 
is always changing), there must be an engagement with an aesthetic dimension- a 
transmission of affects and percepts (sensation) --that allows one to propagate the event. 
As Deleuze and Guattari argue: "Politics operates by macrodecisions and binary choices, 
binarized interests; but the realm of the decidable remains very slim. Political decision 
making necessarily descends into a world of micro-determinations, attractions and 
desires, which it must sound out or evaluate in a different fashion." (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1988 p.221 ). This different evaluation is always an experimental evaluation, for 
we can never be certain that we will succeed in transmitting the event, in re-activating the 
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sense ofthe event, and in doing so make visible the problem the event poses to 
recognized identities, and the desirability of experimenting with one's subjectivity. 
There is no use lamenting these conditions, they are what we are given to work with in 
the contemporary public sphere. Instead, it is necessary to engage in what I call an 
affirmative, or experimental, critique. Rather than following a dialectic critique that 
seeks to synthesize opposition, an experimental critique would follow what Williams 
(2003 p.l9) calls a Deleuzian four-fold dialectic. When one encounters an opposition 
between existing identities, the first move is to critique these identities as partial 
representations of a non-representational reality. This critique of representation is also a 
critique of the control that it legitimates. However, and second, one does not oppose 
these identities with new ones, but explores how these identities emerge within the 
networks and flows that are always both actual and virtual. Third, one shows how these 
conditions are never static, but instead set up a 'search for completeness' - i.e. a process 
of becoming within repetition. Finally, having made identities problematic in our own 
analysis and thought, it is necessary to experiment with how to re-activate this event, and 
so provoke others to explore the limits of existing identities in relation to the problem 
posed by the event. An experimental critique aims to propagate the problem posed by 
the event, not contain it, and so it encourages and validates a vital experimentation with, 
and belief in, the world as given (Deleuze 1995 p.l76). 
In the second half of the thesis, I will engage in an experimental critique in relation to 
smog-events and the politics of air quality in Toronto. Smog is of interest in a discussion 
of speed, politics and becoming for two key reasons. First, speed is necessary for the 
control of smog, whether this be through attempts to displace pollution in space and time, 
or whether it is to monitor and control the sources of pollution in an attempt to maintain 
safe air quality. Therefore, speed is central to assembling an identity for smog as air 
quality, and for assembling (ir)responsible identities in relation to mitigating air 
pollution. However, and second, smog is never completely captured by this process of 
assembling, but remains disruptive within everyday routines. Therefore, smog is of 
interest because it provides an example of how subjectivities are not only formed in 
13 
repetition in an assemblage, but also how disruption opens the assemblage to becoming. 
Smog is an example of a political issue that intrudes into the routines of everyday life, 
routines that are supported and disciplined by the multiple speeds and temporalities of 
the contemporary city. The thesis is not an attempt to resolve the best course of action 
for improving air quality in Toronto, but is instead an example of an attempt to intervene 
(however humbly) in an appositional political field 'at speed'. 
The use of smog as an example also reflects my own interest in environmental politics, 
but it does not represent an engagement in the debates in critical ecology that focus on 
the social construction of nature, or the public perception of ecological issues (e.g. 
Demeritt, 200 I, 2002; Castree, 2003; Bulkeley, 2000, 2003). Critical ecology represents 
a different project than the one being presented here, because this literature is focused on 
how ecological claims are constructed and recognized, whereas I am interested in how 
these claims create a potential that moves beyond recognized positions. In chapter four I 
examine the assemblage of a measure of air quality, but my purpose is not to critique 
construction of the knowledge claim, but to explore how this creates a potential for the 
actualization of a public. Similarly, in chapter five I engage with how a subject can 
respond to claims about air quality, but I do not claim to be representing a public, but 
presenting the potential that is created by the circulation of air quality claims, and which 
goes beyond recognized positions. The point of contact between critical ecology and 
what I am doing is in its normative claims that ecological politics should remain open to 
the uncertainty and eventfulness of the nature-culture interface. I begin with this ethical 
premise, and explore how the smog-event, as a daily and ongoing disruption within the 
urban routines, creates a problem that challenges us to think about our ability to contain 
and isolate ourselves, and the consequences of our actions; in doing so it offers an 
opportunity to open public discourse to a process of becoming that searches for a way of 
living that does justice to an event that signals the limits of control. 
Chapter four looks at the machinic production of the smog public(s) through the 
construction of an air quality index, and the system of control and monitoring it 
necessitates. Here we will see that speed is both essential for the capture of the smog-
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event, and that smog continues to escape and be disruptive. The eventfulness of the 
smog-event is transferred through science into the public sphere where it is manifest as 
an inability to legitimately finalize a 'safe' air quality threshold. This raises questions 
about what kind of control is legitimate, because control of smog also necessitates 
control of the urban population. As a result, the formation of a public around a particular 
claim about how to provide 'safe' air remains an eventful and indeterminate process. 
In chapter five, building on interviews conducted in Toronto, I explore the indeterminacy 
of forming a public in more detail. I look at how the disruption of the smog-event enters 
into everyday routine, and the moral quandary it presents to the subject as they try to 'be 
efficient' with their energy use in order to 'do their part' to reduce smog. As a first pass, 
I present the subject as a 'body-without-organs' (BwO), open to its 'milieu', and argue 
that the subject here encounters smog first as an intensity or force. The subject as BwO 
is conceived as creating a 'plane of consistency' that is disrupted by the added intensity 
of smog, and which then creates a potential for change, or for a reactive turn away from 
the smog-event. The concept of a BwO presents a subject that is opened to the smog-
event, but how a person responds to this disruption is also dependent on how they 
negotiate the discipline required to 'be efficient'. As a second pass, I explore how the 
intensities and forces that define the body-without-organs become expressive as a 
territory, in which a subject can be recognized as (ir)responsible. This territory is not 
fixed, but is continually being re-defined as a subject negotiates what is 'reasonable' in a 
particular context. I argue that in both these aspects we can see how smog creates a 
problem for maintaining a stable subjectivity, which in turn allows us to see that the 
subject is always exceeded by a process of becoming. 
This excess can then be used to problematize the dynamics of control in modern 
societies. However, making control problematic requires that moments of disruption are 
used to animate and give force to critiques of control in the public sphere. Therefore, in 
chapter six I look at how one might do this in the case of encouraging a public open to 
experimenting with transportation reform (one ofthe key reforms in a smog politics). In 
order to do this, the opposition between already recognized road users must be diffused 
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and opened to becoming. I therefore engage with the opposition between cyclists and 
drivers on the streets of Toronto. I argue that in the everyday conflict between cyclists 
and car drivers negotiating the congested streets, the identities of both are opened to 
becoming-other as the question of freedom in mobility becomes problematized. I engage 
with photographs take by participants in Toronto, as well as the art of Martha Rosier and 
Rainer Ganahl, in order to discuss and evaluate ways that this becoming can be 
productively mobilized in the public sphere to destabilize existing identities and 
encourage experimentation with different forms of mobility. 
The politics of becoming will prove frustrating for some readers, especially if they are 
searching for a resolution or adjudication of political claims. The theoretical path 
followed here does not offer any solutions, but instead magnifies and propagates the 
disruptive event and the difficulty of capturing and containing that event in any particular 
political claim. This is not, however, a lament for a lost subject, nor a celebration of the 
potential of a more volatile subject. It is instead a sober, but hopeful, engagement with 
the conditions under which politics- and so critical theory-- must take place today. It is 
still possible to have a critical engagement with a world characterized by flux, change 
and volatile subjecitivities, but it must also be accompanied by a sober recognition of the 
continual labour, and risks, attendant in assembling and sustaining a truth claim that can 
remain ethically responsive to changing events. The world is always excessive to 
representational capture, and so part of the role of a critical theory must be to embrace 
this excess and encourage us to open ourselves, our theory and our politics, to becoming. 
In this way we start to develop a critical theory that is able to think at speed. 
The thesis is structured as three purely theoretical chapters, followed by three chapters 
that provide examples of how the event is captured and how we can think about how to 
re-activate the event through an experimental critique. Chapter one explores in more 
detail the argument concerning the limits of an appositional politics, or politics of 
recognition, in a world characterized by speed and change. Crucial here are the 
arguments about the importance of mediation in the public sphere, and how this creates 
the conditions for experimentation with recognized identities within circulation and 
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repetition. The loss of self-presence needs to be affirmed as the conditions for 
transformation, and the stakes of political practice. The next two chapters move away 
from this theoretical normative critique and describe in more detail the mechanics of an 
experimental critique as it will be applied in this thesis. Chapter two develops the 
conceptualization of the public sphere as an abstract machine, or diagram, that assembles 
publics by sustaining a conjunction between discursive and material assemblages. Here 
the key argument concerns drawing attention to the multiple networks that sustain a 
public, and the importance of the accident in drawing critical thought towards thinking 
the event, and how it could be re-assembled. Chapter three addresses how an affirmative 
critique must engage a 'non-representational' approach to its field of enquiry, since 
becoming- by its very definition- is beyond representation (always in process of 
becoming). This is important, because I am not providing a narrative of how people in 
Toronto are responding (or should respond) to smog-events, but am using my 
interventions with the smog-event as examples of how to use theoretical concepts to re-
activate the event and encourage a process of becoming; this is an intervention in the 
public sphere (however limited). The chapters that deal with the smog-event in Toronto 
then echo the purely theoretical arguments of the first half of the thesis. Chapter four 
shows how the creation of air quality indices is central to the machinic production of 
subjectivity and control. Chapter five uses interview material to explore the process of 
becoming that is set in process during the repeated encounters between bodies, smog-
events, and the moral claim to be efficient. Chapter six explores how we can experiment 
with becoming in order to try to channel it towards progressive ends. The goal is to 
provide an example of how we can think within the event, and so at speed; I stress the 
indeterminacy of this process, and so hopefully encourage readers to experiment with 
their own becoming in different contexts. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SPEED AND A POLITICS OF BECOMING 
... Fitzgerald says that there is another type of cracking ... Instead of great breaks 
these are micro-cracks, as in a dish; they are much more subtle and supple and 
occur when things are going well on the other side ... But what exactly 
happened? In truth nothing assignable or perceptible: molecular changes, 
redistributions of desire such that when something occurs, the self that waited it 
is already dead, or the one that would await it has not yet arrived ... The crack up 
"happens almost without your knowing it but is realized suddenly 
indeed" ... This molecular line, more supple but no less disquieting, in fact, much 
more disquieting, is not simply internal or personal: it also brings everything 
into play, but on a different scale and in different forms, with segmentations of a 
different nature .... A micropolitics. 
Deleuze and Guattari ( 1988 p. 199) 
The theme of speed and politics is never raised when everything is moving along as it 
should, it is raised in times of perceived crisis and confusion - Deleuze and Guattari 
have captured its essence well in the question 'what happened?' It is in the rush to 
figure out what has happened, and to propose what we should do, that the question of 
speed creeps in. Speed is what prevents us from acting as we should or from being able 
to diagnose what happened. It is all going too fast. Therefore, unsurprisingiy, there is a 
sense of urgency to discussions about speed, a sense that we should not only 'mount the 
barricades', but also that we better do it in a hurry before it's too late and all is lost. 
Countering this stance- or perhaps conjured up in the minds of those who would have 
us believe they have the solutions -- are those who have given up on trying to figure out 
what happened, and have retreated from public engagement. Neither stance, it must be 
noted, addresses the question of 'what happened?' -one has rushed to answer with pre-
given concepts and solutions that may not apply to the new event, the other has given up 
trying to understand. If we are to think about speed, then, we have to get beyond this 
clamouring duality. As Bennington says: 
... what is urgent is to hold up against urgency so as to think it, to be 
patient enough with the emergency to do its urgency justice by not just 
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running with it: the thinking of urgency will, then, also be a thinking of 
the resistance to urgency. (Bennington 1998) 
Resisting urgency, however, does not mean 'slowing down'. It is necessary to act at 
speed, but to not get carried away by speed and so recreate the very conditions one 
hopes to critique. In this chapter, then, I want to review how we can think critically at 
speed by moving critical thought away from a political analysis that is focussed solely 
on the moment of opposition and decision-making, towards one that pays attention to the 
processes by which appositional identities 'crack-up' and create an opportunity to 
experiment with what happened, i.e. respond to the event. 
This chapter will move in three broad passes; it begins by reviewing some of the 
contemporary literature that has once again raised the issue of speed as a problem for 
democratic politics. Speed as a problem for politics is, of course, not a new theme in 
modern thought; the problem of speed is conceived of as a problem of the political 
subject's ability to represent a world of flux and change, and so engage critically in 
democratic debate. However, ifthis has been a recurring theme throughout modern 
thought, why should we believe that today we have reached a 'new speed' after which it 
will become impossible for a critical subject to emerge? The focus on the unity of the 
subject, along with the threshold thinking of a 'new' speed, creates an undue urgency 
that recreates the very conditions it seeks to criticize. It is necessary, then, to consider 
how the subject emerges at speed within political struggles. In the second pass, I argue 
that twentieth century critical theory has accepted modernity's (or better, modernities') 
temporal complexity, and the loss of self-presence it entails. It can be read as an 
exploration into how the subject then emerges within social and material opposition 
between (always partial) subjectivities, leading to a dialectical recovery of presence and 
reason. However, in the absence of the ideal conditions under which such a synthesis 
could take place, politics risks being dominated by powerful interests- a domination 
that today is seen to rely on the spaces and times of segregation, surveillance and control 
made possible by high-speed technologies. Critical thinking is haunted by the fact that 
in practice there is no necessary reason for partial subjectivities to give way in 
opposition to synthesis rather than seeking domination, and critical theory can only 
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counter this with normative statements that risk leading us back to a premising political 
intervention on the will of a self-present political subject. Therefore, in the third pass, I 
argue that critical thought is faced with the task of conceiving how the subject changes 
'behind' the recognized conditions that lead to oppositions. Here we are searching for 
how to open the subject to the eventfulness that characterizes a world of multiple speeds. 
This requires that we think again about the mediation of the public sphere; thinking 
about mediation makes us foreground the processes that in-form subjectivity in an 
assemblage of the material, social and psychic, and it provides grounds for intervention 
in its formation and change. Intervening in this process of de-subjectification is what I 
call an affirmative and experimental critique - it does not seek to re-ground the subject, 
but engage with encouraging change 'at speed'. 
The narrative of speed, first pass: threshold speed and the absence of the 
political subject. 
Raising the question of speed and politics today may strike the reader as a particularly 
timely question, seeing as we live in the so-called digital age of'instantaneous' 
communication (Gleick 2000; 2002). However, concerns with the impact of speed on 
politics have a long history in modern critical thought, and we need to ask what it is 
today that makes us think again about speed, and makes us think that our new speeds are 
something to be concerned about. The key symptom that raises the alarm bells in the 
literature reviewed here, is that politics and critical thought seem powerless to stop the 
rise of ideologies that legitimate neo-liberal globalization; either ideologies that express 
a kind of resigned legitimation that we live in the 'best of all possible worlds', or which 
express an outright celebration ofthe individual over the social (Bertman 1998; Sennett 
1998; Bauman 2000; 2000; Yirilio 2000; Zawadzki 2002). Zawadzki usefully 
summarizes these as concerns with ideologies of 'presentism' and 'individualism'. With 
regard to the first, it is argued that we live in a 'landscape of events' (Virilio), amongst a 
flood of facts and norms, and individuals have stopped trying to make sense ofthe world 
and believe in a coherent vision ofthe future (Virilio 2000; Zawadzki 2002). This is 
accompanied by an awareness ofthe horrors of past history, which triggers a 'politics of 
debt' that does not aim to articulate a vision for the future, but simply to compensate 
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those who have been (and will be) harmed (Zawadzki, 2002 p.l9). This is a melancholic 
politics that Yirilio captures in the image of Benjamin's angelus novus who is dragged 
backwards into the future, unable to see what will come, eyes fixed on a past 
characterized in terms of carnage and destruction ( cf Lash 1998). 
In such a situation, where ideology abandons the future, political discourse becomes 
impatient and urgent, it wants everything and it wants it now. This is also a politics of 
individualism, again for reasons that are claimed to be related to speed. In an 
increasingly harried everyday existence, people fail to reflect on the more persistent pain 
and suffering of others, stuck as they are in the 'solitude of speed' everyone else appears 
to be 'on another planet' (Zawadzki 2002 p.23; Bauman, 2000; Sennett, 1998). 
However, as Zawadzki points out, this is not to say that people simply don't 'have time', 
but relating back to the concern with presentism, it is a concern that time has been 
drained of any social or progressive vision. Hence, leisure time is 'time to kill' or 'time 
Jo spend', and to say that one has 'no time' is in this ideological frame, to say that 'you 
do not interest me' or that without a belief in the future one is literally 'out of time' .1 
Therefore, Bauman (2000) characterizes the politics of 'fluid modernity' as a 'peg 
politics', a politics characterized by a lack of coherent vision, and in which people have 
increasingly adopted the mentality of the tenant in a caravan park- i.e. concerned only 
1 This ideological reading of time-scarcity is important, because we do not want to imply that if people 
simply had 'more time' they would engage in more critical political reflection (holding all other variables 
stable- e.g. education, religious devotion etc.). And even if we suspect that this might be an outcome of 
work-time reform, it is worth noting that the evidence as to whether or not people actually have 'less time' 
is mixed. Some portions of the labour market are indeed working more hours, in particular professionals 
and those who are working two or more part-time jobs. However, the evidence of a time-squeeze is 
ambiguous- while some are working more, on average there is a convergence in the work-time/leisure 
time split in western industrial countries towards an increase in leisure (with the exception of the US and 
UK) (Gershuny, 2001 ). Within this trend, however, there is a gendered component as it would seem 
women are still assuming the bulk of domestic tasks, which would add to their time burden (Hareven, 
1991, Nowotny, 1994, Kay, 1998, Davies, 200 I). In addition, there is some evidence that in a dispersed 
city commuting is taking up more time (Pooley and Turn bull, 1999, Jarvis et. al. 200 I). Nevertheless, 
some studies have shown that those who are working longer hours are still making time for social 
activities and leisure, for example by paying for housekeeping services (Roberts, 2002). In short, the 
evidence on work-time and time-stress is mixed. However, the more fundamental critique is to ask why 
would 'more time' of 'more security' change people's attitudes towards dominant ideologies. Certainly 
politics has taken place in more time-scarce and unstable times. lt is this assumption of a correlation 
between a specific experience of time and space and a commitment to an ideology that needs to be 
clarified before one engages in empirical critique looking at time use and politics. 
21 
with preserving the services that affect them personally, and should these decline, they 
will simply move on (if they can). 
In summary, then, the question of speed and politics today, is posed as a question of the 
fragmentation of temporal experience and the proliferation of times- not of one 
universal acceleration, but of a universal qualitative shift in the experience of time. 
Politically, the question of speed is posed here as a problem for ideology (not of 
ideology), it raises the question of whether it is possible today to oppose dominant 
ideologies with a counter-ideology that articulates a coherent vision of the future, and 
without such a coherent vision it fears that democracy will have been set adrift, unable 
to counter the will of the most powerful groups in society. However, we have to slow 
down so as not to get carried away by this narrative of speed. In particular, we need to 
question the importance placed on the will and self-presence ofthe individual subject as 
an explanation for the legitimacy of particular ideologies. In addition we need to 
question the idea that we have somehow reached a 'new speed' after which it would no 
longer be possible to create a critical public- why should we think the task of forming a 
critical public is more difficult today? 
A more sober assessment ofthe impact of speed and mobility would remind us that such 
a wilful political imaginary has been in crisis for some time. We can find similar 
concerns at least as far back as the work of J.J. Rousseau; in his novel, The New Eloise, 
we find the young hero St. Preux, overwhelmed by the constant flux he encounters upon 
entering the city: 
I'm beginning to feel the drunkenness that this agitated, tumultuous life 
plunges you into. With such a multitude of objects passing before my eyes, 
I 'm getting dizzy. Of all the things that strike me, there is not one that holds 
my heart, yet all of them together disturb my feelings, so that I forget what I 
am and who I belong to. 
(quoted in Berm an 1982 p. 18) 
And as Prendergast ( 1995 p.l2-13) has noted, the question of identity and belonging are 
raised as a political question: 
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The existential problem of 'belonging' in and to the city described by 
Saint-Preux was also a political problem, a politics of belonging. Much 
of the argument of Du contra! social turns on the claim that in the 
modern city (unlike smaller ancient city-state) there is no social and 
material base for the reinvention of the ideals of the polis. The difficultly 
of being a citizen in the modern world is essentially that there are no 
cities ... in which to exercise the virtues of citizenship. The problem of 
'representing' the city as a coherent and intelligible space thus becomes 
associated with the problem of representation in the city. 
In St. Preux's dilemma we see encapsulated the belief that being able to tell a coherent 
narrative about oneself and one's community is an important precursor to political 
engagement- one must belong before one engages politically (Matteson 1998; Passy 
and Giugni 2000; Putnam, 2000). However, by premising politics on a self-present 
identity (a coherent selt), and then lamenting its absence, this kind of narrative only 
serves to contribute to the situation it hopes to intervene in (Prendergast 1995 p.l90). In 
particular, it fails to address the problem of an identity that must be created within 
fragmentation and speed. 
Even in critics who accept a model of the subject as formed in relational, material and 
dialogical encounters, there is tendency when talking about speed to revert to the idea of 
subjects who are able to will themselves back to a self-present attention- as if they still 
subscribed to a simplified idea of alienation in which modernity imposes a kind of 
illusion on top of a more authentic self. Berman writes that" ... the great modernists of 
the nineteenth century all attack this environment [of constant flux] passionately, and 
strive to tear it down or explode it from within; yet all find themselves remarkably at 
home in it, alive to its possibilities, affirmative even of their radical negations, playful 
and ironic even in their moments of gravest seriousness and depth" (ibid. p.l9). Today, 
as well we can here echoes of the belief in the need for this critical will when Harvey 
writes "we have to learn how to cope with an overwhelming sense of compression of our 
spatial and temporal worlds" (Harvey 1989 p.241 ), or when Melucci (2000) calls for a 
'playing self' that is able to respond ethically to the world in flux. However, by 
theorizing about the reasons why a critical subject is absent, without any engagement 
23 
with how we might re-create such a subjectivity at speed, critical theory culminates in a 
kind of critical anxiety, and sense of powerless urgency, about the ability of the subject 
to 'recognize' the predicament that they are in. 
The urgency created by the lost subject is intensified by the idea that 'we' have reached 
a new (universal) speed. As Derrida, argues, the question of speed is often posed in the 
following way: 
Are we having, today, another, a different experience of speed? ls our 
relation to time and to motion qualitatively different? Or must we speak 
prudently of an extraordinary -although qualitatively homogeneous -
acceleration ofthe same experience? (Derrida 1984 p.20) 
In posing the question this way, we are asked to choose between saying that everything 
is the same, or that we have passed a threshold into a 'new' speed, a new overwhelming 
experience of time. However, Derrida continues by noting that this dichotomy is far too 
simplistic: 
And what temporality do we have in mind when we put the question that 
way? Can we take the question seriously without re-elaborating all the 
problematics of time and motion, from Aristotle to Heidegger by way of 
Augustine, Kant, Husserl, Einstein, Bergson, and so on? So my first 
formulation of the question of speed was too simplistic. It opposed 
quantity and quality as if a quantitative transformation- the crossing of 
certain thresholds of acceleration within the general machinery of a 
culture, with all it techniques for handling, recording, and storing 
information -could not induce qualitative mutations, as if every 
invention were not the invention of a process of acceleration or, at the 
very least, a new experience of speed. Or as if the concept of speed, 
linked to some quantification of objective velocity, remained within a 
homogeneous relation to every experience of time- for the human 
subject or for a mode oftemporalization that the human subject- as such 
-would have himself covered up. (ibid. p.20) 
In other words, in the threshold idea of a 'new speed' we have the idea that the subject 
exists as it always has, but it now must manage to do everything 'faster' (a quantitative 
transformation that does not induce qualitative mutations), or that a change in objective 
speed results in a universal qualitative change. But, of course, the relation between 
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objective speed and the qualitative, or phenomenal, experience oftime is not so simple, 
nor is it all at universal (we will return to discuss temporal complexity in more detail in 
chapter two). By drawing attention to the 'machinery of a culture' Derrida draws 
attention to the materiality of speed and the fact that we live in a world of multiple 
speeds and so experiences oftime (Latour 1997). However, this complexity of time 
must be suppressed in the narrative of speed outlined above, because the notion of a 
universal experience of time supports the notion that there is a universal and essential 
human subject- a human as such in the enlightenment tradition- who is overwhelmed 
and lost at a 'new' speed. 
Therefore, the narrative of speed outlined here moves too quickly on two grounds. First, 
in positing a wilful and self-present subject as the motor force for a critical politics, and 
second by suggesting that today we would have reached a 'new speed' that somehow 
makes critical self-presence impossible to achieve for most. Because of these 
shortcomings, the critique of speed remains very much on a normative plane, lamenting 
the presence of ideologies it does not agree with, but offering little in terms of 
constructive advice of how one might intervene, or why speed should be a hindrance in 
the struggle to question these ideologies. It creates urgency. 
The narrative of speed, second pass: the loss of ideal conditions for dialectical 
synthesis and the impasse of 'hard' opposition 
If we read past the initial urgency in these concerns about speed, we can read these 
narratives more sympathetically as pointing towards the need for a critical theory that 
thinks about the conditions that are needed to sustain a progressive opposition to 
dominant ideologies. Picking up on this thread we can come at concerns about speed 
from a more productive angle through critical theorization of how speed impacts the 
public sphere as the realm where ideology is legitimated. The concept of the public 
sphere provides a bridge to cross between, on the one hand, a normative concern ofthe 
dominance of a particular ideology, and on the other hand, the need to engage with the 
processes and material conditions for making critique visible and legitimate within 
different experiences oftime. Habermas' seminal work The Structural Transformation 
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of the Public Sphere ( 1992) moves democratic politics beyond the idea of direct 
participation in decision-making (Calhoun, 1994). Through the public sphere, politics 
moves into the everyday sphere, where 'the public' negotiates what is reasonable and 
legitimate. This is crucial for the discussion of speed, because it provides a link between 
the experience of temporal multiplication and fragmentation in everyday life, and the 
concerns raised above about the political legitimacy of ideology. By unpacking the 
process through which legitimacy is sustained, we can move the discussion of speed 
away from a lament for lost subject, and towards a consideration how ideologies, and the 
subjectivities they express, emerge and change at speed. 
The key dynamic of the public sphere is that of making and sustaining a public identity 
(Habermas 1992). The public sphere gives expression to identities that emerge within 
material conditions of everyday life and, ideally, results in the recognition of their 
claims. Politics can then be understood as a process of 'naming' and calling a public 
into being (Bourdieu 1984). Critique ofthe public sphere is almost always of its 
ideological exclusions, and focuses on the process through which recognized norms of 
publicity and privacy can be continually challenged and redefined through the inclusion 
of new identities (e.g. Young 1990; Mouffe 1993; Calhoun 1994; Fraser 1994; Coo le 
2000). Habermas coneptualizes this process of contestation as an institutional (here in 
its broadest sense to include, for example, print media) and dialogical setting, which 
would follow a strict code of 'discourse ethics' to ensure all voices were heard (Kearney 
1986).2 It is understood that this ideal discursive realm is an ideal to be worked towards. 
With more pragmatic and immediate concerns in mind radical democratic thought 
moves the appositional dynamic of the public sphere out of institutional settings and 
recognizes "an aspect of civic engagement in persistent struggles to maintain workable 
identities ... We can think instead of civic engagement as more pervasive and 
differentiated with respect to locale; it arises in connection with many aspects of 
, 
- Flyvbjerg ( 1998b) summarizes the requirements of the ideal speech situation as follows: I) No party 
affected by what is being discussed should be excluded from the discourse (the requirement of generality); 
2) all participants should have equal possibility to present and criticize validity claims in the process of 
discourse (autonomy); 3) participants must be willing and able to empathize with each other's validity 
claims (ideal role taking); 4) existing power differences between participants must be neutralized such that 
those differences have no effect on the creation of consensus (power neutrality); and 5) participants must 
openly explain their goals and intentions and in this connection desist from strategic action (transparence). 
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everyday life ... " (Shapiro 1997 p.38; see also Rasmussen and Brown 2002). While 
Habermas' dialogism requires a discourse ethics, radical democracy requires an ethic of 
'agonistic pluralism' whereby recognized subjectivities must be open to revisiting the 
terms of the hegemonic consensus in the face of claims from new identities (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe 1993; Gilbert 2002). 
Having given this brief overview ofthe normative role given to the public sphere in 
critical theory, we need to consider how the multiplications of speeds is understood to 
disrupt, or delegitimate, the process of identity formation and legitimation. The 
dominant narrative that I want to review in this regard is of the loss of centrality, or the 
dispersion ofthe city into what Castells has characterized as a 'space of flows' (Castells 
1989 p.341; see also Bauman 2000). As we saw above, the spaces of the city are 
important for the public sphere, because it is in the encounters in such spaces that 
identities form and are recognized. Public space also provides an opportunity to 
encounter and learn from difference, or less ideally, to be forced to accommodate 
difference (e.g. Sennett 1970; 1977; 1994; Mitchell 1995; Light and Smith 1998; Copjec 
and Sorkin 1999; 1999; Sorkin 1999; Bickford 2000). However, high-speed 
communication, transportation and surveillance technologies have been critiqued for 
allowing a more segregated urban form to develop; the high-speed city is negatively 
characterized by gated-communities, gentrification, suburbanization and the 
militarization and surveillance of city space-- all of which has bee associated with the 
marginalization or even criminalization of difference and poverty. (Zukin 1995; 
Merrifield and Swyngedouw 1997; Davis 1999). However, we must bear in mind that 
the spaces of the city have always been policed, and the idea of the inclusive city square 
of renaissance Europe, or the Agora of the Greek city are more ideal representation than 
reflections of an inclusive reality (Virilio 1987; Martinotti 1999; !sin 2002). Therefore, 
the question asked today is whether high-speed technologies make this control more 
difficult to challenge and subvert. 
Certainly critics such as Paul Virilio believe that the contemporary urban forms and 
temporalities are eroding the conditions for democratic politics: 
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Ubiquity, instantaneity, the populating of time supplants the populating of 
space ... the end of the unity of place of the old political theatre of the city, 
and its imminent replacement by the unity of time, a chronopolitics of 
intensivity and interactivity, 'technicity' succeeding the continuity [la 
tongue duree] ofthe City ... the current metropolitan reorganization tends 
toward the definitive disarmament of the conjunctive system of civil 
society, the unity of neighbourhoods, the family unit, the very possibility 
of opposition whatsoever to oppression ... the totalitarian unity advances 
masked by the progress of technologies- civil and military technologies 
·which have little to do with democracy. (Virilio, 1998 #207 p.58, 61, 63 
all italics and parentheses in original) 
For Yirilio the modern city does not work by containment, but by controlling movement 
so that there will always be a smooth uninterrupted passage that keeps the subject 
disciplined. With less hyperbole, Auge ( 1995) makes a similar critique of the more 
mundane 'non-spaces' ofthe modern city, such as airports or freeways, in which he 
argues we have no symbolic codes to provides us with bearings for interaction, 
exploration and appropriation, but only commands that tell where, when and how to 
move and consume (Exit, Luggage Pickup, Keep Right, Mind the Gap, Just do It, Buy 
Gas Here, Historic Monument next Exit etc.). On the one hand, then, the concern with 
speed here is with a purely logistical control of anticipation and interception, but on the 
other hand, control also works by modifying what is recognized as possible. Yirilio 
argues that the subject loses stable references in a space of intensivity, and there fore has 
no grounds by which to compare alternatives and make critical choices (Yirilio, 1997; 
Yirilio, 2000). 
However, in characteristic fashion, Yirilio's adopts a conscious strategy of presenting 
the worst-case scenario as a way of alerting us to the potential risks (Armitage 1999; 
Zurbrugg 200 I). What's missing, then, is any sense that the high-speeds also allow for 
unprecedented connection and coordination -and indeed comparison -- that cannot be 
wholly controlled by the state or any other actor (Thrift, 1996a; Connolly 2002). 
Activists and counter-pub! ics are showing that it is possible to create spaces of encounter 
within the dispersed and mobile city and so maintain an identity in the public sphere 
(Doron 2000; Barry 200 I; Porter 200 I). Here it is not just a matter of using 
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communication technologies to make a media event, but of taking advantage ofthe 
multiple temporal rhythms in the fragmented city to find 'slow spaces' that allow for 
encounter (Bell and Leong 1998; Leong, 1998). In this context, we need to think about 
what potentials exist for creating public spaces starting from our present situation, rather 
than premising the vibrancy of the public sphere on a largely non-existent ideal (Betsky 
1998; Lerup 2000; Teyssot 2000). 
In this framework what is retained is the ideal that space should allow for an overlap 
between public and private, such that the two terms loose their fixed categorisation and 
can be transformed. Teyssot argues that we need to think of thresholds and passages 
whereby what is internal (private) folds into the external (public) and vice versa (Kilian 
1998; Crang 2000). This much more fluid and mobile norm for public space moves us 
away from thinking of defined spaces towards emergent spaces of encounter. Lars 
Lerup (2000) evokes such a folded space in the daily commute: 
Driving the freeway you may see a lone observer. Just as you begin the 
descent into the canyon [where the road drops below grade] the observer 
looks right at you, then down at you, until he disappears above you. 
Invariably they are alone, often leaning on the balustrade, not moving. 
Or they walk back and forth, agitated, gesturing, and since their mouths 
seem to open and close- their heads are turning fast, back and forth, up 
and down- they may be screaming, or haranguing you. You cannot hear. 
They are the overpass people. Where they come from, who they are, no 
one seems to know .... For us, the drivers of the superhighway, they are 
the others. Those who have time to spare. Those who don't have to 
(bikes are often held or parked next to the observer). Those who don't. 
Those who refuse. Not the leisure class, not the vagrants, maybe the 
mad, but mostly those who fall in between, those who refuse to be 
counted. We need them to remind us hat all is not speed and progress 
(pp. 62-63). 
In this example we see not only a folding of private (the car, the commute) and public, 
but also that the encounter is fleeting and its politics are ambiguous- there is no clear 
message imparted. However, in its repetition this kind of encounter can serve as the 
grounds for creating political claims, and as the spur that starts individuals asking 
questions and seeking answers. Such encounters act as a 'shock to thought' that works 
29 
as much (if not more) on an affective register, as they do on a cognitive level (Deutsche, 
1996, 1999; Massumi 2002a; 2002b ). There is clearly a great degree of uncertainty 
associated with such encounters; the circulation of a message is always prone to 
disruption or diversion. However, this is just to stress again the result of speed is 
ambivalent, it creates very time sensitive spaces, or what Crang has called temporalized 
space (Crang 2001). I will return to discuss the nature ofthe encounters in these fleeting 
spaces in more detail below and in subsequent chapters. However, what I want to stress 
here is that in the contemporary city, public identities are not confined to any one place, 
identities emerge and are sustained in repetition at the intersection of the different 
rhythms in the city (Lefebvre 1996 p. 228). 
The ambivalent fluidity in urban space has implications for the normative model of the 
public sphere set out above. In particular, it becomes apparent that the meeting of 
identities in opposition need not lead to a synthesis, but can also lead to an unbridled 
attempt at domination, materialized in spatial control and exclusion. What speed 
exposes then, are the limits of a normative conception and critique of the public sphere 
as dialectical synthesis based on agonistic encounters (Deleuze 1986 p.147; Sloterdijk 
1987 p.367; Robbins, 1993; Flyvbjerg, 1998a). Theoretically opposition is suppose to 
lead to a 'higher' synthesis (or even hegemonic synthesis), and when this doesn't happen 
critical theory works to expose the partiality of dominant interests, and so expose them 
to an ethical and normative critique seeking expanded recognition and inclusion. This is 
not, of course, an ineffective strategy and often works to force the dominant party to 
accommodate the demands that have been made public. However, in adopting a strategy 
that 'blames' the dominant identity, political action can also prompt a reaction that 
attempts to avoid or contain the disruptive element. These are familiar dynamics in a 
democratic politics, but it shows the essentially reactive and conservative nature of 
politics based in a dialectics of recognition and opposition- this is not to dismiss the 
need at times for reaction, or that it is sometimes desirable to preserve what is, but it 
does reveal important limits of this approach to politics for a critique concerned with 
coming to terms with speed and temporal complexity. 
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The reactive dynamics of the dialectic shows why it is ill suited for a political analysis 
concerned with speed. First, we can see that dialectics creates a politics that this is never 
'at the right speed'- from the point of view of the dominant identity, change is always 
'too slow' (unreasonable resistance), while from the point ofview of a dominated, or 
marginalized group, change is always 'too fast' (insufficient consultation, imposition).3 
This creates urgency that is compounded by the fact that the dialectical synthesis re-
introduces the wilful subject into political analysis. While the subject is formed in 
opposition and discourse, it is still the will of the subject once formed that drives politics 
and that becomes the target for critique (Lekhi and Fiser 200 I; Sloterdijk, 1987). In 
dialectical critique the critique of power is always a critique of those whose will power 
expresses. As a result, when it comes to the analysis of speed, a dialectical critique risks 
returning to the undue urgency diagnosed above that laments the fact that subject does 
not 'recognize' justice, truth etc. -the 'wrong speed' is willed by the dominant half of 
the dialectic. The problem of speed gets missed here, because it becomes once again a 
problem of the subject, framed as a problem of who controls speed, while not providing 
us with any analysis of how we might work within speed without waiting for the 
recognition ofthose who have power. 
A second, and related, reason dialectical critique is insufficient for a political analysis 
concerned with speed is because it is based on 'recognition', and so is not well equipped 
to deal with novelty. A politics of recognition is always about the redistribution of 
existing resources and values: 
When we make power an object of representation [i.e. something we 
recognize c.o] we necessarily make it dependent upon the factor 
according to which a thing is represented or not, recognised or not. Now, 
only values which are already current, only accepted values, give criteria 
of recognition in this way. The will to power, understood as the will to 
get oneself recognised, is necessarily the will to have the values current in 
a given society attributed to oneself (power, money, honours 
reputation) ... What seems symptomatic in this philosophy of the will is 
3 We can imagine different combinations of this dualism that produce the same point: e.g. dominant 
groups can 'stall' making change 'too slow'- the point is it is that the dialectic is a thoroughly reactive 
view of politics. 
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conformism, absolute misrecognition of the will to power as creation of 
new values (Deleuze 1986 p.81-82). 
A dialectical and appositional concept of political struggle is ill suited to answer the 
question 'what happened?'- the question which at the outset we suggested was the 
essence of the problem of speed. What if something truly novel has happened, what if it 
is not just a question of redistributing existing resources, but of a creating a new values 
(e.g. as some suggest with ecological politics)? If we ask what those values would be, 
the answer is that we don't know. They are precisely indiscernible at this point in time, 
we sense a need for them, but cannot 'recognize' them in a concrete articulation of what 
we should do. This is precisely the kind of question raised by a world characterized by 
speed and recurring accidents (Virilio 2003). As Virilio says: 
Our generation has to return to questions. Why? Because the preceding 
generation had all the solutions- the economic solution through 
capitalism and the consumer society; the political solution through 
Marxism or capitalism; the military solution through dissuasion. All the 
solutions were there. Now we've seen the results and are experiencing 
the drama of these solutions, so I believe our generation must again find 
the questions, and that's not easy (quoted in Dercon 200 I) 
In such a situation it is imperative that public debate and political legitimacy ground 
itself not just on what is possible and recognized, but that it is also open to the 
'impossible', those questions that we can see today, but whose answers are for 'a people 
to come' (Deleuze 1995 p.l76; Rajchman 1999). Because of the limits of the dialectical 
political analysis, an appositional politics risks falling into nihilism (i.e. literally willing 
nothing but the same) in a world of proliferating speeds and identities- either through a 
wilful and destructive domination that seeks to cynically manipulate, or a resigned or 
overly-strident moralism that seeks to always blame others, or through frustration at a 
politics that is unable to broach 'big' questions about a radically indeterminate future. 
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A politics that is (mu)comfortable at speed: a politics of becoming 
In the above discussion we have been using speed, in the singular, as a short hand for 
what is in fact a proliferation of speeds, experiences of space and time and so identities. 
Speed is a short hand for a complexification of the world that starts to exceed 
representation (Thrift 1994; Connolly 2002). This is troubling for a politics based on 
recognition, it is troubling for thought based on representation. The risk of a politics 'at 
speed' is that it falls into an overly strident reaction to this loss of orientation and 
control, a reaction which we have shown can lead politics towards nihilism. In order to 
avoid this, we need to get past a politics that is based purely on recognition of existing 
identities, in order to supplement it (not replace it) with a politics that experiments with 
identity (Deleuze and Guattari 1988; Massumi 1992; Hardt 1993; 1998; Patton 2000; 
Rajchman 200 I; Connolly 2002).4 If, for example, the problem is that politics has 
stalled in an overly strident, or 'hard', opposition that is leading towards violent 
domination, then it is necessary that recognized identities start to 'leak' and become-
other, and so diffuse the tension. If, on the other hand, we have reached a point when it 
seems that recognized solutions are not sufficient to the novelty of an event, it is also 
important that recognized identities start to come undone, so that we can experiment 
with new ways of being. In both cases what is needed is a politics of becoming, one that 
encourages experimentation as a way of moving beyond what is and engaging in 
thinking about what could be. 
Critical theory, as we have seen, has been premised on the will of the subject, and so has 
been focussed on the conditions through which the subject is recognized and sustained. 
As Lekhi and Fisher argue (2001 p.72): 
What politics has tended to dwell upon, at least in its modernist 
versions ... is a collective or individual subject whose organic unity it 
seeks either to maintain or restore. Together with a neurotic belief in 
4 As will be clear by the references here, such an experimental politics builds on the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari. This connection will become much more clear as the chapter progresses and in following 
chapters. 
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'responsibility', the politics has typically also been premised on the 
possibility of a transcendent intervention into social reality. 
However, in a politics of becoming the goal is to move away from premising change on 
the subject, and its responsibility to recognize truth and justice (Schrift, 2000). Instead, 
we want to engage with the limits where a subject recreates itself or starts to 'crack-up'. 
This means attending to the contexts that mark the limit of existing subjectivity, where 
conventionally recognized categories (e.g. age, class, gender, ethnicity etc.) start 
becoming problematic for the subject, and where a search for a new way of being 
becomes potentially desirable (e.g. it is no longer enough to be recognized). Such 
problematic moments are not properly political in the conventional sense- they do not 
fall into the binary for or against. As Deleuze and Guattari argue: "Politics operates by 
macrodecisions and binary choices, binarized interests; but the realm ofthe decidable 
remains very slim. Political decision making necessarily descends into a world of 
micro-determinations, attractions and desires, which it must sound out or evaluate in a 
different fashion." (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.221 ). A politics of becoming, or what 
Deleuze and Guattari call a micropolitics, is interested in those forces that pull a subject 
beyond their recognized identities before they are able to articulate any 'good reason' to 
change, and before they know exactly where it is they are headed. This is a politics that 
is comfortable with a subject who is overwhelmed, it affirms the fact that the subject is 
'out of control' as the very condition of possibility for political practice and change. 
With these goals in mind, we need to return to the analysis of the public s'phere as that 
realm in which subjectivities emerge and become recognized. In the above discussion it 
was suggested that subjectivities emerge within opposition, and the analysis was 
explicitly focussed on the public sphere as the process by which different identities meet 
in opposition and are reconciled. However, this moment of political confrontation 
represents a very slim aspect of the public sphere- what Habermas calls the 'properly 
political' public sphere (Habermas 1992). Habermas also identifies another dimension-
the literary public sphere circulated in newspapers, books and essays; this is 
characterized as a set of spaces and practices in which individuals discuss what it is to be 
a 'human as such', and reflect on the relationship between their inner feelings and 
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passions, and their public identity, or 'audience oriented subjectivity' (ibid. p.43-57). In 
paying attention to this dimension of the public sphere, we are reminded again that there 
are aspects of political engagement in the way one negotiates the everyday disciplines of 
presenting oneself as a respectable citizen (Burchell 1995), and we can start to better 
understand how it is that subjectivity emerges in the public sphere through the 
circulation of texts- this is a becoming of identity that happens behind, below, beyond, 
or in parallel, to the hard oppositions of the politics of recognition. This is an analysis 
that is immanent to the circulation within the public sphere and to the formation of 
subjectivity. This will require we pay attention to the fact that public sphere is always a 
mediated encounter. 
Mediation and indeterminacy in the formation of publics 
The mediation of the public sphere is crucial to an analysis of becoming, because it 
disrupts a nostalgic longing for a public sphere stylized as authentic face-to-face 
communication between self-present subjects. What is shows is that any intervention in 
the public sphere is always highly indeterminate and beyond the wilful control of any 
individual or group subject. Public discourse in the earliest public spheres circulated 
through newspapers, letters and conversations in coffee-houses (Habermas 1992; 
Warner 2002), while today electronic media have multiplied the paths of circulation 
(Stevenson 1998). Warner (2002) reminds us that public sphere exists by virtue ofthe 
circulation of texts- or more strongly, a public exists only as a circulation of texts, and 
only by virtue of being addressed (see also Eisenstein 1983). The mediation ofthe 
public sphere cannot be overcome; indeed it is the very condition of its existence. 
Mediation is what allows public discourse to travel, to move beyond the here and now, 
and find applications in other times and places. Warner notes that: 
... [the] interactive relation postulated in public discourse ... goes far 
beyond the scale of conversation or discussion, to encompass a 
multigeneric lifeworld organized not just by a relational axis of utterance 
and response, but by potentially infinite axes of citation and 
characterization (ibid. p.91 ). 
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... this is often missed from view because the activity and duration of 
publics are commonly stylized as conversation or decision-making" (ibid. 
p.97). 
As a result, a text is never simply sent and received between individuals occupying the 
same space, but is disseminated amongst strangers, and received within a mediated 
context in which it may have effects unanticipated by its author. Here attention is drawn 
to the fact the public sphere is not an actual agora-like space in which individuals of a 
community meet and exchange information or debate. Instead, in the public sphere 
texts circulate in the absence ofthe sender, and move through many different spaces, 
where they are used to justify different kinds of actions. It is for this reason that Warner 
insists that one can be a member of a public by giving a text the 'merest of attention'. A 
critical understanding of communication in the public sphere, then, cannot avoid an 
engagement with what Derrida calls the iterability of all communication (Caputo 1997; 
Derrida 1998; Glendinning 1998; Bergen 200 I). 
Derrida argues that theories of language and communication are inadequate because they 
posit a break between writing (absence) and speech (presence). Speech, it is said comes 
before writing and is argued to be more 'authentic' than mediated forms of 
communication (Derrida, 1998). But if this is the case then what is the difference 
between speech and writing and how can we understand the first act of speech (i.e. its 
origin)? It is the standard postulate of linguistics that writing distinguishes itself from 
speech by its ability to travel over long distances and long delays and still be understood. 
Therefore, it posits the absence of the sender. But, Derrida notes, it also posits the 
absence of the receiver, and his or her intentions. As a result, the characteristic of 
writing is that it can be understood in the absence of either the writer or receiver and 
hence is open to reinterpretation. Derrida calls this characteristic of language iterability, 
by which he refers to the possibility that the same act (of writing) could be repeated in a 
completely different context and still be understood as writing, as communication 
(Glendinning, 1998). Therefore, writing has no meaning in and of itself (as writing) 
independent of context. As a result it is the act of repetition (both past, and possible 
future) that makes writing writing, i.e. makes it communication. Derrida then notes that 
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speech also shares these features with writing, as does any form of communication. 
Communication is that which can be recognized as an act of writing, or inscription, 
independent of sender and receiver. We cannot privilege writing over speech, then, as a 
carrier of meaning. This is because speech, if it is to have any meaning, must be 
expressible, and if it is expressible then we can say it follows rules, as does writing. The 
question then is the nature of these rules, which Derrida sets out to show are no more 
fixed in writing as in speech (ibid. p.ll4). You can never find the original moment 
when natural speech was fixed in writing because we cannot conceive of speech without 
rules. Writing is no less, nor more, contextual than speech or other forms of 
interpretation. Hence, we do not bring a fixed rule and meaning to a situation, instead 
we have recognition of an act of communication that has taken place in the past and can 
take place in the future and which therefore gives it meaning in this context. What is 
crucial is to recognize absence as a modification of presence (or, vice versa) (ibid. 
p.ll6). 
The essentially mediated character of all communication is important for our 
understanding of the public sphere, because it questions the extent to which we can 
conceive of individuals as self-present subjects, a point that diffuses the tendency in 
critical theory to reify the subject once they have been formed. In order to see this more 
clearly, Glendinning asks us to consider the case of someone who sends a message to 
him or herself and then immediately reads it; even if only the slightest of moments has 
passed it is possible that the message could be read anew and given a different, 
previously unanticipated, meaning when read by the same person. If we read the 
message in a completely novel way, a way that 'surprises us', then it is an example of 
how language works in the absence of a defined sender and receiver, which happens in 
this case to be the same person. The possibility of being able to 'surprise' ourselves 
indicates that we are not always present even to ourselves. Of course, this does not 
preclude that the message can be read the same way, only that no identity is fixed and 
hence we always bear the responsibility to interpret.5 Glendinning argues that this 
5 On the responsibility to interpret messages in the public sphere Hirschkop ( 1999) notes that Bakhtin 
considers the public sphere as a context in which we have responsibility, by which he means we are able 
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shows how our being with others is not conducted through language, but that we must 
consider that kind of being with others that language is- or, more broadly, the kind of 
being that mediation is. In order to think through the impact of our 'language-being' on 
the subjectivities formed in the public sphere, it is necessary to reflect on the 
implications of how something is mediated. This provides a more concrete 
understanding ofthe nature ofthe indeterminacy that is at the heart of communication, 
and so how a focus on mediation can help us see how the subject becomes receptive to 
critical intervention and experimentation. 
Often the question of how something is mediated focuses on the ideological restrictions 
of the content of a message, as well as a question of the access to the means of 
circulation. However, it is not possible to do away with the indeterminacy of circulation 
simply by adjusting content, or ensuring access to the means of communication 
(Carpignano 1993; Hartley 1997). This is what Warner calls the 'non-ideological' limits 
ofthe public sphere, because the 'style' of a text will influence who reads it, and what it 
can do. Warner argues that: 
What [ideological] critiques tend to miss, however, is that the tension 
inherent in the [textual] form goes well beyond any strategy of 
domination. The projection of a public is a new, creative, and distinctly 
modern mode ofpower ... One consequence of this tension in the laws of 
public discourse is a problem of style. In addressing indefinite strangers, 
public discourse puts a premium on accessibility. But there is no 
infinitely accessible language, and to imagine that there should be is to 
miss other, equally important needs of publics: to concretize the world in 
which discourse circulates, to offer its members direct and active 
membership through language, to place strangers on a shared footing 
(ibid. p. 77). 
Style, as a 'creative and distinctly modern' mode of power goes 'beyond any strategy of 
domination' because it does not work by 'forcing' people to respond, but by calling on 
them. This highlights that when we say the public sphere is discursive and textual, it is 
not 'just' textual. As already noted, texts always exist in potentially infinite relation of 
to respond and feel compelled to respond. This is a useful way to conceive of responsibility, because it 
does moralize the term- it is not a matter of what you should do, but what you can do. 
38 
citation and characterization, and this takes shape in relation to the world in which they 
circulate and seek to influence. Texts 'call on' people by legitimizing the practices that 
'concretize the world', and do so through a language that offers 'direct and active 
membership' with strangers. In this way a text attempts to "call a public into being", but 
the success of that attempt is always limited by a rhetorical power of language, and the 
iterability of context, in a way that is not captured by an ideological critique of power 
(Goankar and Povinelli, 2003). 
However, the impact of how something is mediated goes far beyond a concern with 
style, which still suggests that the circulation ofthe public sphere depends centrally on a 
human subject who 'appreciates' style. Studies in the history of technology and culture 
show that the public is far more distracted and volatile than even the notion of style 
suggests. For example, Kittler's ( 1986) analysis of 'discourse networks' (i.e. 
communication and transcription networks through which discourse is formed and 
relayed) charts the changes in the concept of subjectivity between the end of the 18111 and 
the beginning of the 191h C. In the discourse network of 1800 it was still possible to 
think about an organic individual qua human because of the technology of writing was 
then a privileged medium for moving between the sights and sounds of lived experience 
and being able to recreate those in other settings. Words literally shimmered with 
feeling, calling into the imagination a world of senses. Humans, through writing, were 
at the centre of interpretation. By the end of the 191h C, however, the number of 
recording technologies had multiplied to include film, the gramophone and the 
typewriter, and the human was no longer a privileged source of knowledge. As a result, 
in the discourse network of 1900, it was no longer possible to hold to a concept of a self-
present subject because it was possible to record and measure a gap between recollection 
of an event and its 'perfect' representation in technology (cf. Crary 1999; Weidman 
2003). There is no memory and no knowledge without technology. Psychotherapy 
works on this model -- first you just talk, and this is inscribed by the analyst, then it is 
organized and sent back to you to be re-embedded in your sense of self. In short, Kittler 
argues, our subjectivity mutates through the constant modulation of our experience by 
technologies of recording and transmitting. Warner's idea of style would need to be 
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stretched then, to include all those affects and percepts that capture our attention, or the 
organization of space that funnels our attention towards certain objects and goals. 
Crary draws out the implications of this kind of analysis for our understanding of 
political subjectivities: 
Much recent critical theory, derived from a now pointless critique of 
presence, has been unable to fathom that whether or not one has direct 
perceptual access to self-presence is intrinsically irrelevant with modern 
disciplinary and spectacular culture. What is important to institutional 
power, since the late nineteenth century, is simply that perception 
function in a way that insures a subject is productive, manageable, and 
predictable, and is able to be socially integrated and adaptive. The 
realization that attention had limits beyond and below which productivity 
and social cohesion were threatened created a volatile indistinction 
between newly designated 'pathologies' of attention and creative, 
intensive, states of deep absorption and daydreaming (ibid. p.4) 
In other words, in a highly mediated society, it matters less what the (self-present) 
subject believes, and more what they will actually do in the situation (Lash, 2002). The 
biggest threat to this kind of discipline is not active resistance, which can be identified 
and either isolated or integrated, but an indiscernible 'daydreaming' that might lead to 
withdrawal, or an accident, or to new ideas, all of which would then disrupt the 
legitimacy of control (ibid. p. 78). The mediated context of communication shows that 
subject is both prone to capture, and constantly escaping from capture- in short, it 
creates a very volatile subjectivity. 
Publics as assemblages 
We are now better able to articulate what exactly a public entails when we say that a 
public only exists in circulation, and only by virtue of being addressed. This is not only, 
and perhaps not even primarily, a form of conscious address but rather a kind of 
continual modulation that relies at times on overt meaning (content), but at others on 
direct bodily stimuli or subconscious suggestion. Where is the subject in all this? Felix 
Guattari argues that the subject exists only in habit or routine- what he calls the refrain: 
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When I watch television I exist at the intersection I) of a perceptual 
fascination provoked by the screen's luminous animation which borders 
on the hypnotic 2) of a captive relation with the narrative content of the 
program associated with the lateral awareness of surrounding events-
water boiling on the stove, a child's cry, the telephone ... 3) of a world of 
fantasms occupying my daydreams. My feeling of personal identity is 
thus pulled in different directions. How can I maintain a relative sense of 
the unicity, despite the diversity of components of subjectivation that pass 
through me? It's a question ofthe refrain that fixes me in front of the 
screen (Guattari 1995 pp.l6-17). 
The subject only ever exists within a constellation of flows of energy, information, 
psychic flows, all which is actualized in a particular material organization of space and 
technology. Here the idea of mediation is understood in its broadest sense of the term 
medium as an enveloping space (Cavell 2002). The concept of the subject that is 
developed here is highly 'impersonal'. It does not depend on any essential interiority, or 
phenomenological perception, it only depends on a body being in the 'right' place at the 
'right' time and acting in the 'right' way. Rather than a subject, Deleuze and Guattari 
would suggest it is better to use the impersonal form of 'a person', or indefinite articles 
such as he or they. 'A person' who is considered to be part of 'a public' whenever they 
utter an ideological statement in a context where it is given legitimacy, and so allows the 
subject to recreate his or her being. A public is this conjunction of the will and psychic 
drives of a person, the material forces of a particular context, the social constraints 
operative in the context etc. The number of terms we include in the assemblage varies 
by context- we include as many as it takes to describe 'what happened'. Following 
Deleuze and Guattari, we will call this constellation an 'assemblage': 
Blanchot is correct in saying the ONE and HE- one is dying, he is 
unhappy - in no way take the place of the subject, but instead do away 
with the subject in favour of an assemblage of the haecceity type that 
carries or brings out the event insofar as it is unformed and incapable of 
being effectuated by persons ("something happens to them that they can 
only get a grip on by letting go of the ability to say I"). The HE does not 
represent the subject but rather makes a diagram of an assemblage. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.265). 
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We will return to discuss the idea of a subject produced within a diagram and 
assemblage in the next chapter. However, for now this concept of 'a public' can be used 
to animate our understanding of the public sphere as a circulation oftexts. Here we see 
that the indeterminacy that is associated with the Derridian understanding of 
communication can be understood as the indeterminacy that surrounds the successful 
conjunction of a collective subjective assemblage- will the text enter an assemblage 
that, in the event, will form a productive, manageable and predictable subjectivity? This 
goes beyond the will of the subject and places us in the realm where 'something 
happens' that we have to 'get a grip on'. The formation of a public, and its implied 
subjectivities, is thus an event, it is singular and exists only in repetition. 
Experimenting with assemblage 
To bring us back to our concern with speed and temporal complexity, and the being and 
becoming of subjectivity, one must acknowledge that in practice subjective assemblages 
are often successfully repeated, imparting a degree of stability, even stolidity, to the 
subject. And this is not at all unrelated to the speed of different technologies that are 
used to 'capture' our attention. A spectacular modernity works by creating spaces that 
require attention, and so make attention a problem for control. However, at the same 
time, it is clear there is not a subject who can rise above the multiple speeds and 
definitively control attention (no internal subject of will, or external subject of control). 
The ephemeral and speedy nature of modern control means that there are always 
situations where speed runs out of control. Instead, of thinking about a subject who fits 
in the binary of in or out of control (dominated, dominating), it is better to see the 
subject as 'alive' or 'vital' within a play of forces (Ansell-Pearson 1997 p.l43). Rather 
than a subject, Deleuze refers to a body: 
What is a body? We do not define it by saying that it is a field of forces, 
a nutrient medium fought over by a plurality of forces. For in fact there 
is no 'medium', no field of forces or battle. There is no quantity of 
reality, all reality is already a quantity of force ... Every relationship of 
forces constitutes a body -whether it is chemical, biological, social or 
political (Deleuze 1986 p.40). 
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Forces here must be understood to be a very heterogeneous set; we can talk of the force 
of desire, the force of gravity, the force perception- in short of any biophysical, psychic, 
social or material force. The approach to force, then, is qualitative- they are not 
comparable in purely objective terms. In this model, power is immanent and relational 
to the field of forces and not something that is imposed from without, willed by the 
transcendent subject (Hardt 1993; Alien 1999; Patton 2000). This is a Nietzschean 
concept of power in which the 'will to power' is dispersed throughout a network or 
assemblage. Nietzsche argues that a will to power is 'beyond good and evil' ("being is 
by itself will to power" (quoted in Deleuze 1986 p.49)). As a result, it must constantly 
be evaluated in terms of what it allows a body to do- what cans/he see and do today? 
Normatively a negative, or reactive, will to power is defined as one that seeks to only 
conserve itself and contain new forces, while an active will to power is a system that is 
open to new forces and can grow and transform with them. No matter how stable a 
particular assemblage may appear this is always a dynamic system because it is open to 
the continual introduction of new forces and new relations. New connection in part of 
the assemblage triggers a global rearticulation of the relations between forces and so can 
change the 'will to power' of a particular assemblage- these are moments of 
'transmutation', and it has the potential to change what a body can do. 
These moments of transmutation are important for distinguishing this approach to power 
from a dialectical and hierarchical model of power. For Nietzsche dialectic thought ends 
when two or more qualitatively unequal forces create a negative will to power that finds 
its culmination in a will to nothing, or nihilism. At this point, he argues that there must 
be a reversal, as distinct from a synthesis and unity. "Instead ofthe labour of opposition 
or the suffering of the negative we have the warlike play of difference ... The no [of 
reactive opposition c.o] stripped of its power, transformed into the opposite quality, 
turned affirmative and creative: such is transmutation" (ibid. p.l91 ). Transmutation 
requires a new relation of forces, perhaps because a new force has come along, or 
because of a previously unnoticed affinity between existing forces. At this point a new 
active force is created, and the struggle of active and reactive forces starts over again. 
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Rather than a synthesis, there is a swerve or schiz, which starts a new trajectory and 
inaugurates a new will to power. It is this moment of escape and creation that defines 
the idea of the 'eternal return', and this is why Deleuze is able to argue that 'only 
affirmation returns'. The world does not proceed toward unity, it proceeds towards 
difference- 'the world is neither true nor real, but living' (ibid. p.l84). Power is only 
unifying to the extent that it is manifest as a negative will to power, to the extent that it 
tries to contain these new trajectories. However, because the will to power is never 
universal but is only as extensive as its assemblage, there is a point when affirmation 
returns with the creation of new forces, at some point life will intrude and take a new 
trajectory. It is in this sense that we can say power is everywhere and comes from 
nowhere. To say that power is creative, is to acknowledge that power exceeds its 
representation, and to ignore this is to reduce analysis to the level of 'blaming' those 
'with' power for a state of affairs that is not ultimately only, or even primarily, the result 
of human will. An appositional stance may be morally (and even intellectually) strong, 
but it can be pragmatically weak if it tries to directly oppose its singular will to the will 
to power from which it emerges. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the will to power, 
the assemblage, in which one is situated, and try to affirm its conditions as the 
conditions of possibility for politics- they are always constrained, but the point is to 
search for potentials to be otherwise that exist within constraint. "To affirm is not to 
take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but to release, to set free what 
lives. To affirm is to unburden: not to load life with the weight of higher values, but to 
create new values which are those of life, which make life light and active" (ibid. p.l85 
emphasis in original). 
In a world of speed and temporal complexity, there are many disruptions that may herald 
new relations of force, and which in turn require a transmutation of the will to power. 
Therefore, it is important 'at speed' to be open to the irruption of the new. A politics of 
becoming requires an affirmative and experimental critique (henceforth just 
experimental), one that moves beyond who is 'responsible' for a particular state of 
affairs and how it can be solved, and experiments with how to open a recognized state of 
affairs to the continual becoming of the assemblage from which is emerges. If speed 
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brings something new to politics, then it is only a renewed sense of the importance of a 
certain modesty in political claim making and in the legitimation of power in the face of 
a world that is always becoming. Nietzsche states: "We are in the phase of the modesty 
of consciousness" and Deleuze expands on this by saying that "To remind consciousness 
of its necessary modesty is to take it for what it is: a symptom; nothing but a symptom of 
a deeper transformation and of the activities of entirely non-spiritual forces" (ibid. p.39). 
However, this call for modesty is not a normative claim (or not only), but rather an 
ontological statement about our limits as humans. It is therefore also a statement about 
the necessity to take up the challenge of engaging the 'deeper transformation' ofwhich 
consciousness is but a symptom. 
Ideology as symptom, counter-ideology as symptom -- a whole field of symptoms of a 
deeper transformation of forces- it is these forces that an experimental critique seeks to 
uncover and articulate. It is by making these forces visible that one then has the raw 
material with which to evaluate the articulation of an ideology in a particular context. 
However, in identifying forces, we must be careful not to conflate forces with the bodies 
that express the conjunction of forces. It is not enough to say that a particular 
proposition is blocked by the 'force' of a particular group or individual; to say they 
'have' force would be to return the analysis ofthe assemblage to a critique of power as 
representation and its politics of recognition. We are broaching here a very complex 
problem that will only be fully dealt with in the coming chapters; this is a problem that 
only becomes visible at the limits of a normative critical narrative of recognition, as we 
prepare to move to an actual application. The problem is that forces that are always 
moving are non-representational: "A 'force' is the set of invisible, untouchable, self-
renewing conditions according to which certain effects can habitually be expected to 
appear...An event, a passage ... " (Massumi 2002a p. I60). Therefore, in an experimental 
critique we start with recognized identities- subjects, ideologies- and work to represent 
the assemblage of which they are but an expression; but what we want to then evoke and 
make visible is the force that moves 'between' the recognized identities and animates the 
assemblage. 
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An experimental critique requires that we present the assemblage in such a way that its 
constitutive incompleteness is apparent, i.e. to make it clear that it is a contextual, and 
reductive of a much more complex reality. In this way the aim is to make apparent that 
an identity is never just what it is recognized to be, but that it is also always in a process 
of becoming. This requires us to present critique as a way of experimenting with what is 
recognized, as an example of thinking about how it could be re-assembled. But all this 
is still only suggestive, and it will be necessary to give some more substance in the 
following two chapters. We have come here to the limit of a normative critique of 
speed. We have made apparent the problem speed poses- the problem of the 'hard' 
opposition, and the problematic question 'what happened?', both of which lead to the 
need to go beyond recognized identities. It will be the purpose of the next two chapters 
to give this critique some substance by articulating a view of the public sphere as a 
diagram of forces, which will make available to us a new set of terms for thinking and 
presenting becoming. In the final three chapters I will then go on to apply these ideas 
and concepts to the becoming of air quality politics in Toronto, Canada. 
CONCLUSION 
I no longer know if I'm looking with my naked eye at a starry sky or at a 
drop of water through a microscope. Since the origin of the species, the 
horse moves, supple and mathematical. Machines are already catching 
up, moving ahead. Locomotives rear and steamships whinny on the 
water. Never will a typewriter commit an etymological spelling error, but 
the man of intellect stammers, chews his words, and breaks his teeth on 
antique consonants. When I think all my senses burst into flame and I'd 
like to violate all beings, and when I give rein to my destructive instincts 
I find the triangle of a metaphysical solution. Inexhaustible coal mines! 
Cosmogonies find a new life in trademarks. Extravagant signboards over 
the multicoloured city, with the ribbon of trams climbing the avenue, 
screaming monkeys hanging on to each other's tails, and the incendiary 
orchids of architectures collapsing on top of them and killing them. In 
the air, the virgin cry oftrolleys! The material world is as well trained as 
an Indian Chief's stallion. It obeys the faintest signal. .. 
Excerpt from Blaise Cendrars Profound Today 
Cannes, 13 February, 1917 
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The above excerpt from the poet and writer Blaise Cendrars ( 1998) resonates as much 
today as it did when it was written in 1917, evoking the sense of confusion and the 
apparent weakness of human will and thought to do justice to modern complexity; it 
reminds us once again that concerns about speed are not new in the cultural and critical 
commentary of modernity. Therefore, if we are to broach the subject of the impact of 
speed on political discourse again today, we need to be sceptical and critical of the 
suggestion that we have somehow today reached a 'new speed'. When critical thought 
suggests that the complexity that characterizes a world of multiple speeds results in a 
singular experience of 'speed' that overwhelms the 'average' person, it simply recreates 
the initial image of confusion it sought to critique. It is important for critical thought to 
hold up against the urgency that universal statements tend to create in order to think the 
urgency. But this does not mean trying to slow down the world in order to have time to 
think, which implicitly validates the erroneous idea of a universal acceleration. Instead, 
it requires that we think about how speed and temporal complexity shed light on the 
limits of how we think about politics and political change. 
This is what I have tried to do in this chapter; starting with the initial sense that speed 
'erodes' the conditions for a critical politics, I have used the concept of the public sphere 
to work through how ideology is legitimated or critiqued, and how speed impacts this 
process. It was argued that 'at speed' the oppositions that characterize a dialectical 
model of politics risk becoming entrenched, or hard, opposition, or risk being unable to 
address the novelty that might be emerging in a world characterized by temporal 
complexity and a loss of control. Therefore, I argued that we need to supplement a 
dialectical model of political analysis and critique, with an experimental critique and a 
politics of becoming. The latter tries to look at the limits of recognized identities and 
oppositions to better understand the contexts that support them within a world of 
multiple speeds. 
Here we saw that the identity and ideology are created within an assemblage of material, 
social and psychic flows, and a public can be understood to always be in a dynamic state 
of becoming. Therefore, if we want to understand how to get beyond the impasse of 
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identity and recognition of an appositional politics, it is necessary for critical thought to 
make this assemblage visible, and so make visible the potential to experiment with how 
new identities, new assemblages, might be created. The overall trajectory of the 
argument presented here is to move critical thought away from a normative critique 
focussing on ideal conditions which would recreate and support a self-present critical 
subject, towards understanding how critique can take place 'at speed', within the 
multiple temporalities and complex assemblages of an always imperfect world, one 
whose complexity exceeds critical representation. 
Understanding a public, and the subjectivities it implies, as an assemblage that emerges 
from this complexity highlights the indeterminacy, and risk, in any attempt to call a 
public into being. However, this indeterminacy is not a cause for lament, but the very 
condition of political action and change, for good or for ill. Pragmatically, rather than 
normatively, it is possible to treat ideologies and subjectivities as 'symptoms' that 
encourage us to seek the conditions that support them and to experiment with how else 
they might be assembled. Therefore, in the next chapter two chapters, I will move away 
from the theoretical normative narrative to look more closely at the dynamics of a public 
as an assemblage, and how an experimental critical thought might present this 
assemblage in a way that encourages experimentation. 
48 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE PUBI..][C ASSEMBLAGE 
The first chapter developed a normative critique of speed, which argued that within a 
society characterized by speed and temporal complexity political discourse risks 
deteriorating into hard oppositions, or an inability to appreciate truly novel 
circumstances that go beyond recognized identities. Therefore, it was argued it is 
necessary to engage in an experimental critique that supports a politics of becoming and 
encourages experimentation with recognized identities. In this chapter, the goal is to 
move away from this normative critique, and develop a positive expression of how the 
public works 'at speed' by building on the concept of the public as assemblage. In order 
to do so, it will be necessary to set aside a wholly negative concept of speed in which it 
is understood as a universal force that comes from without and 'erodes' pre-existing 
identities. Therefore, I will explore Deleuze's Bergsonian conception oftime as 
different/dation; time itself is always a process of assembling, and so is never separate 
from the assemblage within which one is moving and thinking- time is always 
timespace. A public, then, has its own speed formed at the intersection of many speeds, 
and it is at the intersection of these speeds that subjectivities form as an expression of 
the public assemblage. Therefore, if we consider the public as an assemblage, it is one 
that is always in the process of assembling, it is prone to the disruption of a new 
connection that opens it to a process of becoming. However, it is this same openess that 
means that a public assemblage is always prone to capture and closure by a conservative 
will to power. Therefore, this provides us with the grounds on which a critical public 
sphere must work immanently within existing assemblages in order to draw attention to 
the limits of recognized solutions and identities. 
The chapter will proceed in three passes. In the first, I will develop a Deleuzian 
conception of time and speed, focussing in particular on the materiality of time as a 
process of connection, and on the distinction between the actual and the virtual. Here 
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we will see that time itself is a process of assembling. The key image of time is as a 
movement that fills the interval between a particular conjunction within the 'virtual' 
multiplicity (the event) and its actualization in a particular state of affairs. Within 
habitual repetition, the interval becomes invisible, and time is considered a smooth 
projection of the present into the possible future, but if the event continues to be 
disruptive, there is an opportunity to re-think the habitual and experiment with how else 
we might 'go-on'. The important speed, in relation to the public sphere, then, is this 
'virtual speed of emergence' of the event (what we can think of as a 'swerve' or 'shiz') 
and whether or not it can be used to pose new questions. 
The second pass, then, builds on this conception oftime as an assemblage/assembling, 
but in relation to the assemblage of the public (assembling the 'time of a public'). I will 
move through the process of synthesizing the event into a public through three 
repetitions ofthe event. The first is the connective synthesis of the event itself, which 
disrupts an existing state of affairs. The second is a disjunctive synthesis that 'makes 
sense' of this disruption such that it can be circulated in knowledge statements. The 
third is a conjunctive synthesis that brings together objects that would not otherwise 
have connected, but which can now be placed in relation in the wake of the connective 
and disjunctive syntheses. This conjunctive synthesis is of the public draws together 
what is sayable with a particular context of 'visibilities'- whenever and wherever this is 
successfully done, a public forms, along with the subjectivities that are its expression. 
However, the assemblage only exists in repetition (in time), and so ifthe event remains 
disruptive, there exists an opportunity to open the assemblage to the virtual and 
becoming. However, this becoming can in turn be captured and returned to an 
assemblage that is a version of the same (there is a continual process of capture and 
escape). This, then, brings us to the third and final pass. If the assemblage is opened to 
becoming, then contemporary capitalist State works immanently within the processes of 
disruption to capture the event in order to profit from a conservative re-articulation that 
preserves capitalist relations. This capture must be continually and critically evaluated, 
which is the role of a critical public sphere. Because we cannot at present do without 
50 
some form of control, critique is not aimed at 'solving' the problem of control, but 
encouraging experimentation within the assemblage. The process of experimental 
critique seeks to trace the capture of the event in the assemblage, and its continuing 
disruptions, in order to consider how we can keep visible in public discourse the 
problematic questions the event raises, and the potential it suggests for alternative 
realities. 
Assembling time: the achJial andl the virtuan 
If we want to consider how speed impacts the formation of publics, where publics are 
understood to be an assemblage, it is crucial to understand that time itself is an 
assemblage. We do not have a public assemblage that is in time, but an assembling of a 
public that takes time, or better, makes time- the time of the public. In the first chapter 
it was argued that whenever we use the term speed, we are actually referring to a 
problem of multiple speeds and temporal complexity. In the subsequent discussion 
speed was shown to have an ambivalent register - it was associated with the attempt to 
control, and the unexpected loss of control. In this section, I will argue that this 
ambivalent oscillation is intrinsic to a concept of time as assemblage. I will begin by 
reviewing how the control of time depends upon the control of space. We can think of 
the assembling oftimespace networks, and their overlapping and layering into a 
complex series of timespaces. However, this leaves us with the idea that there can be a 
controlling subject at the heart of the unfolding of the time-assemblage; yet the subject is 
formed within the act of assembling of times pace, and so is never strictly speaking in 
control. In order to see this, we need to look more closely at the process of spacing and 
timing, and what happens in this process (Thrift, 200 I a). Following Deleuze, we can 
argue that the actual assembled timespace is only on dimension oftime- its actualized 
dimension - but what goes unseen is a virtual dimension. Time then, is a continual 
interchange from the virtual to the actual and back again, that takes place through 
movement. This means that the duration of time is punctuated by a series of events, but 
that the eventfulness of time is concealed in habit and repetition. This is why 'at speed', 
in a world of multiple temporalities, the accident is so important- it offers the 
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opportunity to make visible the eventfulness of time, and the presence of the virtual that 
is excessive to any actualization in a particular assemblage. The interval between a 
virtual event, and its actualization in a particular state of affairs is closed by habitual 
movement. The challenge that speed poses to thought, then, is to be able to think the 
event, and not let it disappear into repetition. 
Time as the coordination overlapping technological networks 
We can start by picking-up a particularly strong narrative line of modernity as a story of 
increasing speed and mobility, resulting from advances in transportation and 
communication technologies (Kern 1983; Schivelbusch 1986; Virilio 1987; Harvey 
1989; Cronon 1991; Thrift 1994; 1997; Millar, 1998; Crary 1999; Gleick 2000; Kuipers, 
2000; Mackenzie 2002; Virilio 2003). The idea that technology can 'accelerate' time is 
a seemingly uncontroversial claim, but what these studies show is a much more complex 
relation between time and technology that results in a proliferation of speeds. The idea 
that technology could accelerate time is dependent on the image of clock-time where 
time is linear, cumulative, infinite and reversible (Adam 1995). However, clock-time 
exists only where there is a network of coordinated clocks, and it reflects the working of 
the clock as a closed system separate from its environment (Stengers 2000 417 p.l77; 
Mackenzie 2002 chap. 3). Wherever such a system is opened to its environment is runs 
awry and is disrupted by events. Therefore, we can see that "time is not itself a primary 
phenomena. Time passes or not depending on the alignment of other entities" (Latour 
1997 p. 176). The role oftechnical mediators in the passage oftime draws to our 
attention that there is no time, and so no speed, separate from a particular organization of 
space. 
This is the kind of time and space -the kind of speed -- that can be mapped using a 
time-geography diagram, in which case the 'object' is a person, who must coordinate a 
multitude of networks in order to get through the day (Hagerstrand 1984; Ellegard 1999; 
Lenntorp 1999; Vilhelmson 1999). However, this is not a purely technical organization, 
but must also include the coordination and organization of social relations and natural 
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rhythms (Pred 1981; Hagerstrand 1982; Thrift 1983; Pred 1990; Crang 200 I). There is 
always a process of implementation and adaptation to local circumstances, and so a 
given technology never results in a uniform and universal experience of time across 
different contexts; in each case it question of evaluating how a particular technology 
influences the experience oftime (Glennie and Thrift 1996; Stein 2001). The successful 
intersection of different networks produces a 'space-time trajectory' and the idea of a 
'trajectory' implies that in assembling the trajectory people also place themselves in a 
historical time based on projected, or hoped for, course of events, and recall of the past 
(Hagerstrand 1982; Crang 200 I). At this point we are able to extend time-geography to 
not just an objective mapping oftime-networks, but a more phenomenological reading 
oftime. But this is still a map of space and time that is resolutely founded on a linear 
idea of 'clock-time', as reflected both in its technical bias and graphic representation, but 
also in as much as the past and future are imagined only as extensions, or an unfolding, 
of actions taken in the present (Gren, 200 I). This is then an image of a person in time 
that, for all the talk of connection, is curiously detached from the space they assemble, 
creating an objective image of a body in control of space, or 'dragged around', rather 
than one actively interacting with space (Crang 200 I; Gren 200 I). I will return to this 
lack of eventfulness below. 
As a first pass, then, we have an image of time as a heterogeneous network that needs to 
be assembled, and then coordinated with other networks within an overarching clock-
time network. There is not a singular shift to 'clock-time', or a time dominated by 
technology, but a series of overlapping networks and a proliferation oftimespaces 
(Glennie and Thrift 1996). High-speed technologies do not necessarily lead to 'more 
speed.' For example, electric street lighting and railways in European cities opened up 
the city to a night-life, a space-time with that gave a whole new temporality and variety 
to daily rhythms (Schlor, 1998). Similarly, increasing the speed, reliability and cost of 
mass transportation has allowed for the creation of tourist spaces where one could 'get 
away' or 'drop out' (time made possible, it should be added, by the changing pace of 
production that allowed workers to take holidays) (Shaw 2001). Nevertheless, this 
proliferation does create a sense of acceleration to the extent that one recognizes that 
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there is a growing gap between what one is doing and what one could be doing, literally 
a multiplication of experiences and inputs and the desire and need to choose and 
coordinate amongst them. As Tekeli ( 1999 p.229) argues: "The accelerating pace of 
contemporary society is determined by the continuous increase in the gap between 
experience of the past and the expectations of the future." It was at the end of the 191h C, 
at the same time that technical networks (including standard time) were becoming more 
dense and pervasive, that cultural commentary started to register a disjunction between 
'personal' and 'public' experiences oftime (Kern, 1983). David Harvey (1989) has 
suggested that this multiplication of experiences is experienced as a sense of 
'compression' of space and time, but it is more accurate to view this change as a 
progressive complexification, or layering, which means that as the world appears to 
shrink (in as much as what was distant can now be close at hand) it is also appears to 
expand as new space-times are created, and because what was previously invisible is 
now part of our world (Kirsch 1995; Bridge 1997; Dodgshon 1999; May and Thrift, 
200 l ). Speed leads to temporal complexity, not uniformity. It is at this point that we 
can start to get the sense that the world is moving 'too quickly' because we are aware 
that much of the action 'escapes' our conscious attention. 
Even if we have traced here a concept oftime as a complex, multi-layered assemblage, 
the suggestion that there is a point after which it 'escapes' our conscious attention shows 
that we have still kept an assembling subject at its core. Therefore, we can think of 
subjects who control timespace, subjects who are controlled, and subjects that loose 
control. Again, this is not without merits, and suggests a whole politics of time 
(Nowotny 1994; Davies 200 I). But premising the passage of time on the subject does 
not serve the purpose of developing a concept of time and speed that contributes to an 
experimental critique and a politics of becoming at speed. The idea that something 
'escapes' control suggests that our description of time is still not complete. We need to 
conceptualize how this escape takes place, and for this we will need to adopt a more 
philosophical standpoint. 
54 
Time as duration - the actual and the virtual 
In the above discussion we have thought about time as a passage between distinct points, 
or objects in a network. However, by stressing the assembling of such networks, I have 
tried to draw attention to the fact that in thinking about time we are dealing with motion 
and change, even if only by repetition of near identical cycles. However, if this change 
is not to be just the assembling of pre-existing objects, it requires that movement be a 
creative conjunction, which in turn implies a dimension that is not yet actualized but 
which provides the context for the 'movement of the mind that orders the world' 
(Crocker 2001 p.48). However, if this 'transcendental' idea is not to become dogmatic 
(i.e. implying a pre-existing truth to be recognized), it must be shown to be in a process 
of becoming. This is what Deleuze, building on the work of Bergson, sets out to 
accomplish by thinking of time as duration composed of the movement between the 
actual and the virtual (May 1996; Patton 1997; Crocker 1998, 2001; Patton 2000; May 
2001; Ansell-Pearson 2002; Deleuze 2004 p.22-51 ). 
Bergson, in his articulation of the concept of duration, argued that "to conceive of things 
as taking place in terms of succession of positionings ('before', 'after', etc.) is to 
presuppose the faculty of space" (Ansell-Pearson 2002 p.30)- i.e. it treats time as if it 
were the same as space. However, he argues our experience of time is one of continuous 
flow, in which we cannot identify the beginning and ending of a particular event because 
it always moving and progressing. "We can conceive of succession without distinction, 
and think of it as a mutual penetration, an interconnexion and organization of elements, 
each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it 
except by abstract thought". (Bergson quoted in Ansell-Pearson, 2002 p.21 ). It follows, 
that movement is distinct from the space covered. As Deleuze argues: 
Space covered is past, movement is present, the act of covering. The 
space covered is divisible, indeed infinitely divisible, whilst movement is 
indivisible, or cannot be divided without changing qualitatively each time 
it is divided. This already presupposes a more complex idea: that spaces 
covered all belong to a single, identical, homogeneous space while 
movements are heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves. (Deleuze 
quoted in Crang 2001 p.202). 
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Rather than thinking about objects first in terms of their incorporation in networks, we 
can think of objects as being in motion, and each motion is in itself a singular becoming. 
This movement is what Bergson called duration, and he argues it is the essence of time 
and for Deleuze the key to the becoming of all assemblages. 
However, the world of constant motion jars against our awareness of solidity in a world 
of, at times all too stubborn, material objects and social relations. This is where we must 
attend to the distinction between the actual and the virtual and the repetition oftime as 
habit. If time is movement, it is a movement that weaves together the actual dimension 
with a virtual dimension. One way to understand the virtual, is to think of every 
duration as composed oftwo kinds of multiplicity- a closed and open multiplicity. A 
closed, or numerical, multiplicity is akin to the space-time networks we have been 
describing above, it can measured quantitatively. In mathematics we would think of it in 
terms of numerical set. However, an open, or virtual, multiplicity is not formed of 
discrete elements, but is a whole in which a change to part leads to a qualitative change 
ofthe whole, and so it is continually changing not just in degree, but in kind. It is the 
open multiplicity that Bergson associates with the virtual, but the two kinds of 
multiplicity are never separate, and only together form duration. Every object differs 
from itself, it is at once part of a closed multiplicity (e.g. it is a 'car' or an 'atom') in 
which it has a distinct identity, and it is part of the open multiplicity: 
Movement has two aspects: by changing qualitatively duration divides up 
in objects and the objects are 'united in duration' by losing their contours. 
"We can therefore say that movement relates the objects of a closed 
system to open duration, and duration to the objects of a system which it 
forces to open up. Movements relate the objects between which it is 
established to the changing whole which it expresses and vice versa" 
(Ansell Pearson, 2002 p.40 quote is from Deleuze). 
Thus Deleuze conceives of a world that is characterized by movement and a constant (if 
not always apparent) mutation. The world of movement is thus characterized by 
difference in as much as movement is a continual process of differenciation, where 
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actual objects appear, and differentiation, which characterizes the continual variation of 
the virtual multiplicity: 
Whereas differentiation determines the virtual content of the Idea as 
problem, differenciation expresses the actualisation of this virtual and the 
constitution of solutions .... Differenciation is like the second part of 
difference, and in order to designate the integrity or the integrality of the 
object, we require the complex notion of different/ciation (Deleuze, 
quoted in Patton 2000 p.38) 
In this last quote we see that Deleuze conceives of the virtual as throwing up 'problems' 
that need to be thought, and which are actualized in particular states of affairs. 
However, there is nothing ideal about the virtual, it is a real arrangement that 'forces' us 
to think- the actual and the virtual are but two aspects of the same reality. The virtual 
as a relation of unseen- but not unsensed- forces, causes us to think; there is nothing 
transcendental about the virtual in as much as it is always related to an actual 
arrangement and is immanent to it (May 200 I). 
The importance of this concept of time for our understanding of speed and the 
assembling of a 'time of the public' are twofold. First, it shows that any actualization is 
part of a much more fluid, nonrepresentional, reality that is a source of potential 
change. 1 Therefore, it is important to understand how a particular state of affairs is 
maintained as repetition within this virtual multiplicity. Second, it shows that 'control' 
oftime depends on the emptying ofthe interval between a virtual differentiation and its 
actualization in a particular state of affairs, such that repetition becomes repetition of the 
same. However, strictly speaking, repetition is never repetition of the same; to say that 
nothing has changed is to ignore the novelty of each repeated conjunction, and it also 
fails to acknowledge changes that are too small to be recognized. All actual objects are 
in the process differing and changing ("Returning is the being of that which becomes" as 
Nietzsche says (Deleuze 1986 p.48)). The concept of time as repetition destabilizes the 
idea of identity, and so of a self-present subject at the heart of time. Instead, the subject 
1 Anseii-Pearson (2002 p.21) writes that duration "is nonrepresentational, as soon as we think it we 
necessarily spatialize it". We will return to how to approach this nonrepresentable quality of the virtual in 
the next chapter. 
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is formed within this repetition, as part of the actualized assemblage- more precisely 
within the movement in the interval between the virtual and the actual. 
The interval- the form of determinability- produces difference. As a 
result, indeterminate being is determinable only in time. lam 
"determines the existence of a 'self' [ moi] that changes in time and 
presents a certain degree of consciousness at every moment". It is a 
difference that differentiates. It is a difference that distributes itself 
through out the self, and is only on this basis that the self thinks and 
produces any movement between I and ego, or concept and object 
(Cracker 200 I p.60-61 quote is from Deleuze). 
This means that subject is always in a process of stabilizing and repeating itself through 
practice, which in turn means that, even for this briefest moment between the virtual and 
its actualization, there is a possibility to think again about how to go on, how to do and 
be differently: "for a brief moment we enter into that schizophrenia in principle which 
characterizes the highest power of thought, and opens being directly on to difference, 
despite all the mediations, all the reconciliations, of the concept" (Deleuze quoted in 
Cracker 200 I p.61) 
In relation to this Deleuzian concept of the time of assemblage, the important impact of 
speed is the part it plays in emptying, or bracketing, the interval. The imaginary of 
speed as an acceleration of a universal abstract time relies precisely on this evacuation of 
the interval, and a replacement with an image oftime in which the passage between 
points does nothing, and so the future is simply a projection ofthe present into the 
future, a rearrangement rather than transformation (Cracker 1998). In this sense we can 
see that the subjective experience here may be anything but 'speedy' -it may be 
frustratingly slow, or it may be the most mundane and plodding of routines, both of 
which are made possible by a conjunction oftlows, some of which may in fact be very 
fast (e.g. telecommunication). The important aspect of speed, from the point of view of 
opening the assemblage and its subjective expressions to becoming, is the ability to enter 
into the interval. This is why the crucial speed, in the first instance, is not any objective 
velocity, but the speed of the 'swerve' of 'schiz' that makes us think again- what Virilio 
calls the 'virtual speed of emergence' (Virilio 2003). Only secondarily does objective 
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speed get broached, as part ofthe articulation of the problem made visible by the 
accident. This is why the accident or disruption is so important at speed. The disruption 
does not necessarily change anything, a person copes with all kinds of disruptions within 
a daily routine. But with repetition, there is the potential to be pulled into a modification 
of routine, a modification of movement that opens the selfto thought and becoming. 
What the accident makes visible, if only for the briefest of moments, is that something 
has changed within the virtual multiplicity, or better, that something is always changing. 
This change is what Deleuze and Guattari ~all the event, " ... the part that eludes its own 
actualization in everything that happens. The event is not the state of affairs. It is 
actualized in a state of affairs but it has a shadowy and secret part that is continually 
subtracted from or added to its actualization" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994 p.156). 
Whenever we try to represent the event, we always say too much or too little, the event 
runs between all recognized identities, it is becoming. This means that the event poses a 
problem that is only partially, and temporarily, 'solved' in a particular state of affairs. 
Therefore, the event is something that creates a new potential in the world, and a 
measure of the potential of the event is the number of different ways it can be actualized: 
The event is not identified with the signiftcations that those who follow 
will create for it, and it does not designate a priori those for whom it will 
make a difference. It has neither a privileged representative nor 
legitimate scope. The scope of the event is part of its effects, of a 
problem posed in the future it creates. Its measure is the object of 
multiple interpretations, but it can also be measured by the very 
multiplicity ofthese interpretations: all those who, in one way or another, 
refer to it or invent a way of using it to construct their own position, 
become part of the event's effects (Stengers 2000 pp.66-67). 
It follows, then, that thought moves backwards, so to speak, counter the actualization 
from the virtual to the actual; thought moves from the set of possible state of affairs 
(what has been actualized) towards sensing the potential of the event and to articulating 
the problem that it poses. It is this problem that we want to keep visible in the pub! ic 
sphere in order to encourage a politics of becoming, because it has no definite solution, 
and so keeps all public assemblages open to the potential of being otherwise. 
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We now have a concept of time that does not require a controlling subject, and which is 
never completely in control- it oscillates on the edge between control and chaos. Even 
in the most repetitive manifestation, we find here a strategy of looking for the 
disruptions that can diffuse entrenched repetitions and open them to becoming. It is also 
in being aware of the continued disruption of the event that we can evaluate how well 
different solutions 'do justice' to the event by allowing us to respond to the event, rather 
than trying to repress it within a repetition of the same. In this regard, speed is not 
intrinsically a problem, but always requires evaluation rather than a blanket 
condemnation of' speed': 
Slow and rapid are not quantitative degrees of movement but rather two 
types of qualified movement ... ln this sense, the role of the qualitative 
opposition gravity-celerity, heavy-light, slow-rapid is not that of a 
quantifiable scientific determination but of a condition that is coextensive 
to science and that regulates both the separation and the mixing ofthe 
two models [of a scientific quantitative model and a qualitative model 
c.o.], their possible interpenetration, the domination of one by the other, 
their alternative (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988 p.371 emphasis in original). 
In any particular 'solution' (possible actualization), it is not objective speed per se that is 
good or bad, but it is good or bad only in relation to how it makes possible, or restricts, 
the connections that allow for creative responses to the event. In this regard slow and 
fast are not only objective measures of speed, but qualitative evaluations of 
compatibility. We will return to this evaluative critical dimension in the last section of 
the chapter. 
The public assemblage and the time of the public 
We are now able to apply this concept of assembling time to the public sphere as 
assemblage, where time will be seen as immanent to the process by which a public 
forms. Again, a public is not in time, instead the process of assembling is the 'time of a 
public'. Therefore, we will want to attend to where and how the swerve, or schiz, of the 
virtual event can open the assemblage to becoming. However, if the public is an 
assemblage, we need to conceptualize what it is that it is assembling, and how we can 
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conceive of this process without reverting to the will of a subject who calls the public 
into being, and which at the same time gives us critical purchase for intervening in the 
process of public formation. The approach that I will adopt follows Deleuze and 
Guattari's concept ofthe diagram and abstract machine as that which actualizes the 
event in a particular assemblage. The idea is to follow the progression of time in its 
repetition as it moves from event to assemblage, stressing the indeterminacy and 
eventfulness of this process. This is conceived, following Deleuze and Guattari as a 
series of machinic syntheses, which I will characterize, following Massumi, as the 
connective, disjunctive and conjunctive syntheses ofthe event (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1984; Massumi 1992; Holland 1999; De Landa 2000).2 It is this last synthesis that is 
central to the discussion here as that which actualizes a public, but I mention the others 
because there is no linear progression- the three synthesis exist concurrently and come 
together in a 'consistent' whole. Focusing on the conjunctive synthesis, then, it is 
argued that we can understand the public in terms of the conjunction of a statements and 
visibilities. The public assemblage forms a territory, in which it is possible to 'see' that 
a particular state of affairs is legitimate- we thus have a machinic production of 
legitimacy and subjectivity. However, there is always something excessive to this 
arrangement, and the question we need to ask is how this excess is made visible and how 
it opens the territory to becoming. 
The first synthesis and assemblage that I want to attend to, is that which forms by 
chance, due to an 'accidental' meeting of two or more objects, but which is also as a 
reflection of an affinity and compatibility that is intrinsic to the matter in question (e.g. 
different sized grains of sand and pebbles filtering in a stream form in layers based on a 
chance encounter and physical affinity) (Massumi 1992). The connective synthesis is an 
actualization of the virtual, an event, and it results in new identifiable entities in the 
world, which behave with a predictable regularity. We can say that this synthesis 
creates a 'coded milieu'. However, the new connections have not yet been identified, 
but are simply the connection between matter that have come together through a chance 
2 These terms are developed by Deleuze and Guattari ( 1984) in Anti-Oedipus, but my treatment of them 
here owes more to Massumi's use of these terms; Massumi uses them more broadly then to critique 
psychoanalysis and state control. 
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encounter, or which have 'found' an affinity for connection after being brought together 
by an unrelated functional requirement. However, even if 'unidentified', the new entity 
can form connections with what already exists within the coded milieu, it can disrupt 
and start to 'demand' to be noticed. This first synthesis leads to what Deleuze and 
Guattari (1988) call a 'machinic assemblage', in as much as when viewed abstractly the 
world here appears as a kind machine, joining compatible segments that come into 
contact with each other. 
This then leads to a need to understand how this new entity can be incorporated into the 
existing state of affairs. This is where a second synthesis takes place, that of knowledge 
formation that gives an identity to the new object. This second synthesis is called a 
disjunctive synthesis, and it is by no means a simple matter, but is again an event in 
itself. The work in the social studies of scientific knowledge (SSK) captures the 
eventfulness of the formation of scientific knowledge (Latour 1993; Latour 1999a; 
Demeritt 2001; Hinchliffe 2001; Braun 2002; 2002; Whatmore 2002). SSK highlights 
that the laboratory is not a place where nature is 'revealed', but a material context 
through which the scientist and the object of study both come in to being through the 
smooth functioning of the experimental apparatus- it is an event (Latour 1999a chap. 4 
and 5). If all the objects hold together, and the experiment produces the hoped for result, 
the scientist infers that the hypothesis was correct, and that there is a new kind of object 
'out there' in nature, or that s/he has discovered new characteristics of an already 
existing object. At this point the scientist is able to name the object and it comes into 
being; this is what Deleuze and Guattari ( 1988) call an 'incorporeal transformation' -
nothing has changed materially, but the naming of it allows it to be treated in new ways.3 
This, of course, will only be sustained so long as the new identity can be repeated or 
used in different contexts (e.g. other laboratories, industry- see below on how the 
identity is used) (Latour 1986). A similar process of assemblage is present in all 
knowledge formation, but the important outcome for our purposes here is that it 
3 Massumi ( 1992) uses marriage as an example of an incorporeal transformation effectuated by the 
statement 'I do'. Deleuze and Guattari ( 1988) make reference to a Judge's verdict as an example of an 
incorporeal transformation. The point I take from these is that the what results is a stable identity. It is 
not just a passing statement which repeats a familiar scene (e.g. saying 'Good Morning' to your eo-
workers) 
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produces an identity for the new object that entered the world in the connective 
synthesis. It is now possible to describe in a series of statements what the object is and 
how it will behave, how it can safely combined with other objects, and where and when 
it might cause disruption (this is not confined to inhuman objects, but all identities). As 
an identity, the object enters the world of knowledge, a world of already existing 
statements where the new identity rearranges what is considered possible, and true. The 
word disjunction captures the fact the object has been disjoined from its context of 
emergence, and through its incorporation in knowledge it is now expected to connect 
only in certain kinds of predictable ways -either this or that, or that and those etc. (e.g. 
tropical flowers will not grow outdoors in Canada) (Massumi 1992).4 It provides us 
with a series of possible options for what is reasonable, given a particular goal and set of 
conditions. This is a process of 'overcoding' that doubles the coding of milieu in which 
the object might be found. This act of identity formation is what Deleuze and Guattari 
( 1988) call a collective assemblage of enunciation (in this case it is the laboratory). 
In summary, the connective and disjunctive syntheses produce both a context where a 
problem becomes visible in a particular state of affairs, and as a series of statements 
(knowledge) that identify the object and how it is possible to respond to the problem it 
raises. Both ofthese syntheses exhibit what Deleuze and Guattari call a 'double 
articulation' ( 1988), in that in bringing together a particular conjunction of objects it 
produces a new potential in the world, something more emerges that 'doubles' and goes 
beyond the mere addition of what was there before - it is an event because it is 
productive of difference. In this way, we can say that synthesis propagates the event if 
in its 'new' form the event continues to have disruptive effect- e.g. it requires us to 
change how we do things, and it remains problematic (Massumi 2002a). 
We are now able to address the conjunctive synthesis that forms the public assemblage. 
This repeats the connective and disjunctive synthesis, but on a different 'plane', because 
4 Deleuze and Guattari ( 1984) distinguish between an 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' disjunction. The latter 
tends to limit what the new knowledge object can connect with, while the former tends to open the object 
to the possibility of new connections. As with all ofDeleuze and Guattari's terms, this is an evaluative 
criteria of the 'more or less' kind, rather than a strict binary of types. 
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what is brought together is a series of pre-existing identities (human and non-human), 
whose conjunction will 'legitimate' the different identities- there will be a second 
incorporeal transformation. If an event remains problematic, it will be necessary to 
decide how to respond to the event, i.e. necessary to choose among the possible options 
articulated in the disjunctive synthesis. This is where the conjunctive synthesis comes 
in, for it brings together a disparate set of elements that might not otherwise have been 
combined (Massumi 1992). Deleuze and Guattari use the example of the feudal 
assemblage to capture this most general and heterogeneous of syntheses: 
Taking the feudal assemblage as an example, we would have to consider 
the interminglings of bodies defining feudalism: the body of the earth and 
the social body; the body ofthe overlord, vassal and serf; the body of the 
knight and the horse and their new relation to the stirrup; the weapons 
and tools assuring a symbiosis of bodies- a whole machinic assemblage. 
We would have to consider statements, expressions, the juridical regime 
ofheraldry, all ofthe incorporeal transformations, in particular, oaths, 
and their variables (the oath of obedience, but also the oath of love, etc.): 
the collective assemblage of enunciation. (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 
p.89). 
This final assemblage, then, brings together both the bodies of the machinic assemblage 
and the identities of the collective assemblage of enunciation. A public is this kind of 
assemblage, for it legitimates a particular claim (a particular truth), by binding it with a 
particular arrangement of things- it actualizes the sayable and the visible (Deleuze, 
1999). In the example of the feudal system we have a very large and stable assemblage, 
one repeated across space and time for a long historical period. But the concept of a 
public as an assemblage works on a smaller scale. The concept of a public here has no 
fixed form (a place) or content (set of people), but is produced wherever and whenever it 
actualized (Rafael, 2003). It is always an event that brings together a diversity of 
statements within a particular context. The example that both Massumi and Deleuze and 
Guattari use is of a court judgement, which both legitimates the power of the judges and 
the law, but also transforms the prisoner into a legitimate convict. After the 'incorporeal 
transformation' of this conjunction, the prisoner leaves as a guilty convict, and the 
judge, lawyers and spectators leave as responsible members of society. Within this 
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context we can conceive of one person as being part of several, perhaps contradictory 
publics, as they move through space and time and are taken up within the assemblage. 
In chapter one, it was suggested, following Warner (2002) that a public can be 
understood as a circulation of texts, and that a public has no existence outside of this 
circulation. We can now see that this circulation does not consist of a text that moves 
through pre-existing contexts, but a 'reading' (viewing, listening, uttering) of a text that 
actualizes a particular context and so 'calls a public into being'. Different kinds of texts 
are used in particular contexts, and so characterize the duration of a public. "The 
temporality of circulation is not continuous or indefinite; it is punctual. There are 
distinct moments and rhythms, from which distance in time can be measured. Papers 
and magazines are dated, and when they first appear they are news. Reviews appear 
with a sense of timeliness. At a further remove there are regular publishing seasons ... ". 
A public then may consist of the reading of a magazine article on subway, or a television 
program recalled during a dinner party, or a more sustained engagement such as book 
dealing with a particular issue, or a professional or personal rehearsal of a particular set 
of ideas and practices. In each case the reading of at text is part of assembling a public 
that calls into being a world, both immediately in a context, but also imaginatively in 
terms of a past and future and trajectory of the possible: "Circulation organizes time. 
Public discourse is contemporary and oriented towards the future" (Warner 2002 all 
quotes pp.94-96). This image of a multi-temporal circulation oftexts is a very useful 
one, because we can imagine a public assemblage as emerging at the intersection of 
multiple circulations and in a given context. 
Where I would diverge from Warner's account is in the primacy it places on the text, 
rather than the context of its reading. For in doing so, he ignores a whole other set of 
punctual rhythms that may influence the reading of the text; for example the manner in 
which past experience can be recalled by a particular encounter in space, thus folding the 
past into the present, or even triggering a different image of the future than the one 
evoked in the text (Crang and Travlou 200 I). Here we have series of overlapping 
durations in which a person is more or less engaged, but which can interpenetrate and 
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influence one another in a particular context. Hence, Warner claims that: "The more 
punctual and abbreviated the circulation, the closer a public stands to politics. At longer 
rhythms or more continuous flows, action becomes harder to imagine." Yet this is does 
not mean that durations with 'longer rhythms or more continuous flows' are not 
influential, they may be recalled at the same time as a more contemporary text is read, 
thus folding different temporalities into each other and forming the time of the event--
it is not that the longer rhythm has less impact, it just "becomes harder to imagine", it is 
more unruly. Warner's concept of a world of circulating texts, all moving at different 
'speeds' and rhythms, is akin to the imaginary of multiple times pace networks we 
reviewed above, which if multiplied quickly reach a complexity that is better grasped by 
collapsing them into one singular emerging duration, in which the past and present and 
possible future co-exist in a singular unfolding of time (Anseii-Pearson 2002).5 As a 
result, a recognized public only exists in repetition and a set of practices. A person does 
not just 'believe' the content of a particular text; they use the content to assemble a 
particular context and to go on. If it stop's being useful, it stops being legitimate. 
The upshot of all this complexity, however, is the binding together of an utterance and a 
context, a statement and space, in a way that creates a recognized identity. The concept 
ofthe assemblage builds on what Foucault would call a dispositifofspace and 
knowledge that expresses power (e.g. the modern penal system) (Deleuze 1999; Patton 
2000). However, at this point we need to ask how these different actualized 
assemblages are created- by whose will, who wields this 'power'? The answer is 
nobody's will determines even if some have more force, they are an expression of what 
Nietzsche calls a will to power, and what Deleuze and Guattari call an abstract machine 
( 1988 p.l41-148). The abstract machine is virtual in the sense used above, and it 
connects words and things, expression and content, immanently within a particular 
conjunction. An abstract machine has no substance (it is not actualized), and it works 
not by connecting recognized forms and substances, but by connecting only matter and 
function 'diagrammatically'- an abstract machine is "a diagram independent of the 
5 In this regard, Deleuze's concept of the 'pure past' is useful, where time is conceived of as a cone in 
which the unfolding present moment forms the apex, with the whole of the past present, but not 
necessarily recalled at any one time (see Anseii-Pearson, 2002 pp. 180, 194 ). 
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forms and substances, expressions and contents, it will distribute" (ibid. p.l41 ). It is 
only once matter and functions have been joined by virtue of their diagrammatic affinity 
that they become actualized in an assemblage, where it is possible to distinguish them in 
terms of form and substance, content and expression. Hence, if we think ofthe double 
articulation mentioned above, the abstract machine is what works to create the first 
articulation, or connection, leading from there to a recognizable assemblage in the 
second articulation. The abstract machine works immanently on unformed matter, but it 
"is neither an infrastructure that is determining in the last instance nor a transcendental 
Idea that is determining in the supreme instance. Rather it plays a piloting role" (ibid. 
p.l42). In terms of our discussion of time above, the assemblage reflects the actualized 
portion of duration, while the abstract machine is the virtual multiplicity which is always 
in the process of drawing new connections. This means that an assemblage is radically 
indeterminate, but not indeterminable- it is determined within the event, and as an 
expression of the event. The assemblage actualizes into content (machinic assemblage) 
and expression (collective assemblage of enunciation), and in so doing it creates the 
conditions for further diagrammatic relations to be joined by the abstract machine. 
A diagram actualizes as an assemblage, and assemblages can be categorized by their 
degree of consistency. On the one hand there are loosely held together, and form a 
'plane of consistency', while on the other they are tightly bound and well formed and 
can characterized as strata (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.33 7). Between these two poles, 
an assemblage is characterized as multiplicity of elements that form a territory; on the 
one hand there are highly territorialized elements, which bind the assemblage to the 
strata, while on the other there are 'deterritorialized' elements, that can make 
connections beyond the strata and open the assemblage, and set the whole territory into a 
process of becoming and change. In order to understand how this happens in the case of 
a public assemblage, we need to recall that the subject is itself formed within the 
assemblage, at the intersection of the visible and sayable, or content and expression. As 
a body (a person) moves through timespace, he or she is actualized in the assemblage as 
a subject, and so we enter here the interval between the virtual and the actual discussed 
above. Therefore, even though it may be just for the briefest of moments, the subject 
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can sense that the assemblage is a reduction of the full complexity ofthe event in which 
they are immersed (Thrift 2000b ); this sense of excess (which will return to in greater 
detail in chapters 5 and 6) can prod the subject into thinking of other ways to go on, 
other possibilities. The subject is not in control, but in thinking the event they can act as 
a 'cutting edge of deterritorialization' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988). 
As an example, we can consider the case of the disciplinary assemblage as a way of 
understanding how the assemblage starts to 'crack-up' in its repetition. Deleuze ( 1999 
esp. chap. 3) argues that in the assemblage expression (e.g. words) and content (e.g. 
persons, things) both have form and substances that are independent of each other, and 
that must be brought together by the diagram, or abstract machine. Thus, if we think of 
disciplinary assemblage, it has a form of expression, which is the penal law, and a form 
of content, which is the prison. Both the form of content and the form of expression 
have a substance. The substance of criminal law is the delinquent, so long as it is the 
object of discourse; the substance of the prison is the body of the prisoner. It is the 
abstract machine, or diagram, of disciplinary power that conjugates these two forms-
expression and content -- and holds them together such that their two substances appear 
to be one and the same body- i.e. the delinquent is the prisoner. Expression and content 
do not reflect signifier and signified, they must be brought together and are exterior, or 
autonomous, in relation to each other. If the prisoner is not seen as a delinquent, then it 
becomes harder to treat him or her as a prisoner (Deleuze 1999 p. 47). The disciplinary 
diagram, then, is an example of Deleuze and Guattari call a strata, in this case an 
example of social or anthropomorphic strata (there can also be physicochemical and 
organic strata). A strata allows for a particular solidification and repetition in the 
organization of space and time, it solidifies the relationship between form of content and 
form of expression in the identification of a hybrid word-thing substance 
( delinquent/prisoner).6 
6 On different strata we might have a musical sound-thing, or a yellow colour-plant. The idea is that an 
object has both an expressive component, which gets its meaning in relation to other expressions (yellow 
flowers attract a certain kind of bird who are not attracted to blue flowers), and content component which 
emerges from certain 'internal' requirements (the plant can survive long periods of drought and high 
winds). There is no necessary relation between a yellow flower and a sturdy plant, but they are brought 
together by an abstract machine in a particular plant- life is creative. 
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The world, then, can be conceived as being formed of multiple strata, each one its own 
assemblage. But if we now shift scales and perspectives, different strata can be 
conceptualized as being brought together in a 'larger' assemblage, or territory (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1988 p.503). So we can have the strata formed from the disciplinary 
diagram of the penal system, brought into conjunction with the strata of the disciplinary 
diagram of schools or factory work. While the strata are 'coded' and 'overcoded' 
milieus (i.e. there is a defined relationship between content and expression), in the 
relationship with other assemblages the content and expression may not be so rigidly 
territorialized, and so it allows for the 'destratification' or 'deterritorialization' ofthe 
substances held by the strata. What allows something to become deterritorialized is not 
the contradiction (or gap) between form and content (e.g. not a contradiction between 
the prisoner and the 'inner' or 'real' person who is 'good'), but an excess that is not 
captured by either form of expression (penal law) or form of content (prisoner) and 
which allows substances to make connections with other strata. For example, consider 
an elderly man jailed for euthanasia for helping his spouse kill herself. He is a 
delinquent, because he stuck a needle filled with poison in her arm. He is a prisoner, 
because we see him there on TV, in an orange prison jump suit, surrounded by guards. 
But there are other forms of expression that might fit as well- discourses about what it 
is to be a loving husband, wise elder etc. And we can 'see' other things7 - he stumbles 
when he walks, has a voice filled with sonorous authority. In this light it is possible that 
the body that was legitimately labelled as delinquent/prisoner can deterritorialize and 
'move' to connect with a different discursive assemblage, one that makes it seem unjust 
to send him to jail, even if the reason for doing so cannot be articulated in law. In such a 
case, the vector of deterritorialization could be the image/story of the convicted person, 
probably broadcast through the mass media. What is crucial to note here, is that this 
deterritorialization was not willed by the subject, but was something that 'occurred' to 
the subject because of a relation that is excessive to the assemblage. Therefore, 
deterritorialization is open to empirical analysis and so to thought. In fact, Deleuze 
7 Deleuze stresses that seeing in this case is not restricted to vision:"Visibilities are not defined by sight 
but are complexes of actions and passions, actions and reactions, multisensorial complexes, which emerge 
into the light of day" ( 1999 p.59) 
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argues that deterritorializations are precisely the source of thinking, we must be "forced 
to think" by events in the world. We would then enter into a process oftrying to think 
why this man should not be labelled a delinquent, which would open a whole series of 
questions about murder, suicide, dignity in death, which might in the end bring us the 
problem of how we define today a 'natural' lifespan, or perhaps whether or not 
'punishment' is the right response to this event. 
These excessive elements form what Deleuze and Guattari ( 1988) call a 'line-of-flight', 
because they open the assemblage, and its subjectivities, to a process that might lead 
towards a new assemblage, and a new stratification. De-territorializations are always 
relative in as much as they are then re-territorialized. An absolute de-territorialization is 
not impossible, but it would be suicidal. The line-of-flight, or detrritorialization, is also 
an expression of the abstract machine, this time acting not to create an assemblage, but 
as the cutting edge of deterritorialization, making connections between elements brought 
together in assemblage. In this we can see that the assemblage remains open to the 
virtual. We can also so see how 'at speed' the subject can still be critically engaged 
with the becoming of society, but not in a wilful or transcendental fashion. Instead, like 
in the example above, it may be the shaking of an old man's hand on the television (a 
form of content or visibility), or the jarring use of a word (e.g. the word 'retard' in 
medical discourse - a form of expression, or statement), that causes the subject to think 
again, and so try to articulate the problem that can be seen, but as yet has no solution 
(and perhaps never will). Within the assemblage, then, the abstract machine works at 
'infinite speed' to create virtual connections that are sensed and seen, rather than firmly 
identified or articulated. They become problematic relations around which the subject 
stumbles with each repetition, and it opens them to a process of becoming. 
The role of an experimental critique is to be attentive, or sensitive, to such moments and 
to present them again in public discourse, to try to re-activate the sense of excess that 
was apparent in the event. The experimental critique works immanently, within the 
assemblage, and tries to magnify and propagate problematic relations. This means that 
the experimental critique must go beyond recognized identities, and make visible the 
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process of assembling that allows them to exist in repetition. In this way the aim is to 
open up stratified identities and relations in the hopes of encouraging experimentation 
with how different elements could be recombined in new relations of content and 
expression. In the following chapter I will explore how one can approach this task, 
given that we are talking about making visible excessive potentials that are usually only 
sensed within the assemblage, rather than firmly recognized and repeated. However, in 
concluding this chapter, I want to reflect on the role of the subject in this process of 
destratification, and why an experimental critique pays such close attention to the 
subject as a node of change. 
The Capitalist Axiomatic and a Critical Public Sphere 
So far we have talked about 'a public' in the singular, yet the contemporary public 
sphere is characterized by multiple publics and counterpublics. In chapter one we saw 
that at speed there is a risk that these identities resolve into hard oppositions and that 
they fail to address the novelty of the event. In terms ofthe Deleuzian language ofthe 
public as assemblage, we would say that the risk is that an assemblage becomes rigidly 
territorialized, and so restricts opportunities for experimentation with the event, or fails 
to open itself to becoming through interaction with different assemblages. Therefore, 
the critical stance of a politics of becoming is to look beyond individual identities, and 
try to re-activate the event (the problem) of which individual assemblages express are 
but one possible solution. Normatively, an experimental critique takes no sides, it 
moves between all identified solutions. However, it does take a stance 'against' all 
those forces that would try to limit the differenciation of the event. It is in this sense that 
we can say that an experimental critique is 'opposed' to State control, or control by 
market forces. However, it would be better to say that an experimental critique 
problematizes any attempt at closure and control, even as it recognizes the inevitability 
of such moves. Rather than opposing control, it seeks to escape, or avoid, control. 
Therefore, if we are to develop a critical stance for an experimental critique, it will 
always be one that evaluates (rather than rejects or opposes) control, not with an eye to a 
final solution, but with an eye toward evaluating better or worse, more or less 
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interesting, and so revealing that all solutions are reductions to the event. It is in this 
sense, then, that we have to understand Deleuze and Guattari's 'opposition' to what they 
call the capitalist axiomatic, a process that relies on high-speed technologies of control 
and which we will review in this final section as a way of articulating the strategic role 
of the subject in an experimental critique 'at speed'. 
In the discussion ofthe assemblage above, we used the example of the disciplinary 
assemblage of the prison, but Deleuze argues we are moving away from a disciplinary 
society towards a society of control, one that no longer relies on set places of discipline, 
but which controls the body directly and interactively through spaces that can be 
recombined in an almost infinite variation that anticipates desire and disruption: 
[In a disciplinary society the] various placements and sites of 
confinement through which individuals pass are independent variables: 
we're suppose to start all over again each time, and although all these 
sites have a common language, its analogical. The various forms of 
control, on the other hand, are inseparable variations, forming a system of 
varying geometry whose language is digital (though not necessarily 
binary). Confinements are molds, different moldings, while controls are 
modulation, like a self-transmuting molding continually changing from 
one moment to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one point 
to another. .. school is being replaced by continuing education and exams 
by continuous assessment. .. In disciplinary societies you were always 
starting all over again (as you went from school to barracks, from 
barracks to factory), while in control societies you never finish 
anything ... (Deleuze 1995 p.l78-179) 
In a control society, the assemblages are continually being modulated by high-speed 
technologies that allow for monitoring and controlled interactivity, which means that the 
subject is 'never finished', he or she has to always be prepared for the next set of 
changes (to career, to skills, to changing fashions etc.). As we noted in chapter one, this 
kind of control offers both opportunities for unprecedented freedom, but also 
unprecedented repressive control. Much depends on how the assemblages are actualized, 
and this regard Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between the working ofthe 
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diagrammatic abstract machine, that multiplies possibilities, and what they call the 
axiomatic: 
... we are not using the word axiomatic as a simple metaphor, we must 
review what distinguishes an axiomatic from all manners of codes, 
overcodings, and recodings: the axiomatic deals directly with purely 
functional elements and relations whose nature is not specified, and 
which are immediately realized in highly varied domains simultaneously; 
codes, on the other hand, are relative to those domains and express 
specific relations between qualified elements that cannot be subsumed to 
a higher formal unity (overcoding) except by transcendence and in an 
indirect fashion. The immanent axiomatic finds in the domains it moves 
through so many models, termed models of realization [p.454 italics in 
the original]. 
The axiomatic logic is similar to the working of the abstract machine in as much 
as it cuts across codes and overcodes, across recognized form and substance, 
content and expression, and deals directly with functional elements and 
unformed matter. However, unlike the abstract machine, the aximomatic seeks 
to preserve a certain kind of assemblage, it works within the virtual to preserve 
versions of the same, which are termed here 'models of realization'. Therefore, 
"diagrammaticism should not be confused with the operation of an axiomatic 
type. Far from drawing creative lines of flight and conjugating traits of positive 
deterritorialization, axiomatics blocks all lines, subordinates them to a punctual 
system, and halts the geometric and algebraic writing systems that had begun to 
run off in all directions" (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.143). 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that the capitalist state is an example of very powerful 
axiomatic machine, but it is important to realize that this is not to say that capitalism is 
in control; to say capitalism works through axiomatic control is distinct from being in 
control. Capitalism is a symptom of capture rather than the motor of development; 
while certain segments of capital and the state limit change through dispersed and 
mobile control, they are continually 'out of control' from the point ofview of social, 
technical, and material mutation (Massumi 1992 p.130). The fluidity and speed with 
which capitalism 'anticipates' (creates) needs, is based on its ability to maintain a 
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particular assemblage in which new connection can be quickly reterritorialized. For all 
its fluidity and flexibility, then, capitalism is inherently conservative; if it increasingly 
requires and provokes change, it does so in the name of a constant repetition of different 
versions of the same. Capitalism, or better the dominant segment of capital and its 
influence on state power, maintains its dominance by restricting access or debate about 
the technical networks through which people could begin to experiment with the 
organization of society, and thrives on multiplying the number of possible forms of 
expression that can be combined with the existing infrastructure - what Deleuze aptly 
calls an infinite tinitude. States regulate access to infrastructure, and regulate its content 
(your behaviour, how much pollution can come out of a factory or car, what gets shown 
on TV or in magazines etc.), but states do not create the initial innovation that leads to 
new technology and infrastructure, nor does capitalism. "It is not a state that 
presupposes a mode of production; quite the opposite, it is the state that makes 
reproduction a 'mode' .... Like seeds in a sack: It all begins with chance intermixing." 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.429). As a result, capitalism profits after the fact, and the 
state regulates after the fact, and both rely on high-speed technologies to monitor and 
contain such disruptions (Andrejevic, 2003). 8 Innovation- becoming- is always 
singular and excessive to its capture, which is why Deleuze and Guattari think of the 
state and capitalism not as a cause, but as an 'apparatus of capture', a 'machinic process' 
that immediately senses and reproduces its own limits without ever passing a threshold 
that would necessitate a different kind of state organization and a different kind of 
economics.9 
8 It is important to recognize the quasi-autonomy of the military in this regard. In practice the highest 
speeds are developed by, and reserved for, the military. In this regard state control is 'faster' than capital. 
However, to the extent that the military is subordinate to the state, and the state in turn subordinate to the 
capital axiomatic, then speed is subordinate to the market. In short, the fastest speeds- those controlled 
by the military- are in the service of a certain segment of capital. On the appropriation of the 'war 
machine' by the state (see Deleuze and Guattari ( 1988) esp. chapter 12. See also Virilio ( 1987 p.9) 
concerning the parallel mutations in both military technology and bourgeois trading class ). 
Q Deleuze and Guattari (1988 p.438) talk about the logic of the penultimate, or limit, in which one knows 
what constitutes the 'next-to-last' after which one would have to change the nature of what one is doing. 
This, they point out, is the 'economics of everyday life' and is characteristic of what the alcoholic calls the 
'last glass' after which he or she will be able to start over again (after a pause, a rest. .. ). 
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However, at this point we have to admit that it can never be a matter of simply opposing 
axiomatic capture; there are times for instance when one could imagine it would be 
desirable to block some lines of flight. But more fundamentally, we cannot do without 
some form of control -or at least it does not seem possible today to see what this kind of 
anarchism would look like, or how it could take shape in a progressive form. That is 
why the critique of control is always immanent and experimental, it is always trying to 
sense out the limits of control, and questioning how they could be exceeded or 
redefined. In this sense it is a critique with no solution, and its goal is not to call another 
public into being (to create another identity from the assemblage), but to create what 
Deleuze and Guattari calls a 'minor' discourse, by which he means a claim that 
highlights the limits of existing recognized possibilities: 
We have seen several times that minorities are not necessarily defined by 
the smallness of the their numbers but rather by becoming or line of 
fluctuation, in other words, by the gap that separates them from this or 
that axiom constituting a redundant majority ('Uiysses, or today's 
average, urban European'; or as Yann Moulier says, 'the national 
Worker, qualified, male and over thirty-five') ... What defines a minority, 
then, is not the number but the relations internal to the number. A 
minority can be numerous, or even infinite, so can a majority. What 
distinguishes them is that in the case of a majority the relation internal to 
the number constitutes a set that may be finite or infinite, but always 
denumerable, whereas the minority is defined as a non-denumerable 
set ... What characterizes the non-denumerable is neither the set nor its 
elements; rather it is the connection, that 'and' produced between 
elements, between sets, and which belongs to neither, which eludes them 
and constitutes a line offlight...minorities constitute 'fuzzy' 
nondenumerable, nonaxiomizable sets, in short, 'masses,' multiplicities 
of escape and flux. (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.469-470) 
In other words, the minority is that element within a recognized assemblage that pulls us 
beyond recognized identities because it is not recognized as part of any identity. Every 
assemblage has a minor element, an element that is more deterritorialized and so which 
is problematic. It follows, then, that a minor politics, or politics of becoming, is always 
asking questions for which there is at yet 'no people'- i.e. no assemblage in which it 
would be possible to recognize a new identity: 
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A minority is always somewhere a 'people to come'- our minorities are 
those 'future' people we might yet become. But we are thus 'peoples' in 
a very different sense form what modern political thought has called 'the 
people'. A minority is rather a people, an indefinite people, a people not 
completely defined or determined ... It can't be found in the public-private 
distinctions built on the concept of political representation. In this way 'a 
people' or 'a people to come' serves to expose what Foucault came to 
think of as a basic difficulty or limitation of modern political thought-
the distinction between state and society, the attempt to base the first on 
the proper arrangement of the second. It raises another kind of question: 
the relation of the 'undoing' of civil society or its determinations, and 
what is yet possible to think and see politically ... questions posed to 
politics which are not yet of politics [Rajchman, p.51-52] 
A politics of becoming, then, seeks to keep open the question of control and 
identification, and in so doing it questions the infrastructure of control. But to what end 
does it question? To no end, only to provoke becoming and experimentation. Because 
this kind of question is at present by necessity a minor politics, it questions only in the 
name of 'a people to come' and in the hopes of keeping politics open beyond the limits 
of the possible. The impossible question of control (i.e. the one with no answer) is how 
to create a State that is not premised on the 'proper arrangement of society', but perhaps 
to look instead for a State that is the expression of the immanent organization of life. 
In such a situation, critique of capitalism is always internal, or immanent, to the 
assemblages that exist, it is always an evaluation of the capture by capital and state. 
Therefore, critique it is always a 'self -critique- i.e. critique of the assemblage of space 
and subjectivity as opposed to critique of ideology (belief) and the subject. The 
relationship between the subject and its necessary mediation in an assemblage gives 
importance to subjectivity as a site of politics, but this has little to do with identity 
politics; the critique of self is a politics for a creative production- a desire for a genuine 
interactivity at the interface rather than one limited solely in the name of profit or state 
control (Massumi 1992; Stone 1995; Mesner 1996; Seller 1998; Clough 2000; Crang 
2000; Kittler 2001; Thrift and French 2002). New technologies create new opportunity 
for unprecedented connections, new ways of organizing, but not all connections are 
equally possible within existing social stratification. Clearly it can never be a question 
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of doing without social stratification, but it is always a question of a responsive 
stratification (rather than the moral overtones of a responsible stratification). 
Within an immanent critique of control, a subject is most radical or disruptive when 
invisible to any assemblage of control and capture (they are 'nonaxiomizable'). This is 
not to say a radical subject is necessarily 'good'- e.g. the criminal is invisible. 
However, it is to say that normatively, and pragmatically, we are aiming for the freedom 
to experiment with existing infrastructure and regulation -- the hacker as figure of 
resistance, people who live 'off the grid' (Galloway, Brucker-Cohen et al. 2004). In 
short, people who try to (re)make assemblages- which of course does not mean simply 
hacking, it can mean using older technologies within new technological assemblages, it 
can mean experimenting with modes of expression such as poetry or music, so that the 
whole is more interactive. A positive evaluation of the invisible subject requires a 
recognition that the axiomatic capitalist State- and by extension liberal politics- has 
relatively little problem dealing with difference (i.e. it can adapt to difference; whether it 
will is a matter of struggle) so long as the difference is only an 'identity' difference (i.e. 
one simply of recognition rather than organization). Political struggle conventionally 
remains on the level of recognition, but is most radical when it shifts to the terrain of 
organization. The right to organize takes on a different connotation, and resists the 
state's attempts to give resistance an identity that will reterritorialize it within a form of 
existing relations. 
If the critique of organization and production was before in the name of a class (the 
workers) and a teleological or transcendental end (the revolution, 'justice'), it is possible 
to argue that it should now be in the name of the invisible individual -the singular, the 
nobody, the whatever body- and that it has no end, only a becoming that requires 
h. I .. 1 10 constant et 1ca vtgt ance. 
10 This is distinct from moral and guilt ridden vigilance. Nietzsche talks about a need to valorize 
'irresponsibility' so that we can be open to responding to the event without the reactive guilt or shame that 
prevents an ethical response (Deleuze, 1986 p.l41) 
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The novelty of the coming politics is that it will no longer be at struggle 
for conquest or control of the State, but a struggle between the State and 
non-State (humanity), an insurmountable disjunction between whatever 
singularity and the State organization. This has nothing to do with the 
simple affirmation of the social in opposition to the State that has often 
found expression in the protest movements of recent years. Whatever 
singularities cannot form a society because they do no possess any 
identity to vindicate nor any bond of belonging for which to seek 
recognition. In the final instance the state can recognize any claim for 
identity ... What the State cannot tolerate in any way, however, is that the 
singularities form a community without affirming an identity, that 
humans eo-belong without any representable conditions of belonging 
(even in the form of a simple presupposition) (Agamben 2003 p.85-86). 
In writing this, Agamben is quick to note the risk of such a politics, in that those without 
identity have historically been those most ruthlessly crushed by the state because unable 
to call upon its mechanism of recognition and protection. This is why he writes of an 
'insurmountable disjunction' between the (invisible) whatever body and State 
organization- at present we cannot articulate clearly a form of social organization that 
no longer relies on the centralizing control of the State, and so politics no longer simply 
'opposes' the state with the aim transcending its contradictions. Instead, the political 
project proposed is a politics of multiplicity (Patton's term), one no longer based on 
identity or belonging, but on the attempt to multiply the number of collective, yet 
singular, becomings that a body can be accomodated within society. 11 At present this 
open-ended becoming of society is an impossible task, but one that provides a trajectory 
for politics 'without end'. This can be a "very disconcerting and dangerous idea: politics 
seems to revel in the idea of progress, development and movement. .. What prevents [a 
politics without ends] from blurring into fascism or conservatism?" (Grosz 1999 p.l7). 
The answer is that there is no guarantee, only a constant need for a vital 
experimentation. 
The role of the critical public sphere is to transmit the continuing disruption of the event 
and to encourage experimentation. But just as we cannot say that capitalism controls, as 
11 This singular collective becoming challenges the notion that politics is about what happens to 
recognized collectivities and group indentities. Deleuze writes suggestively: "I ... sense that we're rapidly 
approaching an era of half-voluntary and half-enforced secrecy, the dawn of a desire that is, among other 
things, political" (Deleuze, 1995 p.9) 
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if capitalism were a subject doing the controlling, we cannot say that the public sphere 
transmits, as ifthere were some form ofwilful transmission from the reflective, 
englightened and ethical elite to the masses. Capital controls- this is a diagram of what 
is happening not a statement of will. Likewise the public sphere transmits is a diagram 
of a rather unruly and indeterminable assemblage. If capital controls through 
identification, the critical public sphere transmits through a 'sensed' potential of that 
which exceeds identification- it 'perceives' (makes visible) problematic situations. 
This is what Deleuze calls the power of the 'false': 
We might begin with the terms real and unreal, defining them the way 
Bergson does: reality as connection according to laws, the ongoing 
linkage of actualities, and unreality as what appears suddenly and 
discontinuously to consciousness, a virtuality in the process of becoming 
actualized. Then there's another pair of terms, true and false. The real 
and the unreal are always distinct, but the distinction isn't always 
discernible: you get falsity when the distinction between real and unreal 
becomes indiscernible. But then, where there's falsity, truth itself 
becomes undecidable. Falsity isn't a mistake or confusion, but a power 
that makes truth undecidable (Deleuze 1995 p.66). 
lfthe critique of ideology harbours a hope for an 'authentic' relation ofthe subject to the 
real, the experimental and problematic critique affirms that no particular arrangement of 
identities does justice to the complexity of a reality in the process of becoming. Rather 
than make a claim for a particular state of affairs, the power of the false is better 
understood as a background against which different claims can be evaluated for the way 
in which they do justice to the event. Therefore, even if not explicitly embodied in 
particular state of affairs or identity, the power of the false shadows all positive claims -
not as a lack, but as productive excess with which to experiment. In other words, what 
is transmitted is that which is indiscernible, and hence the importance placed on 
aesthetics and affect in chapter six below. However, like all claims within the public 
sphere, the claims of an experimental critique exists only by virtue of their circulation; 
and like all claims, their legitimacy exists only in as much as they can be articulated at 
the same time as they are made to resonate with a particular state of affairs. In short, an 
experimental critique is just that- an experiment. 
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Programmatically, an experimental critique will unfold by tracing the event through its 
capture within a public assemblage, paying attention to the subjectivities and oppositions 
that it makes possible, and to the disruptive contexts in which an excessive element is 
made visible that can be used to open the subject and the assemblage to experimentation 
with change, i.e. to becoming. In following chapter I will engage in more detail the style 
of this kind of critique, and then following will be three chapters that present the 
formation and becoming a public assemblage in relation to air quality politics in 
Toronto, Canada. Chapter four will look at the diagrammatic assemblage of the public 
through the capture of the smog-event in a measure of air quality. Chapter five will then 
look at how individuals negotiate air quality claims in different contexts. The goal here 
will be to show how smog makes visible and problematic the question of control, and so 
open the subject to becoming. Finally, chapter six will look at how we might 
experiment with keeping the problematic question of control visible in public 
circulation, by engaging contexts where excess to control is made visible and the re-
activation of such contexts. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided the backbone of an experimental critique through the 
development of the concept of a public as an assemblage of expression and content, 
words and things, in a particular context. In this we have seen that a public exists only 
in repetition, and its claims are considered legitimate only so long as they remain useful 
in concretizing the world- i.e. allowing a person to go on and to make connections with 
others. Understanding a public as an assemblage means that we do not think of the 
public as having a definite form (place) and content (type of people), but instead as an 
emergent phenomena that must be repeated in order to be maintained. Therefore, a 
public is prone to disruption, and is indeed perhaps characterized by a constant 
disruption that forces us to re-affirm the public, and so re-create our 'belonging'. It is 
these disruptions that provide an opportunity for intervention into the public, and it is the 
goal of an experimental critique to use such disruptions to raise questions about how the 
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public has been assembled, and the reductions and limits it places on recognized 
identities. 
In the first part ofthe chapter it was argued that if we are to think critically of 
intervention of a public 'at speed' it is necessary to work with a concept of time that is 
immanent to the formation of the public. Therefore, we began by reviewing the 
materiality of time as assembling of space, and so stressed that there is not time separate 
from an organization of space. This provided us with an image of a world of multiple 
temporalities and growing temporal complexity. However, the limit of this approach for 
an immanent critique of speed, is that it leaves the subject 'outside' of time, and so 
quickly overwhelmed by the complexity. Therefore, we moved to explore a concept of 
time as duration, which sees the subject as forming within the unfolding of time. In 
duration time is movement, and in particular the movement between a virtual 
multiplicity and its actualization in a particular state of affairs. This means that any 
object in the world is but a temporary stabilization of a more fundamental fluidity and 
change. Therefore, recognized stabilities exist only in repetition, and this repetition is 
one that is punctuated by events and disruptions that open time to the potential of new 
trajectories and new becomings. This draws attention to the importance of routine and 
habit for getting 'a grip' on time, and in particular the importance of the accident, or 
disruption, as a way of being able to think 'at speed'. We need to think within 
repetition, and try to open repetition up to the event of which it is but a partial and 
temporary closure. 
The second pass then applied this concept of time to the idea of a pub I ic as an 
assemblage. Here a public exists in time, or better creates time in its assembling. 
Therefore, what is important is to pay attention to the disruptions that become apparent 
in repetition. The assemblage is first of all a heterogeneous multiplicity, but through the 
movement of a virtual 'abstract machine', it brings together utterances and contexts, 
expression and content, within a stable repetition. An assemblage, then, forms with 
greater or lesser 'consistency', or durability, and so forms into territories whose 
elements are more or less 'territorialized'. When many assemblages come into contact, 
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it is possible for elements within the assemblage to de-territorialize and cause a 
disruption. This is once again the expression of a virtual 'abstract machine', but this 
time acting as a 'cutting edge of deterritorialization'. It is at this point that it becomes 
possible, even desirable, to think about the potential of assembling the event in novel 
ways. The deterritorialized element introduces a play into the system. An experimental 
critique must pay attention to the context in which such disruptions become visible, as 
well as trying to articulate the problems that they raise for all attempts to capture the 
event in a pmticular assemblage. The disruption renders control problematic. 
In the final section, then, we explored how disruptions are re-territorialized by an 
axiomatic that seeks to contain the disruptions set-free by the 'abstract machine'. A 
critical public sphere that seeks to encourage a politics of becoming, must always work 
immanently to re-open the reterritorializations effectuated by the axiomatic. However, 
at this point we need to acknowledge that it is not clear how we might organize a society 
that does not effectuate some element of axiomatic control, and so centralizing power. It 
is not enough to 'oppose' the State and capitalism, because it is not clear how one would 
get beyond the axiomatic control it has set in place, but also it is not clear what beyond 
would mean. At present it is impossible to imagine a society that is intrinsically 
responsive to its immanent becoming. Hence, the goal of an experimental critique is not 
to find a solution, or to call another identity and public into being, but to encourage 
experimentation with the limits that are currently placed on recognized identities, and to 
make visible the problematic question of control. This explains the focus that is placed 
on the individual and subjectivity in an experimental critique- it is not a form of 
identity politics, or individualism, but is instead an attempt to multiply the number of 
collective, yet singular, becomings that can be tolerated within society, and so 




EXAMPLES AND EXPERIMENTAL CRITIQUE 
There are ... two ways of reading a book: you either see it as a box with 
something inside and start looking for what it signifies ... Or, there's the 
other way: you see the book as a little non-signifying machine, and the 
only question is "Does it work, and how does it work?" How does it 
work for you? ... This second way of reading is intensive: something 
comes through or it doesn't... This intensive way of reading, [places the 
book] in contact with what's outside the book, as a flow meeting other 
flows, one machine among others, as a series of experiments for each 
reader in the midst of events that have nothing to do with books, as 
tearing the book into pieces, getting it to interact with other things, 
absolutely anything ... 
(Deleuze 1995 p.8) 
Conventionally political analysis seeks to represent, and perhaps adjudicate, a situation 
of political conflict. However, an experimental critique falls between the recognized 
positions of political opposition. It does not ask what should we do, it asks instead: 
'given what we are told we have to do, how is it that all positions seem to say 'not 
enough' or 'too much' and so appear 'false'- in doing so, it makes us aware that no 
position has a privileged relation to truth, and so there is a need for a vital engagement to 
support what we believe, but also for a need for a continued experimentation with what 
we are becoming. In other words, as it name suggests, it is an experiment itself, an 
experiment in thinking that it is hoped will reinvigorate thought in political debate. 
Therefore, if a research text plays a role 'in' the public assemblage, it does not act as a 
manual detailing positions and what should be done. It acts as an example of how we 
can think again, or Deleuze says above "as a series of experiments for each reader in the 
midst of events that have nothing to do with books." The strength of this approach is in 
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the invitation to use it and think with it, the affirmation of a common problem with 
multiple solutions. 
In this chapter I will discuss how I will use the concept of the public as assemblage in 
relation to the public sphere of air quality in Toronto. The aim is not to represent 
different positions that individuals and groups can take in relation to smog, and 
adjudicate between different responses to smog, but to present the circulation of claims 
about air quality in such a way as to transmit a sense of the potential that inheres in the 
repeated disruption of the smog-event. A key challenge for writing an experimental 
critique is incorporating that which is strictly non-representable into a textual 
presentation -trying to present recognized identities in such a way that shows they are 
not fixed but becoming, i.e. in motion. As was noted in the discussion of time and 
duration in chapter two, a system that is constantly in motion is not one that is amenable 
to strict representation- any representation will always be a partial picture of an 
ongoing process. Becoming is sensed rather than recognized. The risk of dealing with 
such a fluid system in a social science framework is that analysis might be dismissed as 
'mere opinion' and so 'false'. In order to head off this misunderstanding, it will be 
necessary in the first half of this chapter to explain Deleuze's 'transcendental 
empiricism' (sometimes called radical empiricism) and how it informs the presentation 
and reading of concepts and examples. 
In the second half of the chapter, I will then engage more directly with how I have 
presented the disruption and circulation ofthe smog-event in the final three chapters. In 
geography there has been a growing interest in the 'non-representational', and 
'methodologically' this has led to three guidelines for a non-representational approach-
witnessing, presentation and detailed description. I will use these as a framework for 
linking my work to the theory in the first half of the chapter, and to introduce how my 
work in Toronto is presented in the following chapters. If, as has been argued in the 
previous chapters, a world of temporal complexity and speed is one that 'escapes' a self-
present subject, then it follows that one cannot produce a definitive representation of 
such a world without implying the researcher is somehow able to adopt a self-present 
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position outside the unfolding of events. This is possible only if one wants to freeze the 
becoming of a system and represent what is. Seeing as the task here is to try to 
encourage thinking beyond recognized identities, to describe a world that is in motion 
and to re-activate the potential of the event, it follows that it is necessary to create a text 
that does not represent the world, but which tries to intervene in the unfolding of events 
at speed. 
Repeating the event: using concepts to create examples 
In geography the focus on that which is excessive to strict representation is addressed in 
a growing body of literature labelled 'non-representational theory', a label attached to a 
broad set of theorists who try to think beyond a subject-centred mode of representation 
(Thrift 1999, 2000a, 2003; Dewsbury 2000, 2002; Dewsbury et. al., 2003). However, as 
those supportive of exploring this new approach have argued, it is not a question of 
being 'against' representation, but of opposing the "beliefthat [a representational 
system] offers complete understanding- and that only it offers any sensible 
understanding at all ... " (Dewsbury, 2003 p.l911). This is not to suggest that 
representational modes of analysis deny the partiality of any given representation; 
however, the critique of representation wants to subvert the resistant, judgmental and 
oppositional dynamic that is set up whenever analysis is always subjected to the criteria 
of true or false, right or wrong, which leaves no space for what is becoming or excessive 
within these binaries- i.e. that which cannot be strictly recognized. The challenge is to 
open our concepts and thinking to their limits, and so encourage a process of 
experimentation, of always asking ourselves to look and think again and differently. In 
the previous chapter I have developed the concept of a public as an assemblage, and 
have argued that the assemblage is composed of both virtual and actual elements, but 
that the former are non-representational. If there is a portion of the assemblage that is 
non-representational, then it is necessary to explain how we can research and write in 
such a way as to make 'make visible' that which is not strictly present without falling 
into mysticism. This will require an engagement with what Deleuze calls 
'transcendental empiricism' and in particular its use of concepts and examples. 
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Transcendental empiricism is a phrase used to describe an immanent image ofthought, 
one in which thought can never stand 'above' what it represents. It is 'transcendental' 
because some of the relations that define an object are virtual (they come from a realm 
that is known only in thought and sensation), but it is empirical because for Deleuze 
there is nothing ideal about the virtual (see chapter two). Empiricism, for Deleuze, is a 
philosophy in which everything exists only in relation; an object is not defined by its 
essence, but by the externality of its relations (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994 p.47-48; 
Lawlor, 1998; Patton, 200 I). Therefore, a thought is not ideal, it has an empirical reality 
that connects it with actual material objects. Within a transcendental empiricism an 
idea, a concept (e.g. ofthe subject, of the public), and a text, are not judged in terms of 
whether they accurately represents an extant reality- whether it is true, false, or mere 
opinion- but in terms of how well it is able to engage with that which it comes into 
contact. By the simple fact of being uttered, the idea has an existence in the world, and 
whether it is true or false is secondary to what it will do. In other words the question is 
not is this 'true', but is it useful and to whom? Therefore, in order to respond to the 
charge of that presentation is 'mere opinion' (or false, or fabricated) it is necessary to 
better understand how Deleuze understands the formation and use of concepts, because 
it allows us to be more rigorous in our evaluation of how to engage in and with non-
representational work. 
Concepts 
To embrace an immanent point of view, we must do away with the idea that somehow 
representation is 'just' a weak echo of the world. In order to do so, we need to 
understand what concepts do in the world. If one is not careful in reading non-
representational arguments it is possible to miss this point and think that what is being 
said is that theory and representation are somehow 'inauthentic' and suspect, and that 
there is something 'behind' theory that needs to be brought into the light of day by 
'presentation'. On the contrary, the task is to affirm theory's limits, and so redefine its 
place in the world, and free it from the burden of 'truth'. 
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For example, Dewsbury recognizes that a non-representational theory needs to move 
beyond the subject-object dichotomy, and so writes that we need "to get back to a 
moment of prediscursive experience; to recommence everything, all the categories by 
which we understand things, the world, the subject- objective divisions; to recommence 
everything to pause at 'mystery', as familiar as it is unexplained, of a light which, 
illuminating the rest, remains at its source in obscurity (Dewsbury, 2003 p.l91 0). Yet 
strictly speaking, ifwe follow the logic ofDeleuze's transcendental empiricism there is 
no source that is in obscurity, there is nothing to get back to; after Deleuze there is little 
mystery although there is joy and re-enchantment, a bracing affirmation of the world's 
unpredictability and constant differentiation. As Rajchman (200 1 p.l25) notes: 
"[Deleuze] was never drawn to attempts to turn the voids or silences in modern work 
into a mystical metaphysics of the Unsayable or the Invisible." Therefore, when 
Dewsbury et. al. (2002) claim that "The world is more excessive than we can theorize" 
(p. 437), it would perhaps be more accurate in the case of Deleuze's thinking to say he 
has theorized a world that is excessive. He does not shy away from using his concepts 
to dispel the mystery of mystery that too often shelters dogmatic thinking - in Deleuze' s 
philosophy sensation exist and is amenable to thought, the moment ofprediscursive 
experience is not beyond our ability to think and engage it. 
Deleuze is the pre-eminent critic of philosophy as representation, but he does so with the 
aim of freeing thought from judgments that limit what it can do. Philosophy cannot 
represent the world because the world is in constant motion, but it can conceive of this 
world in concepts, and so it can participate in the world. Deleuze's philosophy is 
totalizing; it explains everything through a constant multiplication of concepts (no 
mysterious background), but the concepts are created in such a way that they remain 
open to the world they hope to engage, they are tools for thinking about the 
particularities of the world without prescribing in advance what those particularities will 
be or should mean. Therefore, if we are to ask how to situate ourselves as researchers 
and readers in the plane of immanence, the answer has to do with our use and 
understanding of philosophical concepts. It is the way that we use concepts that 
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distinguishes a representational and transcendental critique from presentational and 
transcendental empiricism. 
In an immanent frame, thought is understood as a movement from chaos to expression 
(an idea) triggered by an encounter between the body and the world. We are forced to 
think. The act ofthinking is a repetition of the event, but it is not a repetition ofthe 
same, because clearly the first time it was an event in the actual world, the second an 
event in thought. Deleuze and Guattari create a typology ofways of thinking by 
dividing thought between the arts, the sciences and philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994 p.ll7 onwards; Massumi 2002a p.208-256). In the arts thinking takes the form of 
the direct connection between forms of expression (e.g. colour, sound) to create an 
image/sound/text that re-activates sensation of the virtual in the world (see chapter six 
below). Good art moves us. In science, the forces of the virtual are captured in a 
machine that measures them against a standard; science creates propositions about how 
the world really is, it creates a model. Science's concepts are representational, its image 
of thought is transcendental. Good science is useful, it gives control (see chapter four 
below). Finally, moved by art and intrigued by science, philosophy creates concepts that 
break open limits of our representations so that they can reconnect to the virtual from 
which they emerged. The concept is not representational, it instead gives conceptual 
shape to a problem (i.e. to an event) that becomes visible at the limits of science, and 
which is expressed as sensation in art. 
These three modes of thought are all interrelated: for example, given what science tells 
us about relativity, microscopic relations, flows of matter and energy, given what art 
expresses about the embodies experience in a world of flux, what today is an adequate 
concept of the subject? Deleuze and Guattari answer with concepts such as the 'body-
without-organs' and the 'refrain' (see chapter five below). The question is not what 'is' 
a subject, but how do you think about the subject in a way that affirms what we sense 
(art) and know (science), and which then reconnects a person to the virtual and opens the 
subject to becoming other. These are not relations of comprehension or extension (i.e. 
that refer to, or represent the world), but "pure simple variations ordered according to 
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their neighborhood ... The concept of a bird is found not in its genus or species, but in the 
composition of its postures, colors, and songs ... " (Deleuze and Guattari 1994 p.20). 
Therefore, the philosophical concept is incorporeal, it has no spatiotemporal coordinates 
only ordinate intensities- it is not the bird itself, it does not even refer to the bird, but it 
can help in thinking what the bird might be able to do, or what we may be able to do like 
a bird; the concept-bird is something we can use in our own life. 
But where does this leave social science? In the past social sciences have been just that 
-sciences. Even a 'soft' science is still a science- "Containing expression in properties 
belonging to general classes of beings is science's activity" (Massumi 2002a p.253). 
The social sciences, in both quantitative and qualitative work, have tended to take 
expression (images, personal reflections, quotes from interviews) and describe a class or 
type of person, like science the move is from expression to reproducibility. However, 
does this mean that to get beyond this we are suppose to be become artists or 
philosophers? Dewsbury (2003) has suggested that Deleuze's discussion of philosophy 
"explains a practice that can equally operate for theoretical work in other fields" 
(p.l9l6) and that "the researcher's task" is that "of inventing concepts" (p.l912). 
Perhaps, but that sets a daunting task (which is not in itself a reason not to try), and more 
importantly, do we not in the process become philosophers and not geographers and 
social researchers? I do not raise this question as an expression of disciplinary 
parochialism, but in the name of keeping some rigour and consistency in the 
understanding of what thought is doing. Deleuze and Guattari ( 1994) have already 
characterized their work as a 'geophilosophy', and so perhaps some geographers do 
embrace the task of constructing concepts, but for all its merit as a tool for thinking 
about space and materiality, philosophy is still, in the words of Massumi (2002a) 
"gloriously useless" (p.243). Philosophy is a speculative exercise that can feedback into 
'useful' activity, but in and of itself it only serves to inject questions, problems, make 
visible potentials, all of which ideally triggers wonder. Social sciences can provide the 
link between philosophy's 'wonder' and its 'feedback' into actual contexts. 
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Social research serves a 'relay' function between creative thought and more mundane 
practices and contexts; as a result it has always been political as it negotiates the 
insertion of new ideas and concepts into a complex reality that exceeds representation 
(Latour 2003). With a transcendental philosophy that judges and pronounces on truth, 
social sciences took on the role of police and the rebel, creating knowledge about the 
population and its resistance, narratives about the struggle over truth (Serres 1995 p.68). 
However, with transcendental empiricism, with a philosophy that seeks to make visible 
that which exists at the edge of truth, the edge of the recognizable, the social sciences 
need to take on the task of creating examples that can be useful for, and encourage, 
experimentation. 
Examples 
Following Massumi (2002a), I would argue that the role oftheoretically informed social 
sciences, let's call it an experimental social science, should use philosophical concepts 
to think through and make visible the potential for change in particular contexts. 
Massumi describes the work of art, science and philosophy in terms of series of process 
lines between the event and actualization- hence art connects expression to expression 
to create sensations, science moves from expression to reproducibility, and philosophy 
moves from reproducibility to connect back to the relationality of the virtual. He 
suggest that cultural and social critique could encompass a more general and ample 
movement: 
... beginning before the scientific limit of recognizability and continuing 
past its limit of reproducibility. This is a broad sweep running from 
philosophy to art, through the middle region that is shared, in passing, 
with science. If a process line succeeded in following this path, there 
would be nothing prohibiting it from then turning around and taking the 
same path in reverse, going from expressed quality to relationality ... 
Imagine the power of contrivance, the fabulatory skill, needed to pull that 
off. .. A process line of this kind would be most fraught- and filled with a 
unique potential. It might even be in a position to draw political 
effectiveness from its movement, perhaps serving in some way as an 
arbiter in the mutual interferences, battles, and negotiations between 
philosophy, science and art. It would distinguish itself from both art and 
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philosophy by taking their political middle as its eventual terminus (ibid. 
p.252-253). 
Massumi imagines the cultural studies researcher as an inter-disciplinary academic who 
practices a particular kind of politics, one aimed at finding a way of combining the 
insights of the different process lines of thought into a politically useful way of 
expressing the problematic situations that underlie social conflict. Would this mean 
creating new concepts? I don't think so, instead it would involve creating a 'translation 
machine' that would be sensitive to differences in modes of thought and being, and 
productive of a mode of presentation that encourages connection across difference. 
What is potentially unique about cultural studies is its institutional calling 
to substitute affect for interest, more or less vague affective tendency for 
sharp class self-defence. This is ... not something they would want 
everyone to do. There are acute contextual differences in many people's 
lives that make general defences of particular interest or rights a vital 
necessity. The removal [of sharp class defence] is self-referential: 
pertaining only to the activity of cultural studies ... Consider that the 
expanded empirical field is full of mutually modulating, battling, 
negotiating, process lines liberally encouraged to develop and sharply 
express self-interest across their collectively remaindered, ongoing 
transformations. The anomaly of an a.ffectively engaged yet largely 
disinterested process line could conceivably be a powerful presence if it 
were capable of conveying its (masochistic?) removal of self-interest 
(ibid. p.255). 
Massumi argues that this tending of openness and connection would necessarily be 
tending of "symbiosis as such" a tending "of coming-together, a caring for belonging as 
such" (p.255). Such an approach would not be without risk and difficulties, which is 
why he suggests it may be masochisitic -the researcher becomes vulnerable, indeed 
even invites, the punishment that comes with being misinterpreted as being 'for' one 
side or the other, or condoning certain kinds of knowledge and actions as acceptable, 
when one is in fact only trying to express the conditions of existence that make their 
presence understandable and approachable (not necessarily admirable or even 
justifiable). He suggests that this approach would be an ethical engagement (in order to 
stress that it is not abstract and prescriptive, but contextual and demonstrative). 
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Massumi claims he does not know exactly what such an approach would like for cultural 
studies. Fortunately, however, he has provided ample examples in his own work of the 
kind of ethical engagement will look like in social research in areas that may not strictly 
be termed 'cultural studies' (e.g. architecture, film criticism, media studies, political 
economy) (Massumi 1992; 1998; 2002a). Massumi's approach is to 'use' philosophical 
concepts to engage in evaluating the potential that exists in the social field, in the 
continued reproduction of its assemblages and strata. He uses the philosophical concept 
to propagate the disruptive element of an event in textual form. Again, this an ethical 
engagement, but: 
Ethics is not about applying a critical judgment to expressions product. It 
is about evaluating where its processual self-conversions lead. The basic 
question is: does process continue across its capture? Is the crossing of 
the gaps, the transformative feed-forward between strata, drift enough to 
keep it creative? ... [or] Does the success ofthe system's self-reproduction 
create such a logjam that it backs up the flow of expression spreading 
stagnation along its entire course preventing still-striking autonomies of 
expression from making perceptual waves? ... The next question is, can 
the logjam break? (Massumi 2002a p.xxvi) 
Therefore, in using philosophical concepts, one is evaluating whether the event that gave 
rise to a given state of affairs has ceased to have force, and is simply reproducing the 
status quo, or whether the existing state of affairs still has the potential to re-activate the 
lightning flash ofthe event and open itself to transformation. 
To use philosophical concepts to propagate the event, Massumi warns, is different than 
'applying' concepts. "If you apply a concept, or a system of connections between 
concepts, it is the material you apply it to that undergoes change, much more markedly 
than do the concepts. The change is imposed upon the material by the concepts' 
systematicity and constitutes a becoming homologous of the material to the system. 
This is all very grim" (Massumi 2002a p.17). For example, if we consider Deleuze and 
Guattari's concept ofthe subject as a body-without-organs, it is important to recognize 
that a person encountered during research is not a body-without-organs (BwO). To 
apply the concept to a person is to expect that person to be a BwO or, what amounts to 
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the same thing, to expect them to be an organized body, a territorialized self. Even to 
say that they have the potential to be a BwO misses the point, for it still suggests that 
such a concept exists beyond its conceptual home (as an idea in text). The world is 
composed of bodies and of the concept of a body-without-organs, it is not composed of 
bodies that are (or could be) bodies-without-organs. BwO is a tool for thinking about 
our engagement in the world (the BwO exists only if it is useful when someone uses the 
concept) not for representing the world, or predicting how the world will be. 
Social research can use the concept to think, not to represent the world; the task is not to 
apply the concept but to use contextual details to animate the abstract components of the 
concept and in so doing create an example that will have a wider resonance. Massumi 
argues that the example "is neither general (as is a system of concepts) nor particular (as 
is the material to which a system is applied). It is 'singular'. It is defined by a 
disjunctive self-inclusion: a belonging to itself that is simultaneously an extendibility to 
everything else with which it might be connected ... " (ibid. p.l7-l8). Unlike the 
application, which forces what is applied to conform to the concepts systematicity, the 
example creates a tool that allows what happened in a particular context to have a wider, 
yet not prescriptive or predictive, significance. There is a degree of creativity in putting 
together an example, but it is a different kind than the creative work of concept 
formation. Examples require that the researcher take empirical details and combine 
them in such a way that they make the concept connect to a particular context, but in 
doing so also make it is possible to connect (it' might be connected') the particular 
context to other (perhaps as yet undefined) contexts remote from it. 
The contextual details animate the concept, and the concept gives the context a wider 
resonance. The details used to animate the concept are related to a particular context, but 
they do not necessarily related to each other- for example, to build on a case Massumi 
looks at in discussing how affect is important to cultural studies, it may be necessary to 
evoke the blue of Sinatra' s eyes, as well as a particular person's experience with the 
colour blue, even if no actual person encountered by the researcher made a connection to 
Sinatra- it is the researcher who makes the connection having been in contact with both. 
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The success of such an enterprise depends on detail. "Every little one matters. At each 
new detail, the example runs the risk of falling apart, of its unity of self-relation 
becoming a jumble" (ibid. p.l8). And success is not evaluated by the criteria true or 
false, but by whether or not the example makes a connection with the reader, i.e. makes 
them think. Massumi breaks new ground in his use of current events as details to 
animate concepts, and he is my estimation the most successful at using the approach 
articulated here, but he is not alone in taking up this challenge. (Kawash, 1998; Patton 
2000; Thrift 2000b, 200lb; Massumi, 2002b; McCorrnack 2002, 2003; Pisters, 2001; 
Wylie 2002a, 2002b; Dewsbury 2003). 1 
Witnessing, presentation and description 
Having laid out these theoretical considerations for a non-representational and immanent 
approach to research and writing, I will now turn to engage more directly with how these 
ideas have informed my research and writing about the smog-event. The insight that 
there is something in excess of representation is not easy to translate into a concrete plan 
for research, a challenge which has recently been the focus of some discussion in 
geography (Dewsbury, Harrison et al. 2002; Latham 2003; McCormack 2003). What 
has come out of such discussion is a focus on the principles of witnessing, presentation 
and detailed description as an approach to research and writing that encourages us to see 
the non-representational elements of any assemblage. Witnessing refers to the work that 
the researcher does 'in the field', while presentation and detailed description reflect an 
interest with using conceptually driven examples to re-activate the event. The challenge, 
1 In the references give in the main text, Wyl ie has engaged the concept of becoming through an analysis 
of the Antarctic exploration, and critiqued Cartesian notions of subjectivity in a theoretically informed 
reading of walking. Dewsbury uses literature to animate a style of writing that goes beyond 
representation. Outside of geography, literature and art have been used as details to animate concepts. 
This is a reflection of Deleuze's strategy of using art as a trigger for thinking, and developing concepts in 
conversation with art (e.g. his two books on cinema, his book on Proust and Katka, and Sense and 
Sensation which engages the work of the painter Francis Bacon) (e.g. Massumi, 2002b; Pisters, 200 I). 
McCormack, Massumi and Patton have shown there is work to be done bringing these concepts to bare on 
non-fictional examples (even if in doing-so we tend to blur and challenge any strict divide between fiction 
and non-fiction). Finally, Thrift has applied the insights of non-representational theory by looking for 
examples of how performativity, and attention to affect, has become central to entrepreneurial and 
corporate culture, as well how it can be used to provoke us to think about those practices which allow a 
subject to enter into the 'interval of duration' (to use the phrasing from chapter 2 above). 
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as discussed above, is to relate the potential of the event by describing it in sufficient 
detail such that the event seems immanent again. 
The first guideline of a non-representational critique is the focus on 'witnessing' as a 
strategy for research. Quoting Agamben, Harrison (2002) stresses that the witness is not 
someone who testifies in the name of truth, but "a person who has lived through 
something, who has experienced the event from beginning to end and can therefore bear 
witness to it" (p.50 1 ). This leads to a commitment to so-called 'modest theory' (Thrift, 
1996b ), in which the concern is with "witnessing the conditions of intelligibility of 
certain terms of experience", and "how the terms in which this experience are described 
are thus given their sense only in relation to this form of embodiment" (p.35). In other 
words, in witnessing the researcher does not perceive a universal dynamic, but a 
contextual one, the challenge is to make this context provoke thought even if it does not 
strictly apply to the other contexts. This, as we saw above, is the role of the example. 
The narratives that are presented in the following chapters are based on my experience 
engaging with the politics of air quality in Toronto, Canada. Pragmatically, fieldwork 
was a combination of participant observation and qualitative interviews, but I was not 
actively engaged in observing any one particular group. In the summer of 2002 I moved 
to Toronto, and lived in Toronto almost continuously until the summer of2004. It is this 
experience that provides the basis for my presentation of how the smog-event is taken up 
in the public assemblage in Toronto. In the summer of2002 I conducted a series of 
interviews with people in Toronto concerned about air quality. Participants were 
contacted through email list serves for local environmental organizations, the City of 
Toronto staff email list serve and through word of mouth. Twenty people participated 
by keeping a one week diary of their encounters with smog, as well as a three-day time 
diary recording their daily routine. In addition, they were given a disposable camera, 
and asked to take pictures of times and places where they encountered smog or thought 
about air quality. At the end of the week they participated in a follow-up interview that 
lasted anywhere from 30 minutes to one and half hours in which we discussed their 
concerns with smog, their diaries and their pictures. The diaries and photographs, as 
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will become clear in chapters five and six, were not used to represent people's lives, but 
to provide texts around which a conversation about smog could take place. The 
interviews themselves were actualizations of the public sphere, and so an expression of 
the assemblage of the smog-event (this is discussed further in chapter five). 
During my time in Toronto I was also able to attend the 2002 and 2003 'Smog 
Summits', in which the Federal, Provincial and Municipal governments report on their 
efforts to combat air pollution. In addition, I conducted information interviews with 
scientists at the Ontario Ministry of the Environment, as well as staff working at the City 
of Toronto's Clean Air Partnership and the 20/20 Way to Clean Air social marketing 
campaign, the Province of Ontario's Drive Clean Programme, the environmental NGO 
Pollution Probe and the Ontario Medical Association. The interviews and engagement 
with the institutional public sphere allowed me to better understand how the smog-event 
is assembled and circulated, as well as how institutions try to create a public. This 
material forms the foundation on which I developed the presentation in chapter four. 
Finally, during my time in Toronto I was engaged in transportation activism focussing 
on improving cycling and public transit infrastructure, which meant that I was engaged 
in following the debates about transportation reform in Toronto. These experiences 
allowed me to understand the different positions that emerge in such debates, and gave 
me a sense of the degree of opposition and resistance that exists in an appositional 
political field. These experiences not only informed my theoretical argument in chapter 
one and two, but provoked and informed the thought that went into the presentation and 
analysis in chapter six. 
In all ofthese activities I was involved in different ways in the unfolding of the smog-
event, and the formation of different publics in Toronto, and in doing so I developed a 
sense of the potential that exists at the limit of recognized claims and identities, and 
which is sustained through the circulation of claims about air quality. The challenge is to 
then make the potential of this assemblage apparent in textual form, which as we have 
seen above requires an engagement with the use of conceptually driven examples that 
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will be animated by details taken from the field. In the literature on non-representational 
theory, this has been expressed as a focus on presentation: "we want to work on 
presenting the world, not on representing it, or explaining it" (Dewsbury et. al., 2003 
p.438 my italics). This distinction between representation and presentation reflects the 
fact that "non-representational theory ... is characterized by a firm belief in the actuality 
ofrepresentation ... Representations thus do not have a message; rather they are 
transformers, not causes or outcomes of action, but actions themselves" (ibid. p.438). 
To present something, then, is to be creative, to add something (however modest) to the 
world and see what it does. 
In the chapters that follow the goal is to render visible the problem that the smog-event 
poses to the legitimate control of the body in an increasingly dispersed and mediated 
society, as well as how this problem of control animates, and is repeated, as a problem of 
how to maintain a particular claim about smog in public. In this political approach to 
smog as a public assemblage, controlling smog is about the difficulty of legitimately 
controlling people. I am only secondarily interested in the possible solutions to smog 
and the barriers to their implementation; I am primarily interested in how the smog-
event makes visible these questions of control, and how these can be made visible 
through a conceptual re-activation of the smog-event. The point in doing so is to make 
visible a potential that exceeds any particular identity or positions, to re-open the 
appositional dynamic to its own becoming and to encourage experimentation. 
The overarching concept used in the following chapters, is that of the public sphere as an 
assemblage, however each of the three example chapters deals with a different aspect of 
this machinic production of a public and subjectivity, and so it brings in different 
concepts and details. Chapter four will use details from the institutional public sphere, 
and technical details associated with assembling a measure of air quality; these will be 
used with the conceptual distinction between molecular and molar bodies, in order to 
animate the working of the 'smog diagram' as it converts the virtual smog-event into a 
threshold measure of'good' and 'bad' air, around which appositional identities can 
form. Chapter five then uses details from participants' diaries and interviews to animate 
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concepts of subjectivity, in particular the concepts of the body-without-organs and the 
refrain. This presentation shows how the smog-event disrupts moments of 
subjectification and opens the subject to becoming; the aim is to make visible the 
potential that exists to encourage people to experiment with their own subjective 
refrains, and to encourage an evaluation of the degree of control that is considered 
reasonable and desirable. Finally, chapter six then engages with how we can experiment 
with becoming in the public sphere, focussing in more detail on the importance of 
sensation (percepts and affects) in opening a subjective refrain to becoming. Here 
participants' photographs and the artwork of Martha Rosier and Rainer Ganahl are used 
to animate conceptual understandings of how the subject is formed in an assemblage, 
and how images and texts can re-activate moments of subjectification and becoming. 
Taken together these three examples provide a fractured image of a public assemblage 
that works 'at speed', and which is continually in a process ofbecoming. Each chapter 
is an example of how conceptual thinking makes visible a problematic and indeterminate 
situation of control, and a need for a creative engagement in the public assemblage in 
order to ensure it produces progressive results. In the first pass we have an example of 
a diagram of an assemblage, in the second the subjective becoming that occurs within 
this assemblage, and finally in the third an example of how one might experiment with 
intervening in the process of change. 
As noted in discussing Massumi's theorization of examples, the success ofthis 
endeavour is crucially related to its use of detailed descriptions, the final guidepost for a 
non-representational approach. In the chapters that follow it is particularly important to 
avoid returning to a subject centred narrative, and so details should be used to position 
the reader at the center of the unfolding of the events presented in the text. This reflects 
an engagement with a concept of a relational or distributed subjectivity, as articulated in 
the work of Actor-Network Theory (Latour 1999; Law and Hassard 1999; Michael 
2000). The focus is on making visible the 'material compositions and conduct of 
representations' (Dewsbury et. al. p.438). It is necessary to write in a style that points to 
certain relations and objects present during the actualization of the public assemblage, 
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and how that naming in turn impacts what the presentation can do, i.e. how it might 
provoke the reader to think about how else the assemblage might be actualized. This 
takes us away from talking about subjects that pre-exist the event, towards 
understanding how a subject is constituted in the given. 
There are no rules for what details and objects one should pay attention to in making a 
concept work as a tool for propagating the event. However, there is a matter of a style 
that avoids creating a narrative that unfolds based on the will of a subject (collective or 
individual). Colebrook (1999) notes that to avoid a return to subject-centred narratives 
Deleuze and Guattari adopt two points of style: 1) the infinitive (e.g. 'to write'), that 
does not admit a division between something and what it does. 2) The indirect speed 
act, which places the act outside the subject (e.g. 'it is said that...'). Deleuze and 
Guattari often adopt a style of 'free indirect discourse,' that switches between voices in 
the text (e.g. the personal I of the author, the impersonal presentation of a person, the 
indirect speech act that places a statement in circulation unattributed to a subject). In 
this way it is never clear whose point of view is being presented, and the reader is 
forced to make the connection between these different positions, and enact for 
themselves a moment of subjectification in which they can think about how the event 
might actualize differently. In doing so, the reader enters the assemblage that is being 
presented. These stylistic points for presenting the subjectless-subjectivity (Bains, 
2002) are to be used to create a text that presents subject as an expression of an 
assemblage, which reflects what I observed and sensed while interacting with 
participants, observing, reading or participating in public events. 
I take this to require a different way of treating material collected in the field. In relation 
to interview material, the researcher is 'free' to move beyond simply repeating or 
interpreting what research participants intended to say, and instead use their utterances 
as part of a constellation that the researcher is pulling together in order to transmit what 
the researcher sees as the unique potential of a given context that is being discussed by 
researcher and participant. This approach is apparent below in chapters five and six. A 
researcher still must acknowledge a context in which the utterance is used, but the 
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context does not necessarily relate to the participants intention. The researcher is 'free' 
from what Deleuze and Foucault call the' indignity of speaking for others' (Rajchman 
1999), but the participant is also free of any responsibility for the final product, or from 
any fear of being (mis)identified as the source of certain 'beliefs' presented by the 
researcher. There are no people out there who believe what the researcher is saying, or 
whom he or she represents; the social science researcher, like the philosopher, the 
scientist and the artist, is always looking for 'a public', or 'an audience. ' 2 
The narratives constructed in the following chapters will not have research participants 
who explain to the reader what is going on, or whose comments -once properly 
interpreted -- reveal what is going on; often in qualitative research the participant is 
given a name and some grid markers for the reader to get their bearing so as to judge 
whether or not the use of the quote is 'valid' (e.g. Jamie, a white 32 year old bookseller 
who lives in the middle-class district of X). However, in an experimental and non-
representational critique, the goal is not to represent subjects, and understand intention, 
but to think beyond what is recognized and intended- and for this the researcher must 
take full responsibility. What is given in the following chapters are examples, which 
include details from interview material, and material collected from time spent as part of 
the public assemblage of air quality in Toronto. I have thought about how to present this 
material in a way that connects a context to a concept, which will hopefully make the 
smog-event continue to have disruptive potential and encourage experimentation. This 
is a kind of participant-participation that moves the encounter in the field beyond what it 
was and is, towards what it could be. This is a thoroughly 'impersonal' presentation, 
because it does not 'apply' to anyone, it does not represent anyone's point of view. 
It is only subsequent to such an impersonal account that the researcher can allow herself 
or himself to make a statement about the potential of such an encounter, because the 
conditions for such an evaluation will have been laid bare, and other possibilities of 
2 Latour (2003) makes a similar point: "One could say that, 70 years further on, we are led finally to what 
John Dewey focused on: social sciences have to create the public, defined by him as what cannot be 
mastered by anyone but that can be represented, over and over again, by the social sciences and 
humanities." 
100 
going on will be immanent in the description. Thought can never simply remain 
unattributed, it must at some point reterritorialize on a 'belief', but it will clear that this 
belief is the author's, and perhaps the reader's if the text provokes thought, but it in no 
way claims to represent participants' belief (Colebrook, 1995). The resulting product is 
meant to be circulate the event in 'public', but in a wholly transformed state-
participants may recognize nothing of it. Such presentations are fragile creations that 
will only gain in strength if they are affirmed by those who read them and re-activate the 
event by seeing a different potential within what is described. Rather than a fidelity to 
what participants intended, there is a 'fidelity to the event' (McCormack, 2003). 
CONCLUSION 
An experimental critique works from within the unfolding of the public assemblage. 
However, this poses a problem for research because by definition that which is 
unfolding is non-representational, it has no final form. Instead, embracing the 
conceptual path we have outlined in the first chapters, we need to accept that the public 
exists in repetition and is continually changing its actual character (if only by degrees). 
Therefore, experimental critique presents the assemblage in a way that makes this 
fluidity visible. If something is moving we can only ever present aspects of the whole, 
leaving it to the reader to then fill the gaps in their reading and put the whole back into 
motion again in a world of 'events that have nothing to do with books'. This means that 
the place that would usually be adopted by the subject in a conventional representational 
narrative is left empty, to be filled by the reader as they 're-activate' the context 
described while reading. Instead of presenting a synthetic narrative that explains the 
world, an experimental critique presents a series of examples of how we can use 
philosophical concepts to think about the unfolding context in which we find ourselves. 
The researcher, then, acts as 'witness', describing the context with an eye to the details 
that will hopefully trigger in the reader a sense of how they might think about their own 
situations, and the potentials it holds, in a similar fashion. This necessarily involves a 
degree of fabulation, research presents the conditions for experimentation, rather than 
represents the way the world is. But as we have seen, it does not follow that these 
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presentations are merely 'fictional'; it's only that they have a reality that is ascribed to 
concepts, not to a world of recognizable objects; a reality whose criteria of validity is not 
the binary judgment of 'true' or 'false', but the qualitative evaluation of (more or less) 
'interesting' (more or less) useful. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ASSEMBLING THE SMOG-EVENT 
Brown fumes. Fiery Sunsets. Pollution fills the days when the weather rests. 
The totally still, yellow girdle or haze binds the sky and ground together. 
Creating a third ecology, the vapour drops invisibly through the canopy of trees 
to slip into the drifter's nostrils, lungs and eyes ... Yet it is only above the canopy 
with the benefit of a foreshortening that pollution builds its body and makes its 
demanding presence visible. Like some immense unwanted backlash, it reminds 
us of the price of our total mobility ... Two ecologies [ground and air C.O], two 
modalities (speeds) of circulation and appearance. The two strata touch, as do 
the two speeds, when the freeway hews its way through the green carpet to 
merge with the air space ... the rider is brought to a realization. In fact, all 
brushes with the outer margins of the various ecologies of the city, whether ... at 
the base of the hierarchy or at its very top, hovering in an air vehicle while 
rapidly traversing both ecologies, tend to throw the whole into focus ... a 
sensation oftraveling along the tangent of the ecological envelope. 
(Lerup 2000 p.52) 
SMOG-EVENT: Toronto, 5:30 PM, rush hour commute 
The city of Toronto sits on the shores of Lake Ontario and benefits from a cooling wind 
off the lake, and on most summer days when the sun is out the sky in clear and blue-
Toronto, on a global scale, is not a particularly polluted city, it doesn't usually get 
mentioned in the same breath as Mexico, Beijing, London or Los Angeles. But in the 
summer months temperatures regularly reach into the mid-30's degrees centigrade, and 
if the climatic conditions are 'favourable' the sky turns a hazy greyish-brown because of 
air pollution. Usually in the canyon streets of the city core, or in a suburban backyard 
shaded by trees, a person cannot see this haze. But if they move out where they can see 
across a vaster distance, for example, while driving on highway 40 I that bisects the city, 
or one ofthe broad suburban arteries, the smoggy horizon becomes abundantly clear 
(Figure 4.1 dark band on horizon, and Figure 4.2 dark cloud at horizon); or perhaps a 
person will learn to sense when the air is thick, finding it difficult to breathe, or because 
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of a gritty taste in the mouth. In such moments, as Lerup suggests in the quote above, a 
driver, a pedestrian, may begin to glimpse their place within a much larger ecology. 
Fig, 4.1: Smog Horizon Highway 40 I Fig. 4.2: Smog Cloud Suburban arterial 
lfLerup 's intuition is correct, then in this moment of exposure to smog, the limits of 
existing borders are sensed , ground merges with the air, the body is infiltrated with its 
exterior; and in so doing air pollution brings into relation, for the passing moment, all 
the identities and structures a person had been using to navigate their daily routine- a 
person sees themselves as part of a larger whole. In that first instance - the moment of 
burning nostrils, or a striking brown horizon, a moment that always returns as a singular 
impulse, but never strictly before discourse - a person is faced with the question: ' what 
happened?' No sooner has that question been asked than the answer is present at hand -
smog, pollution, the result of wasteful and excessive consumption of energy. And so 
immediately a person knows what needs to be done, knows their relation to the whole; 
they can shake their head in despair at the fact that there are no alternatives to using their 
car, or feel content that it is just a matter of time before more efficient technologies do 
away with smog. Smog has been identified, along with its culprits, a pub I ic has been 
actualized in this briefest of moments. In this chapter l want to explore how thi s 
moment between sensation and recognition is sealed in the actua lization of a pub lic, in 
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order to then be able in subsequent chapters to re-open the gap between impulse and 
recognition as the interval in which a politics of becoming can inserts itself into a 
politics of recognition. In order to this, I want to trace the outlines ofthe diagram that 
allows smog to be treated as singular identity that can be grasped and put in its place. 
Smog is of interest to the discussion of speed, politics and becoming for two reasons. 
First, speed is central to being able to monitor and control smog and create a public 
assemblage that legitimates responses to smog. Second, smog is a good example of the 
kind of repeated disruption that I argued was central to understanding how a public 
assemblage is drawn into becoming 'at speed'. Before the event, smog and a subject are 
both molecular in the sense used by Deleuze and Guattari; which does not mean formed 
of molecules, but that they are virtual. The air is polluted all the time, but it is only 
under the right climatic, optic, and embodied conditions that it becomes apparent to a 
person and/or to political discourse. Then it becomes what Deleuze and Guattari call 
molar. A molar entity has an identity, it has an extensive limit (a cloud over the city) 
and sits outside the observer. Already, then, when smog is referred to in terms of 
certain types of molecules and particles it is a molar entity so long as it is imagined as a 
cloud that sits apart and that society can definitively control. On the molecular/molar 
distinction Massumi notes: "It is crucial. .. to remember that the distinction between 
molecular and molar ... is not of scale, but of mode of composition: it is qualitative, not 
quantitative ... When we say that a molarity is grasped as a whole, the emphasis is on the 
as. The particles are still there ... a molarity remains a multiplicity- only a disciplined 
one" ( 1992 p.54 my emphasis). As a molar entity, then, smog is set apart and, 
potentially, manageable, but as a molecular entity it escapes discipline, disrupts the 
molar subject even at times when the air shows no visible signs of pollution. It is a 
molar entity that it is possible to have politics of air quality and make claims about 
cleaning the air. It is as a molecular entity that smog triggers a minor politics, or politics 
of becoming, that questions the limits of control. In this chapter I will explore the 
molecular-molar (virtual-actual) conversion in the context of Toronto, and show that 
speed has been, and continues to be, central to maintaining a molar entity called air 
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quality- initially through displacing sources of pollution outside of the city, and more 
recently through the intensive real-time monitoring of emissions. 
However, smog remains molecular and escapes. There is actually no such thing as 
'safe' or 'clean' air (or none that can be measured). Instead, there is only cleaner air, 
and the debate about how to make the air 'clean' is implicitly about how clean the air 
needs to be, and what kind of social control is legitimated by this need. Therefore, 
pollution remains political, and not just a technical, problem. Failure to recognize this 
lends undue urgency to the debate about smog- we know what to do, the time to act is 
now, why don't we act!? However, the narrative presented here is not one of an 
illegitimate conversion of smog to a molar entity; this move is necessary in order to 
make decisions and implement some form of regulation (i.e. to be able to say: 'This 
action will improve air quality'). The diagram that I will sketch here outlines how the 
conditions are created that allow a public to be called into being. However, because the 
idea of clean air is a necessary fiction, claims stand or fall not simply on their technical 
merit in mitigating air pollution, but on their ability to maintain and legitimate a control 
network that maintains 'a public' (Barry 2001). This is necessarily an eventful and 
indeterminate process, each mitigation effort will need to be fought for and will be prone 
to disruption once created. Stabilizing a concept of air quality makes it possible to 
create and circulate what Deleuze and Guattari call 'order-words', statements which 
under the right conditions can be used to legitimate and identify a path to clean air by 
actualizing a public assemblage. However, because smog remains disruptive, it is 
possible to pursue a politics of becoming that seeks to keep open the problematic 
question of control raised by the smog-event. 
SMOG EVENT: Smog Summit, June 2, 2002: "The time to act is now" 
The politics of air pollution are the politics of energy efficiency, and in Toronto, as in 
other major cities, this focuses around two broad sectors- electricity 
generation/consumption for home and industry, and fuel consumption in transportation. 
Therefore, it is helpful to give some background in these two areas. Toronto is 
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Canada's largest city, and North America's fifth largest city, with a population of2.4 
million, and it is situated within a larger metropolitan area (know as the Greater Toronto 
Area) with a total population of 4.6 million (City of Toronto 2004a). The city and its 
region are largely suburban, which means it is heavily dependent on the automobile and 
trucks for the transporting goods and people. 1 In addition, people tend to commute on a 
regional scale for work (Miller 2000), yet regional transit is limited (Soberman 200 I; 
Munro 2002). 2 It is important to understand that in a Canadian political context that 
municipalities have little power, and there is no regional authority for the GTA, which 
means that much of the decision-making power for smog-related issues lies not with the 
municipal governments, but with the Provincial government of Ontario. In 1994, and 
again in 1998, the Conservative Party was elected to office in Ontario (defeated in 2004) 
and instituted a series of reforms that severely limited the tax-base for cities (Boudreau 
2000). This has left the city of Toronto with few options for unilaterally initiating 
meaningful transportation or energy alternatives and introduced neo-liberal 
entrepreneurialism to city planning and development (Kipfer and Keil 2002). Similarly, 
with regard to electricity production, the conservative government has been working to 
privatize generation, which effectively stalled any reform of the generation capacity 
(Stewart 2002). Energy production is dominated by the provincial utility (Ontario 
Power Generation), which since the late 1980's has had to rely increasingly on coal-fired 
generation (a relatively dirty source compared to other sources) because of unexpectedly 
lengthy shutdown of its nuclear plants for maintenance and repair (Ontario Power 
Generation 2001 ). In brief, then, the changes that are being discussed are structurally 
constrained, which means that they would require sizable resource commitments, and 
centralized coordination and leadership by higher levels of government, and in particular 
the provincial government. However, as will become shown in more detail below, and 
in the next chapter, in the absence of coordinated large-scale structural change, much of 
1 Miller (2000) calculate that 80.4% of all GT A trips involve cars and only I 0.8% use transit. 
Automobile usage as a percentage of total trips is lowest in the urban core, at less than 50%, and highest in 
the lowest density suburbs and the surrounding suburban cities, where 85% of trips use cars. Vehicle 
ownership reflects this pattern as well. The average occupancy of cars during rush hour in Toronto is 1.2, 
again stressing the dominance of the private automobile. 
2 Within metropolitan Toronto the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) has in the past been praised for the 
quality and range of service it provides, but the TTC has been struggling since 1990's due to severe 
funding cuts from the provincial government, which has forced it to reduce service and cut routes (Munro, 
2002). 
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the current politics of air pollution focuses on actions individuals can take to 'spare the 
air' by helping make existing infrastructure more efficient. Assembling a public at this 
level is not only important because individual energy conservation is a crucial part of 
any smog-reduction strategy, even if structural changes are implemented, but also 
because it impacts what kind of public can be assembled for more comprehensive and 
controversial changes (e.g. one that is predisposed to support more public transit, or 
more stringent monitoring of individual vehicle emissions?). A politics of becoming 
will take place in relation to how individuals respond to the technologies of control that 
are necessary to mitigate smog. What kind of control network is legitimate? 
At first glance, there is little contention about what can to be done to improve air quality. 
One might be tempted to say, along with Barry (200 I p.l72), that air pollution is "anti-
political", because government bureaucracy suggest that 'we all agree on what needs to 
be done' and the only questions are those of technical feasibility. Most obviously debate 
centres principally on the difference in the degree to which the groups are critical ofthe 
government's progress and priorities in implementing change, but not on the broad 
outlines of what needs to be done.3 However, what appears as being predictably 
3 In Toronto concern about smog is greatly influenced by the pronouncements of Public Health authorities, 
and in particular the Ontario Medical Association and Toronto Public Health. That is because, as we will 
see below, medical science is at the forefront of creating smog as a molar entity and also questioning the 
limits of such a conversion; medical science provides credibility and legitimacy to the claim that smog is a 
health threat upon which government should act. Health officials have taken on an advocacy role trying to 
encourage government to act more quickly and decisively to reduce emissions. At the municipal level, the 
City of Toronto has created an arms-length agency called the Toronto Atmospheric Fund/Clean Air 
Partnership (T AF/CAP), whose goal is to promote and support clean air initiatives in Toronto and the 
Greater Toronto Area (GTA). One of the key initiatives of this agency is to organize the Smog Summit 
every year, where all three levels of government report on progress towards lowering emissions; they also 
coordinate the GTA Clean Air Council, which serves to help the sharing of 'best practices' between 
different government departments and agencies. The CAP is also involved in communicating the 
efficiency message to the public through programs in schools, the publication of a 'Clean Air Consumer's 
Guide' and, '20/20 the way to Clean Air', a social marketing program to encourage energy efficiency in 
the home. Beyond this institutional tier, there are a number of environmental NGO's that work to lobby 
government to accelerate progress on clean air initiatives. Pollution Probe is active in promoting progress 
on clean air initiatives by bringing together industry, government and NGO's in conferences to discuss 
ways forward, and by producing policy proposals- sometimes of their own accord, and sometimes at the 
behest of government departments. The Ontario Clean Air Alliance (OCAA) is an umbrella group of82 
local communities, faith based and environmental groups, it lobbies for the elimination of coal-generation 
in Ontario and its replacement with renewable 'green' energy. The Toronto Environmental Alliance 
(TEA) is active in monitoring municipal progress, including public transit funding, and in lobbying for 
support for renewable energy alternatives. TEA produces an annual report card on the city's 
implementation of its corporate clean air initiatives. EnerAct is a non-profit group formed to promote 
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mundane about air pollution politics in Toronto is actually the result of a complex 
synthesis of the smog-event that will be unpacked below, and it covers over significant 
differences in the approaches that can be taken. The hegemonic consensus focuses on 
the efficient use of fossil fuels, and it is clearly articulated at the annual 'Smog Summit' 
organized by the City of Toronto, through its agency the Toronto Atmospheric 
Fund/Clean Air Partnership. The summit is meant to be an opportunity for all three 
levels of government in the GT A to report on their progress towards cleaner air in a non-
confrontation (non-political) environment. In 2002 and 2003 all three levels of 
government signed the "Intergovernmental Declaration on Clean Air", which included a 
'statement of common understanding' that characterized air pollution as 'a serious health 
threat', recognized the health based evidence on smog, identified ozone and particulate 
matter (small microscopic particles) as the main health risk factors in smog, recognized 
fossil fuel as the main contributor to air pollution, and concluded that "Compact urban 
form, combined with pedestrian and transit-friendly design, fosters opportunities to shift 
from automobiles to alternative transportation options" (City of Toronto 2002a). 
The structure of such a forum, and the wording of the declaration, is such that it avoids 
addressing why progress on the 'solutions' is slow, or in some cases apparently non-
existent. With regard to transportation, for example, it is agreed that the smog-free city 
will contain a mix of high-efficiency automobiles, public transit and bike/pedestrian 
accessible urban design; however, what the nature ofthe mix will be, and how 
aggressively it should be pursued are matters of contention. At present very little has 
been done to change the modal mix of transportation in Toronto. The solution to what 
mix is 'best' is ultimately a somewhat arbitrary decision- i.e. it requires a judgment--
renewable energy, and also runs a social-marketing campaign to promote energy conservation; in addition 
it offers energy audits of people's homes through a company it created called GreenSaver. Members of 
EnerAct, in cooperation with a local group called North Toronto Green Door, also created a cooperative in 
Toronto to fund the construction of wind-generation (the first turbine has been built, and they working a 
second). EnerAct also now runs a social marketing programme called 'Smart living' living to encourage 
home energy conservation. At the grassroots community level, I am aware of four groups that work to 
promote energy efficiency -Greenest City (Active and Safe Routes to School, promoting walking your 
kids to school), East Toronto Climate Action Group (public education displays, lobbying politicians, 
raising awareness about Toronto's anti-idling bylaw), Humanize Toronto (free public transit on smog 
days) and Good Air Safe Power (GASP; lobbies for the closure of a coal-fired plant in the west suburb on 
Toronto). 
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because one can always claim to 'offset' the impact of one particular action with another 
(e.g. try to calculate if more efficient cars means it possible to have the same amount of 
cars and still reduce smog-emissions). It also becomes credible to assume that, given 
enough time, technological progress will create the necessary efficiency gains to make 
air pollution a thing of the past without major restructuring of the energy or 
transportation sectors (e.g. see Goklany 1999). 
It is at this point that air pollution politics appears to be 'all talk and no action' from the 
point ofview of someone who wants to implement more fundamental changes to 
transportation and energy production and consumption. The arithmetic of efficiency 
implies the kind of threshold accounting shown in the above example, and while one can 
evaluate better or worse options, politics becomes mired in finding the burden of proof 
to support a particular option. But perhaps even more important than 'proof', is the 
ability to secure public legitimacy. It is in facing this challenge that we start to hear 
comments like 'the public does not care' or that 'the public is ill-informed'. At the 2003 
Smog Summit a series of'Citizen's Forum's' were organized that were meant to consult 
'the public' about what they thought about air pollution. Five hundred concerned 
citizens showed up at six different forums, and expressed a support for immediate and 
decisive action to reduce smog. Participants were encouraged to sign the following 
"Citizen's Declaration on Clean Air" (Houghton, Levy et al. 2002): 
l I 0 
Clean air is a basic human need. 
We know that the principle source of air pollution is burning oil, gas and coal in our vehicles, 
homes, businesses and electricity generating stations. 
Now is the time to act. 
As individuals, we will reduce our contributions to smog and climate change by using less 
energy, using cleaner energy, and using the energy we need as efficiently as possible. 
As consumers, we demand that business reduce pollution associated with the manufacture, 
transport and consumption of their products. 
As citizens, we the undersigned call on our elected officials to act with us to clean up the air we 
breathe. We need all orders of government to develop and implement policies that will reduce 
air pollution by investing in public transit, stopping urban sprawl, enhancing energy efficiency of 
our vehicles, homes and businesses, and facilitating a transition to cleaner, renewable sources of 
energy. 
These clean air policies are also vital to achieving our international obligations on climate 
change. We call on our elected officials to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the international agreement 
on greenhouse gases, as a public expression of Canada's commitment to take action on smog and 
climate change. We commit to doing our part to assist Canada in achieving this goal. 
This declaration not only repeats the hegemonic consensus, but also portrays citizens as 
willing to take action in their own lives, but frustrated by the lack of action by 
government-- it expresses a clear sense of urgency: "Now is the time to act". The Smog 
Summit report on these fora indicates that participants felt that politicians were "too 
timid and scared to mandate what people in their hearts really want" (ibid.p.3). 
Participants expressed the belief that "we know what the solutions are, and we're ready 
for the consequences costs of action" therefore "just do it" (ibid. p.2). However, if we 
look to see why government is timid, the only suggestion is that "there is a strong feeling 
that the general public are not sufficiently educated and knowledgeable about 
environmental issues ... " (ibid. p.6). In other words, it would be a political risk to try to 
implement bold actions on air pollution and there is frustration that the politics is getting 
in the way. The Smog Summit, then, is an attempt to de-politicize smog by legitimating 
the idea that we should all 'be efficient' and that we all know what needs to be done; it 
outlines the kind of changes that will be necessary to 'be efficient', but sidesteps the 
debate concerning what exactly would be the best course of action to achieve this goal. 
Individuals can then evaluate whether or not they are part of a 'responsible' public. 
1 I 1 
Those who are deemed to not be 'doing their part' can in turn be labelled as 'ill-
informed' or negligent.4 
The judgment of fellow citizens motives is not restricted to a few concerned and 
overzealous citizens at the smog forum, we can find within the ecological policy 
literature a debate about what role individuals beliefs and knowledge about 
environmental issues, including smog, plays in their actions and responses to 
environmental matters (Kassirer, 2002; Bickerstaff and Walker, 2003). The critical 
ecology approach to this debate critiques the idea that all that is needed is 'more 
information', and suggests instead that the problem is with political claims that say 'too 
much' by ignoring, on the one hand, the constraints and discipline that individuals 
negotiate on a daily basis, and on the other, promising to be able to solve problems 
which people know, from their everyday experiences, are actually much more intractable 
and complex. In addition, such literature points to the inherently constructed nature of 
nature, and the difficulty that this then creates for being to claim to 'represent' nature- a 
point I will return to below (Hinchliffe 1996; Slake 1999; Darier and Schule 1999; 
Bulkeley 2000; ONeil 2001; Bickerstaff and Walker 2003; Bulkeley and Mol 2003). 
The focus is on both the construction of the knowledge claim, as I will do here, and on 
its reception, which is where I differ. This literature provides a much more sympathetic 
and realistic reading of public attitudes, but what it shares with the approach that 
suggests that the public is 'ill-informed', is the assumption that there is a public that 
continually exists beyond the repeated moments in which it is actualized, and that 
members of this public act based on those beliefs (for critique of this idea see Owens 
2000; Hinchliffe 200 I). While this is undoubtedly true for some, and perhaps even for 
many who respond to calls to attend the Smog Summit or participate in research on 
pollution, it is an assumption that I will refrain from making here because it returns the 
subjective will and self-present citizen to the heart of political debate- this literature 
seeks to understand why people adopt recognized positions, whereas I am interested in 
understanding the potential that is created to go beyond recognized positions by making 
4 The focus on individual behaviour was even more apparent at the 2003 Smog Summit, where the theme 
of the summit was 'Making the Connection' between home electricity use and smog. 
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visible the diagram that supports them. The public must be created, and the Smog 
Summit is an attempt to call a public into being, just as a research interview is (Latour 
2003). However, as Warner (2002) argues, institutionally formed publics are usually 
fairly weak if they simply try to appeal to 'virtue' or beliefs of the citizens and try to 
impose a public from 'above'. In what follows, and in the next chapter, I will try to 
make clear why this would be the case in relation to smog. 
The weakness of an institutional public in relation to smog in Toronto can be seen in 
polling results from a survey conducted for the Ontario Clean Air Alliance of a random 
selection of 1000 Torontonians in December of 200 I (accurate+/- 3.1% 19/20 
times)(Ontario Clean Air Alliance 2001). When asked initially what were the most 
important issues facing Torontonians, only 1% identified air quality. However, when 
asked directly about air quality, 90% of respondents claimed to be concerned or very 
concerned about air pollution, 38% thought overall air quality in Toronto was poor and 
69% thought overall air quality was poor in the summer, and 82% felt air pollution will 
pose a health risk to themselves or their families in the future. The survey also found 
overwhelming support to close down coal fired generating plants (which has 
subsequently become a government promise), and for more government action on air 
pollution issues- but given that the question gave no specifics as to what that action 
might involve, it is unclear how much control and change individuals would be willing 
to tolerate should it impact their own time and material resources. In short, the survey 
indicates that there is high awareness of air pollution and its identified sources, but it is 
hardly at the forefront of an individual's minds, and it is unclear how this concern 
translates into action and political support in the event of an election, or other decision-
making forum. 5 
The focus on what 'the public' thinks leads us away from the challenge of understanding 
how a public comes into being. There is not just one public, but many, sometimes 
competing, publics who are able to come into being around different claims about how 
5 It is worth noting the actualization of a smog public through the technology of polling- it is only once 
directly confronted with smog as a problem that a person takes a position, and so actualizes their 
subjectivity. 
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to attain energy efficiency and clean air (Whose responsibility is it to act? Who should 
act first? What kind of action should be taken?). Claims about efficiency and air quality 
are what Deleuze and Guattari ( 1988) call an 'order-word' that transforms a conjunction 
of expression and content into a new molar identity -this transformation is an event, or 
incorporeal transformation.6 Therefore, in a particular context it may be possible to 
legitimately say 'mass-transit is necessary to achieve good air quality', and in another 
the statement 'new technologies will make smog a thing of the past'. Each of these 
'order-words' (statements) will have a discursive and material context that supports 
them, and which makes the conjunction between statement and content legitimate. 
However, this temporary stability does not mean that the body politic does not then 
dissolve back into its molecular reality, where it contains the potential to be called forth 
again. Therefore, each use of a statement about air quality is indeterminate, but 
determinable in the actual context where it will be used. 
Ifwe want to understand why there appears to be an apparent stalling of action on smog, 
it is necessary to look at the way that smog is captured (mediated) and circulated as a 
question of control and efficiency. Central to this stability is an entity called 'air 
quality', around which struggle can ensue as to 'how efficient' a person needs to be in 
order to have 'clean' air. However, the incorporeal transformation that legitimates 
different approaches to 'clean air' is not simply a speech from a podium- it must be 
repeated over and over again, and there must be people who perform the repetition in 
their daily practices. Responses to smog are not only a result of a 'rational' appraisal of 
risks, but are an event where knowledge must be sedimented within the materiality of 
the city, and this conjunction is always an event. To see this we can begin by looking 
briefly at the 'solution' to smog that occurred in the wake ofthe 'Great Killer Smog' of 
London in 1952; however, the solution here is one of displacement, and smog escapes 
this initial solution and continues to raise problematic questions about our ability to 
control smog, which sets the stage for contemporary debates about air pollution. 
6 For example, Deleuze and Guattari note, bodies grow old and mature, but 'retirement age' is an 
incorporeal transformation placed over the body, just as 'mature' can an incorporeal transformation 
performed by the order-word 'You are no longer a child' (p.81, see chapter two above as well). 
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SMOG-EVENT: London 1952 
Within historical and contemporary policy discussions of smog, the justification for air 
pollution control often refer to 'air pollution disasters' (i.e. where many people died as a 
result of an acute episode) as a way of showing why air pollution is a serious public 
health problem requiring action (Brimblecombe 1987; Bates and Caton 2000; Dewey 
2000; Nugent 2002). The story of London's 'Great Killer Smog' of 1952 is a prominent 
example of such an event, and since there is abundant historical analysis of air pollution 
in Britain prior to this event it is useful for showing that the severity of air pollution does 
not necessarily result in action. In December 1952, a mass of stagnant air, accompanied 
by foggy conditions, trapped coal smoke over London for three weeks, causing an 
estimated 4000 deaths and forcing Londoners to stay indoors and curtail their activities 
(Brimblecombe 1987; Bates and Caton 2000). It is in the wake ofthis incident that the 
government decided to get 'serious' about reducing coal usage, and enacted its Clean 
Air Act of 1956. While the London smog of 1952 was dramatic, because of the number 
of deaths, and because ofthe popular notoriety of London and its 'fog', it is not a 
particularly unique incident in the history of industrial cities (Dewey 2000; Mosley 
2001).7 
Given the historical context of a population subject to the burdens of dirty air, it will 
perhaps seem unsurprising that the London smog of 1952 would be a catalyst for a 
public consensus to 'get serious' about cleaning up the air- public legitimacy would 
flow in light of the magnitude of the death toll, and the availability of cleaner heating 
and industrial fuels, which would make it seem like 'common sense' to enact legislation. 
But if air pollution advocates continue to refer to 1952 it is because there is nothing 
'natural' about the progression to a more effective clean air legislation regime, and to a 
public that supports it. It was an event in air pollution history- after this point 
government becomes responsible for promoting 'good air quality'. To think that 
enacting legislation was simply a 'rational progression' towards cleaner air relies on 
7 In 1880 it was estimated that close to 2,994 people died in the smog incident between January 24th and 
February 7t\ and other such events had been noted throughout the 19th C (Mosley, 200 I). 
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what Dewey (2000) has identified as two misconceptions in air pollution history: I) that 
before the mid-20th C there was not adequate technology to reduce air pollution 2) that 
before the mid-20th C the concerns about air pollution focussed more on their aesthetic 
and economic costs (e.g. in deteriorated buildings), and not on the dangerous health 
impacts. However, neither of these assumptions are born out by the historical record. 
An important point to take from these historical examples, is that the severity of air 
pollution does not provide sufficient grounds on which to act, nor does any other factor 
on its own, whether it be 'cultural perception', political economic constraints and 
interests, or scientific and technological knowledge. Even with active clean air 
advocacy, 19th C Britain was a stable constellation -a diagram - relating competing 
discourses of economics, health, domesticity, an urban form that accommodated soot 
and smog, and cultural discourses that at times even spoke of smog with sentimentality 
and approval as a sign of progress and wealth (Brimblecombe, 1987; Mosley, 200 I). 
In 1952 the dynamic of this diagram changes and rearranges the constellation of forces 
at play. After 1952, the health discourse gains force in relation to the economic 
concerns. What happened? Clearly it did not happen 'all at once', a revelation in 
December of 1952. Instead, if action took place after the 'killer smog' of 1952 it cannot 
be divorced from almost 200 years of concerted efforts to identify smog as a health risk 
and seek legislative change to enforce reductions in air pollution, including a process of 
monitoring air quality put in place after WWII. London-1952 therefore could catalyze a 
number of factors that were held together in repetition. What is interesting from the 
point of view of speed and politics, is that it was in part the speed of transport and 
transmission that provided a 'solution' to the problem of air pollution. In 201h C, 
manufacturing started to move outside of the centre of cities. What's more, the 
introduction electricity, and electrical heating and cooking technology, meant that it was 
possible to do away with individual coal fired furnaces and displace the consumption of 
coal to large centralized generating stations. 8 In effect, speed allowed a displacement in 
time and space ofthe smog problem. 
8 On a cultural plane, we can speculate on range of diverse factors-- perhaps a population that had been 
drilled for close to a decade in the threat of a gas attack was not inclined to be 'gassed' by its own 
116 
Clearly this event would have had a different genesis and historical marker in different 
jurisdictions beyond the UK, and its actualization may not have been heralded by a 
dramatic incident such as the smog of 1952.9 I am using London-1952 in the same way 
that Deleuze and Guattari ( 1988 p.l42) assign a ' proper name' to an event to highlights 
the singularity of the actualization; this allows London-1952 to stand in as expression of 
an event, but it cannot be used as an example of historical turning-point after which the 
health benefits of clean air were recognized. 10 To think otherwise is to assume that since 
the health benefits of clean air were demonstrated and recognized in London in 1952 
(and earlier in American cities), it is irrational, or a step 'backwards' in time, if current 
legislation fails to implement and enforce the 'best practical means' of pollution control 
elsewhere, or today in London. As is evident today, such a normative assessment is 
largely toothless in light of growing concern about the need for a renewed effort to 
address air pollution. The event, ofwhich London-1952 is one expression, must be 
sustained through repetition. A crucial factor in maintaining this diagrammatic relation 
is the ability to demonstrate that action will have an impact on the health of the 
population, and political struggle shifts to defining the actions that will have a positive 
impact on 'air quality'. London-1952 is an event that depends on the stabilization of 
something called 'air quality'. 
What followed from this event is relatively rapid improvement in air quality in most 
industrial cities in the second half of the 201h C. However, and again of interest to the 
discussion of speed and politics, smog returns as disruption after an initial improvement. 
practices (Connor, 2003), or perhaps a society that could no longer afford to hire domestic help to clear 
away smoke dust was not willing to live with the nuisance any more (Brimblecombe, 1987). 
9 In the US, for example, cities such as St. Louis and Los Angeles were instituting effective air pollution 
campaigns in the 1940's (Dewey, 2000). 
10 On the relation between the proper name and the abstract machine Deleuze and Guattari ( 1988 p.l42) 
write: "The diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but 
rather to construct a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality. Thus when it constitutes points of 
creation or potentiality it does not stand outside history but is instead 'prior to' history. Everything 
escapes, everything creates- never alone but through an abstract machine that produces continuums of 
intensity, effects conjunctions of deterritorialization, and extracts expressions and contents. The Real-
Abstract is totally different from the fictitious abstraction of a supposedly pure machine of expression. It 
is an Absolute, but one that is neither undifferentiated nor transcendent. Abstract machines thus have 
proper names (as well as dates), which of course designate not persons or subjects, but matter and 
functions ... There is a diagram whenever a singular abstract machine functions directly in matter". 
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The initial response to smog- to displace the problem of pollution in space and time-
proves to be only a temporary solution, such that by the mid to late 20th C, the growing 
use ofthe automobile leads to a new source of pollution that contributes to a return of 
smog in major centres, this time in the form of photo-chemical smog. In addition, 
concerns about the impacts of long-range transport of pollutants between cities and 
regions from the 'tall stacks' enters into public circulation. As a result, it is no longer 
possible to 'solve' smog by building a taller smoke stack, and the control of smog in the 
latter half of the 20th C and into the 21st C is about direct monitoring of emission 
sources, leading as we will see, to the logic of real-time monitoring and interactive 
control. In other words, while initially speed allowed for a 'solution' to smog through 
displacement in space, speed is now being used to look for a 'solution' to smog through 
the intensive and interactive control of time and space (an example of what Virilio 
( 1987) identifies as the quintessential transformation of control through speed). It is the 
ability to maintain a monitoring network in Toronto that sustains the hegemonic 
consensus outlined above that smog is a matter of greater efficiency, and which then 
prepares the ground on which different options for mitigating air pollution are debated 
and considered. 
SMOG-EVENT: Tracking the invisible -molecular escape and the problem of 'no 
safe level' 
Central to being able to sustain and repeat a post-London 1952 smog diagram is ability 
to monitor whether or not action on air pollution is effective. Early monitoring, public 
discourse, and legislation tended to focus only on the visible nuisance and effects of coal 
smog. 11 Yet it is the invisible dimension of air pollution that has become visible through 
better monitoring, and is now central in animating and changing contemporary debates 
about air pollution. In particular, smog regains its molecular character as scientists 
claim there is 'no safe level' of exposure to air pollution. 
11 Brimblecombe ( 1987) notes that Post-1952 a simple paper filter was used to measure the 'thickness' of 
the 'smoke' by judging how dark the filter got when exposed to dirty air. This allowed for a common 
measurement and calibration of air quality on which to base action. However, it is of course ineffectual 
for measuring invisible pollutants. 
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Capture? - Ozone, P M2. 5 
The tracking and monitoring of smog that is essential for regulation has had the 
unanticipated effect of changing the nature of the smog-event, because it pushes it 
towards the invisible, and introduces a number of sources of uncertainty as to when and 
where smog is present, and how effective control can be. Improvements in monitoring 
smog and its health impacts show that the visible component of smog- the brown cloud 
on the horizon - is only an acute expression of a more pervasive problem. Tracking has 
allowed the smog-cloud to be broken down into its component molecules, and each of 
these is tracked independently, and sources for each are identified. Two molecules in 
particular have become the focus of smog-politics because they have the greatest impact 
on health and continue to exceed standards of safe exposure- ozone (03) and particulate 
matter (PM). Unlike coal smog these particles are not always visible in the air, or even 
sensible to lungs, nose or eyes, but they may still be present and causing health problems 
(especially in vulnerable segments of the population such as youth, the elderly and those 
with respiratory ailments). Confirmation of a smog-event relies upon a mediated display 
-e.g. a number, or a map generated from a satellite image- which a person has to 
decide to 'trust' or which they can reject in favour of our their own embodied 
experience. As will become clear, in practice there are good technical grounds on which 
to be sceptical of these presentations. Molecular smog escapes its capture as a molar 
number. 
The first challenge to representing the 'presence' of air pollution is that ozone, and some 
of the more toxic forms of PM, cannot be traced back to the sources from which they are 
emitted, because they are actually produced from reactions between precursor chemicals 
that take place in the atmosphere. Ozone is produced from the reaction of Nitrogen 
Oxides (NOx), produced largely from automobile exhaust, and Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOC), produced from a wide range of products (e.g. including fuels, paints 
and solvents, industrial processes, drycleaners, plastics and foams- the list here is very 
large even if the quantity from each source is very small). When these two chemicals 
come together in the presence of sun I ight they produce Ozone (03) (but the reaction is 
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quite complex, prone to reversals (scavenging), and so is not strictly predictable) (Douw 
and McKendry 2002). Particulate matter is literally very fine particles, and may just be 
composed of small dust particles (e.g. cement production is a large source), but it can 
also form when molecules such sulphur dioxide (S02), come in contact with water 
vapour in the air and produce small droplets of sulphuric acid. It is these 'acid aerosols' 
that are particularly toxic because they can be breathed deep into the lungs and cause 
damage to the respiratory and circulatory system (Nugent 2002). The fact that smog is 
created in the atmosphere, as opposed to emitted directly from chimneystacks or car 
exhaust, highlights that in reality today's smog is actually a soup of different chemicals 
that are always present in the atmosphere, but which are only considered dangerous to 
health above certain threshold levels and/or in reaction with each other. This poses a 
problem for regulation and monitoring. What exactly should be regulated? The 
precursors, obviously, but the question is really how much the precursors need to be 
regulated so that ozone and particulate matter are not formed in the atmosphere at 
dangerous concentrations. It turns out that this is a complex scientific problem, indeed 
one that ultimately requires an educated evaluation in the setting of standards and 
proposing appropriate responses, which in turn means that the problem of how to control 
smog remains a political question (see below on the Air Quality lndex). 12 
In Ontario, the province where Toronto is located, the ambient levels of key smog 
components and precursors have been dropping, but ozone and tine particulate matter 
continue to be above ambient air quality criteria (AAQC) for short intervals in the 
summer months. 13 The trend in ozone is towards a small but consistent increase through 
12 ln Canada the setting of standards is a 'closed door' process, where the government solicits input from 
experts (Boyd, 2003). The public can challenge standards, and under Ontario's Environmental Bill of 
Rights the government has to provide a period where the public can give input into the setting of standards 
to which the government must respond (Bates and Canton, 2000). Barry (200 I chap. 7) has suggested that 
the setting of standards is in fact an 'anti-political' move, because it attempts to avoid the inherently 
political process of standard setting in a field of scientific uncertainty. 
13 Six substances are considered most relevant for measuring air quality because of their risk to human 
health and well-being: sulphur dioxide (S02), carbon monoxide (CO), Nitrogen Dioxide (N02), Volatile 
Organic Compounds (VOC, there are actually a whole series of these compounds), ozone (03) and fine 
particulate matter (PM I 0 and PM2.5). The standards for these substances are called Ambient Air Quality 
Criterion (AAQC), and they act as guidelines for government policy, but do not obligate the government 
to reduce emissions from any particular source. The government is obligated to report on the levels 
measured, and on any efforts in place to regulate or control them. As a result, monitoring only provides 
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the 1990's, with ozone showing up in rural areas that were previously considered 
pristine (Ontario Ministry ofthe Environment 2001a). As a result, it is possible to claim 
that air pollution in Toronto has both 'improved' overall since the 1970's, but is also 
'getting worse' in relation to key pollutants, depending on how you read these numbers. 
In Toronto, health officials and environmentalists have argued that the standards are too 
low and are out of step with other jurisdiction (Campbell, Pengelly et al. 200 I; Ontario 
Medical Association 200 I). Ultimately, because of the toxic nature of particulate 
matter, and because we can't know the synergistic effect of the chemical soup, health 
professionals argue that there is 'no safe level' for atmospheric pollutants (MacPhail, 
1998; Ontario Medical Association 200 I), such that while ambient concentrations give 
us an indication of trends, it is clear that air still poses some form of 'health risk'. But 
how severe is the problem, and what does it mean that there is 'no safe level'? 
It is accepted by the medical community that elevated ozone and particulate levels 
correlates with increases in morbidity and mortality (DSS Management Consultants Inc. 
2000; Campbell, Pengelly et al. 200 I; Ontario Medical Association 200 I), but the 
concept of 'no safe level' is not a statement that is meant to indicate- to be absurd- that 
even one molecule ozone will harm your health. What it says, is that for even the 
smallest incremental increase in ambient air quality, epidemiological studies are able to 
correlate adverse health impacts in the population as a whole, an impact that is usually 
felt by the most vulnerable segments of the population- the young and the elderly. In 
addition, laboratory work shows adverse biological effects with even trace amounts of 
ozone and PM2.5, leading the OMA to conclude even people who do not sense ill-
effects can be suffering from reduced lung capacity and long-term damage (Ontario 
Medical Association 200 I; Boadway 2003). Therefore, while the elderly, children and 
those with respiratory ailments are particularly sensitive, for a majority of the population 
concerned citizens or lobby groups with a lever by which they can pressure governments to regulate 
emissions more forcefully. The most recent figures in the Air Quality in Ontario 2001 report show that 
only ozone and fine particulate matter exceed the standards, all other monitored substances have reduced 
considerably since the 1970's and have stabilized since the early to mid-1990's. The report identifies two 
important trends: First, seasonal mean ozone levels have been increasing across Ontario since 1971. 
Second, fine particulate matter has just recently begun to be measured, but it indicates that average 
particulate matter load exceeded the AAQC in the summer months of200l in Toronto (Ontario Ministry 
ofthe Environment 200la). 
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air pollution is truly an invisible threat- one that is made visible only through hazy 
horizons or the stabilization and circulation of claims about air quality in the public 
sphere (to which we will return below). In short, 'no safe level' is an admission that 
epidemiology cannot provide us with a 'safe' target, but that does not mean we should 
not act to reduce emissions. 
One of the key studies in Ontario that quantifies the health risk was commissioned by 
that the Ontario Medical Association (OMA), and it estimates that at present ambient 
levels Ontario suffers about 1900 premature deaths, 9800 hospital admissions and 13000 
emergency room visits and 46 million illnesses as a result of air pollution (DSS 
Management Consultants Inc. 2000). 14 These estimates are based on a computer model 
create for the OMA, but it is acknowledged that: "The primary value of models is 
heuristic: models are representations, useful for guiding further study, but not 
susceptible to proof' (DSS Management Consultants Inc. 2000 p.31 ). This is because 
smog, and its health impacts, do not have a singular cause that we can point to (a 
smoking chimney), but are the result of a confluence of factors that may not stay the 
same over time, and certainly not for a given individual. Similarly, the model, based on 
statistical correlation between health effects and pollution levels in the present, does not 
allow for the determination of a level at which it is possible to detect 'no' adverse 
effects. The presentation of morbidity and mortality numbers in relation to ambient 
levels of pollutants, then, is not a causal relation, but indicates only a trend, a direction, a 
vector- this is a mobile system. In short, it says that less is better for the population as 
a whole, but how much less and how much better must remain a point of contention and 
debate (particularly so for any given individual). However, given that it is possible to 
further reduce emissions, it argued that it is not credible to suggest that current mortality 
and morbidity is at an 'acceptable' level. 
In addition to the uncertainty of defining a safe level of pollutants in terms of health risk, 
a further source of uncertainty arises in relation to the weather (Brauer 2002; Douw and 
14 In the summer of 2004 a new study by Toronto Public Health reports 1700 premature deaths in Toronto 
alone, and 6000 hospital admissions, due to poor air quality (Campbell, M., D. Pengelly, et al. 2004). 
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McKendry 2002; Yap 2003). The tendency is to think of air pollution as humans 
pumping toxins into the air until the concentration gets too high, much like a bunch of 
smokers in a room. While this is essentially true it is complicated by two factors- long 
range transport of pollutants and the chemical reactions that take place in the atmosphere 
itself under correct conditions. This is particularly important for both ozone and PM2s 
concentrations in Toronto, because in the summer months, when atmospheric conditions 
are conducive to the reactions that produce these harmful molecules, there are also 
prevailing winds blowing from the Midwestern United States industrial belt. The 
Ontario Ministry of the Environment estimates that 50% of pollutants come from south 
of the border carried by climate fronts of warm air (Ontario Ministry ofthe Environment 
200 I). What does this mean? At least one climate model suggest that because of these 
large masses of pollution, even ifToronto were to eliminate all sources of pollutants, it 
would still experience smoggy days (Yap 2003). In part such a conclusion also reflects 
the fact that there is lag in space and time between the emission of precursors (e.g. N02, 
S02, VOCs) and their transformation into 03 and PM (the substances that most often 
exceed AACQ). This means that much of the pollution that Toronto produces moves 
downwind before it creates ozone. 
In addition to the challenge of lag and long-range transport for setting 'safe' standards, 
the impact of weather is particularly acute. This apparent by comparing the number of 
smog advisories called in 2000, which had cool and wet summer, and 200 l, which was 
unusually hot. In 200 l there were three smog advisories lasting 4 days, whereas in 2000 
there were 7 advisories, lasting 23 days (Ontario Ministry of the Environment 200 l ). 
There is also considerable diurnal variation, with ozone concentrations peaking at mid-
day (Brauer 2002). The situation is further complicated by an ironic twist in the 
atmospheric chemistry of ozone- N02, one of the precursors of ozone, also reacts with 
ozone and so reduces ozone concentrations. This is called 'scavenging' and it leads to 
the so-called donut effect in large cities, where surrounding suburban and rural areas 
often have higher concentrations of ozone because of long-range transport, than do car-
chocked and congested cities that eliminate ozone through scavenging. It has even been 
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suggested that in some instances reduces car-traffic could actually increase ozone levels 
in the city core (Douw and McKendry 2002). 
None of this is to deny that in Toronto ozone, particulate matter concentrations, as well 
as those of the precursors, are problematic, and that action should be taken to ensure that 
ambient concentrations do not rise. But the complexity of the health correlation, the 
atmospheric chemistry, and long-range transport means that it is difficult to decide how 
to proceed and how much regulation and reduction is actually needed to keep ambient 
levels with a 'safe' zone, not least of all because it is unclear what a 'safe' zone would 
be. 
At this point we need to conceptualize the implications for politics of what science has 
done to smog. Following Latour, we can say that the laboratory work on air quality has 
been an event, it has created something that did not exist prior to this work- an 
understanding of the smog body as a multiplicity of shifting and interacting molecules 
(Latour l999a p.l45). In the language of actor-network theory, smog is an actant, which 
is not something with a will or intention, as we would ascribe to a human actor, but an 
entity whose vitality requires a constant effort to control. In this synthesis of the smog-
event, smog has become a new identity in the city, and it falls to politics to give it an 
'acceptable' place within the city by deliberating on questions such as what level of 
mortality and morbidity is acceptable, and what level of control or modification of our 
actions is acceptable- these are not primarily technical questions, put political ones 
(Latour l999b ). Smog has been shown to be immanent to the city, and it cannot be 
definitively excluded from the city. The molecularity of smog does not just reflect the 
fact that smog is produced of molecules, but that it is produced by myriad unseen and 
indeterminable (but not indeterminate in the event) actions, such as reactions between 
particles of a polluted air masses and the hot sun, or actions by individuals (e.g. an 
accumulation of unexpected trips to the store by car (NOx), paint cans left open or a new 
parking lot being paved (VOCs), an extra shift put on at the cement factory (PM)). In 
addition, actions distant in time and space can equally surface in the here and now (e.g. 
the trip in the car last week contributes to smog elsewhere next week etc.). Therefore, 
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the molecularity of smog is also the molecularity of the city itself, an indicator of the 
vitality ofthe city to produce unexpected results (even ifnot always welcomed). If it is 
not possible to exclude smog, then it is necessary to figure out how to respond to smog, 
it becomes a force that society has to content with 
However, this new identity is curiously difficult to grasp and control (as indeed are all 
identities) and poses an ethical dilemma to politics. The nature of smog is well 
described in Spinoza's terms as 'a body' that emerges at the confluence of different 
flows (Hardt, 1993 chap 3; Deleuze, 1986 p.39; see above chap.l ). A body is something 
which we encounter and which has the power to affect, and to be affected, but which 
does not have an essential interiority. The ethical dilemma in encountering another body 
is that it is only a surface, such that 'we know not what a body can do' (Deleuze 1986 
p.39; Proctor 2001 ). A body forces us into an exploratory stance towards it in I ight of its 
ability to affect us, and in light of the uncertain limits of our ability to affect it. With 
regard to smog, science helps define the surface that we encounter by providing us with 
the means to identify and measure different components through which air affects us as 
we affect the air. However, we also learn that these key indicators are the surface of a 
molecular body. In political discussion the attempt to get to 'know' the air body is 
equated with a desire for this body to disappear into thin air, i.e. into 'clean' air. This 
reaction is not dictated by the science, but it is certainly one of the most immediate 
answers that science can give to the question 'what can we do?' But such a dream of 
clean air is also a dream of perfect control of the human body and the networks it lives 
within. Therefore the ethics of the encounter with the smog body are not just a matter of 
acting with due respect to the uncertainty of our ability to control smog (i.e. the familiar 
ecological claim to think of future generations), but also acting ethically towards those 
who will have to be controlled today in the name of controlling smog. 
If controlling smog increasingly means controlling people and behaviour, the ability to 
form a public is challenged by the impossibility of completely 'benign' control. In 
addition, this control is haunted by questions about the technical effectiveness control 
given that in the past smog has returned after it was apparently solved. In order to 
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understand such concerns as not simply expressions of scepticism, it is important to 
understand that they are asked in the context of awareness that smog is a problem of a 
'finite' system. Smog returns to the city with the awareness that there is no longer any 
'outside' (no sink) where we can send our emissions. This finitude is not relative, but 
global (pollution comes from long distances). Therefore, control necessitates the control 
of 'everybody' (not just here, but across the border and around the world). The 
molecular nature of the smog-event already questions control, but when posed on this 
scale the idea of controlling smog becomes more daunting. Such a control would 
depend on being able to control the impact of a multitude of dispersed, and often 
unanticipated, actions in 'real-time' -in a world of multiple technological networks and 
speeds, can we not expect a 'loss of control' as we have seen in the past? As Yirilio 
(2003 p.24) argues, a world of finitude is a world where we become aware of the 
'generalized accident' or 'integral accident' --i.e. the constant emergence of the 
unexpected which is the hidden truth of progress for good or for ill. However, it is 
important to not get carried away by this conceptual enlargement of the problem, and 
suggest that the molecularity of smog and the problem of control is intractable, but to 
understand that this enlargement is a limit that is made visible by the molecularity of 
smog within a finite world. It is not that we should throw our hands up in the face of the 
challenge of controlling a molecular population; it is not that there is no solution, but no 
final solution, and there is a need for constant experimentation. It is within this context 
that we have to consider how to monitor and contain the smog-event, and how to live 
with our own molecularity. It is necessary to think about how the continued disruption 
ofthe smog-event can be used to raise the question oftechnical limits and social 
legitimacy of control without delegitamizing all action, which would only produce a 
weak relativism, and deep cynicism. 
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Capture?- Air Quality Index and 'legitimate(v safe' air 
Smog has a molecular dimension, but in politics it is necessary to be able to legitimate 
mitigation and control efforts on the basis that it will definitively improve air quality. 
Given that we have seen that there is actually no threshold of safe air, what is at stake 
here is being able to say that a particular course of action will move us 'towards' better 
air quality, towards where the air is 'legitimately safe' or 'safe enough'. Therefore, it is 
necessary to be able to stabilize the unruliness of the molecular air, so that we do not 
spiral into a kind of weak relativism that suggest we can never know what clean air is, so 
why bother with models and why bother trying to clean up the air (Bailey 1993; Stott 
2003). This is not the message that we get from the molecular smog body, which on the 
contrary highlights the need for a continual monitoring of, and experimentation with, our 
relationship with the air. The stabilization of the debate around air quality relies on the 
creation of an Air Quality Index (AQI) that is said to give a single measure of' good' or 
'bad' air quality (Elsom 1996; Ontario Ministry of the Environment 1999; Barry 200 I). 
As Barry (2001) suggests, the creation of 'air quality' is an event in the history of air 
pollution, because the air becomes a measure amenable to technocratic management, and 
politics now focuses on the best way to achieve clean( er) air. 15 In this section I will 
review Ontario's Air Quality Index, which is used in evaluating Toronto's air. I want to 
stress three key points: First, the air quality index is explicitly constructed as a public 
communication tool, created in order to help 'the public' (and especially those with lung 
ailments) cope with air pollution, and to encourage individuals and corporations to 
curtail activities that produce air pollution. Therefore, and second, it is not a scientific 
measure of air pollution concentrations and is not scientifically valid as tool to track 
trends in air pollution. As a result, and third, what the AQI communicates is not really a 
representation of pollution in the air, so much as the idea that the air can be '(un)safe'. 
As long as air quality is sustained as a network, it is possible to legitimate other control 
networks based on their ability to improve air quality. 
15 It is no longer possible to legitimately say the air is not a problem. Those who feel that air pollution 
mitigation is unwarranted can only legitimately say that air pollution will, in time, become a non-issue 
because of technical progress. This is what Barry calls making smog 'anti-political', because in the black 
box of air quality rests a whole series of contentious assumptions about AQ standards and their correlation 
with health. However, as we shall see, the idea of air quality is not so unproblematically accepted. 
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Ontario's AQI tracks five particles: ozone (03), particulate matter (PM), nitrogen 
dioxide or (N02), sulphur dioxide (S02) and carbon monoxide (CO). However, the 
AQI is presented as a single scale from 1-100, which is divided into five sections 
labelled Very Good (0-15), Good (16-31 ), Moderate (32-49), Poor (50-59) and Very 
Poor (60- I 00 and over). 16 However, while all five substances are tracked, the AQI 
actually only reports the substance with the highest concentration, such that should any 
of the five substances exceed its AAQC for more than three hours, it triggers a 'Smog 
Alert'. When a smog alert is called citizens are advised to avoid strenuous activity, the 
elderly and young are advised to stay indoors (preferably in an air conditioned space that 
filters the air), and everyone is encouraged to curtail activities that contribute to smog 
(including, paradoxically, the use of air conditioners that tax the electricity grid and its 
coal fired plants)- e.g. don't cut your lawn (uses fuel or electricity, contribute to PM), 
don't use paints (contributes to VOCs), do bike (but, I suppose, not strenuously) or do 
take the bus instead of your car etc (Ontario Ministry of the Environment 1999). 
The AQI is promoted as a 'real time' indicator of air pollution, which then gets 
disseminated through the Internet and mass media; but in fact the AQI inserts a lag of 
three hours between detection of 'poor' air and reporting it to the public. Nevertheless, 
the claim to work in real time draws attention to the fact that the AQI is only possible 
given the high-speed of sensing and computing technology, as well as the speed and 
reliability mass communication technologies that insert the AQI message into daily 
routines in the form of pithy AQ readings (very good, good, moderate, poor, very poor). 
16 The concentrations of each ofthe substances are fitted to the 1-100 scale as represented in the index in 
such a way that should the concentration of the substance rise above the ambient air quality criteria 
(AA QC) for that particle it would translate to a number that is within the poor range on the air quality 
index scale (so for example, a concentration of 81-149 ppb ozone would translate into a number between 
50 and 59- i.e. in the poor range-- on the AQI scale). There is nothing particularly scientific about the 
conversion between AAQC and the AQI scale, except perhaps that scale is weighted in such a way that 
small increases at low concentrations tend to create a greater change in the index value than do 
concentration changes above the AAQC (the logic being that at that point an Air Quality Alert has been 
called, further fine gradation is not useful- the air is doesn't get an 'worse' than 'very poor'). The reason 
for converting to a single scale is to make the concentrations of all pollutants comparable. Toronto Public 
Health has noted that for concentrations of S02 and CO that exceed the AAQC the AQI indicates that the 
air is 'moderate', rather than poor. However, the 200 I Air Quality in Ontario report show that these 
substances never get high enough to exceed their AAQC, and so at present they would not trigger a smog 
alert or reach the moderate range. 
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The speed of this translation and transmission is also supported by weather forecasting 
technology that allows the Ontario Ministry of the Environment (OME) to track long-
range climatic conditions that will contribute to air pollution (e.g. warm temperatures, 
air from the U.S. Midwest). As a result the OME is also able to create 'smog forecasts', 
which are given when it is expected that a 'smog alert' will need to be called for the 
following day. The speed of this compilation and translation of data is indeed 
remarkable (yet is still 'too slow' and limiting of the accuracy of the AQI), but it is an 
example of the rather mundane use of speed to control the smog event and allow it to be 
inserted into the multiple speeds that form the duration of a given individual routine 
(Will I know stay indoors if the air is poor? Will it change my day? No matter what the 
individual reaction to an AQI posting, we are now reminded of our constant relation to 
something called poor air). 
There are a number of weaknesses to the Ontario AQI, which when taken together 
amount to showing that it is a quasi-arbitrary construct with little scientific validity or 
usefulness as a tool for guiding individual action. The weakness of the AQI is most 
apparent in its failure to act as indicator of health-risk. Toronto Public Health notes that 
in Toronto "92% of the premature deaths and hospitalizations attributable to air 
pollution in Toronto occur when air quality has been classified as good or very good by 
the provincial AQI" (Campbell, Pengelly et al. 200 I). The OMA and Toronto Public 
Health argue that the primary reason for this discrepancy, is that the AAQC for Ontario 
are too lax. Second, and related, the AQI does not measure synergistic and cumulative 
effects of being exposed to different substances (e.g. most often a smog alert' is 
triggered by high ozone levels, but 'moderate' ozone and fine particulate levels may 
together create an equally harmful 'air quality'). As a result, the AQI is constructed not 
to measure local and short-term air pollution episodes, but to measure large regional 
effects that will last 3 hours or more. This means that when a 'Smog Alert' has been 
called, most people are likely to sense that the air is poor, but when air is good according 
to the AQI, many people may in fact be experiencing what they consider to be poor or 
very poor air (e.g. we need only consider standing at the side of a congested road during 
rush hour and breathing the air). Finally, because the AQI measures large scale 
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atmospheric and pollution events (in which much ofthe pollution is carried in large 
regional air masses), and because of the nature of the atmospheric chemistry means that 
there is a lag between the emission of pollutants and their transformation into ozone or 
PM2.5, the AQI is not sensitive to short term changes in local sources of air pollution. 
In the words of one scientist, "the city does not pollute itself''- at least according to the 
AQI network. This means -completely contrary to the message of conservation that 
accompanies the AQI --that even if people in Toronto curtailed all smog contributing 
activities during a 'smog-Alert', it would not effect the duration or severity of that 
particular episode. In summary, the AQI detects the presence of smog at the point when 
it has become bad enough to be a large, regionally pervasive, problem (a 'cloud' 
covering the whole city), but it is being presented as if it were an acute episode that 
correlates with individual's experience of smog, and which is immediately responsive to 
the actions of the local population in 'real time'. In doing so, the AQI maintains the 
idea of smog as a molar body which it is possible to control. 
Given these weaknesses we might be tempted to say that AQI is useless, but it serves an 
important function. By maintaining an AQI network, and providing repeated broadcasts 
on air quality through the local media, it serves to solidify the idea that there could be 
'cleaner' air and that there exists an imperative to 'clean it up'. Those who are critical 
of the AQI do not want to eliminate it, but improve it to make it more sensitive to local 
contexts, and so more useful as a health indicator (Cole, Pengelly et al. 1999). 17 As 
Barry says:" 'air quality' is not just a property ofthe urban air in general, or even a 
property of the air at a particular time and place (such as behind a moving vehicle), it is 
an expression of a relation between air and the government of an urban population" 
(Barry, 200 I p.169). The AQI is what Serres calls a quasi-object, and Latour an 
immutable-mobile or factish (Latour 1986, 1999a; Serres 1995; Braun 2002 Chap. 6). A 
quasi-object is not strictly 'believed' to be true, but is recognized to serve a social 
17 In addition to making the AAQC more stringent, such that the AQI would register bad air at lower 
ambient air concentrations, it is suggested that the AQI needs to measure synergistic effects, and that 
rather than presenting break points between 'good' and 'poor' air, the AQI should be presented as a single 
scale against which individuals can calibrate their personal responses to air pollution (e.g. a scale of 1-10, 
much like the current UV-index, in which the individual learns to know when they are personally 
sensitive). (Campbell, M., D. Pengelly, et al., 2001 ) .. 
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purpose. The quasi-object enables a conjunction ofmateriality and discourse that is 
created with its circulation. On one level it is a material object (immutable), created 
from a network of measuring stations, and whose existence is said to demonstrate the 
truth about the existence of another object (in this case air quality as molar entity). 
However, it is not enough to show a number on a scale, the object has to have some 
functional value and so it must be circulated in different contexts where it serves to 
actualize a particular discourse and call a public into being. It is in this sense that the 
object is only 'quasi', and mobile- it is not just an object, but also includes the 
performance of making a context in which the object wi 11 have an effect and affect. We 
can see in this dynamic the very process described in chapter two where the public 
assemblage was called into being through the 'reading' of texts and utterances in 
particular contexts. 
The AQI fails as a 'useful' health indicator for many people (especially the very 
sensitive), but it succeeds in legitimating a debate about how we can reduce air 
pollution, and about the individuals role in such a project- in short, it legitimates 
control. Therefore, the challenge that the AQI poses to politics is not, I would suggest, 
that it simplifies the complexity of air pollution, and that it makes into simple threshold 
-that would be to suggest that people simply 'believe' the AQI, when it would be better 
to say that people make (more or less) use of the AQI as a relative indicator of trends 
(see chapter 6). The politics of air quality cannot be diffused by 'recognizing' the 
uncertainty of the AQI, because it is still a matter of deciding what should be done in the 
face ofuncertainty. 18 Similarly, ifthe AQI were modified it may provide greater 
18 The focus on the recognition of uncertainty is central to ecological rhetoric and underlies the 
'precautionary principle'. The normative premise, that I share, is that if we accept the uncertainty 
associated with ecological knowledge claims, then it should make our political claims more humble. 
However, while I agree with this, I don't think it is enough to recognize this uncertainty, because there is 
still the work of actualizing a public around the recognition of uncertainty (we might say the certainty of 
uncertainty). As we have seen here, it is not just nature that is uncertain and molecular, put the public 
itself, and the city which it emerges from (Clark, 2002 makes similar argument). Stabilizing a public 
requires the formation of a quasi-object as detailed here and in other studies, but that is only the beginning 
of the assemblage. Three excellent studies of the social construction of quasi-objects, which have 
informed my analysis here, are Whatmore's (2002) work in Hybrid Geographies, especially the chapter on 
elephants and genetic food, Braun 's (2002) Intemperate Rainforest, especially the chapter on the 
constntction of old-growth rainforest maps, and Barry' s (200 I) Political Machines, especially the chapter 
on air quality monitoring in the EU. All of these studies stress that the legitimacy of a public claim 
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urgency for action to address air pollution if the modification resulted in it showing a 
greater number of' smog alerts', but it would still leave open the question of what form 
that action would take. What is interesting about the AQI from the standpoint of 
creating a public assemblage, is that it creates a potential for action, a potential which 
must subsequently be actualized in a conjunction that expresses a legitimate response to 
air quality- it creates the conditions where the molecular body of smog and of the body 
politic can be actualized into a molar public assemblage. 
SMOG-EVENT: The incorporeal transformation of the public assemblage 
In Ontario the concept of air quality has been essential in calling different publics into 
being around smog. For example, coal-fired electrical generating plants have become a 
powerful symbol of 'poor' air quality, and the Ontario Clean Air Alliance (an umbrella 
group of 82 local community environmental and faith based groups), has managed to 
sustain a- now successful- campaign to have the government promise to shut down 
coal-fired stations. This effort relies upon the ability to monitor and measure emissions 
from these plants (reported publicly), in order to show that they are the 'largest single 
source' of air pollution in Ontario, but also in order to call the government to account 
every time these plants exceeded their emission caps (www.cleanair.web.net). Through 
an extensive email list and a website, the OCAA could then ask its members to write 
their elected officials to complain when yearly reports showed emission exceedences, or 
whenever the government seemed to be wavering on whether to keep coal generation. 
The following is a text from an OCAA email: 
July 22,2004- Today is Ontario's 161h smog day of2004. In 2003 
Ontario had 37 smog days. 
The Nanticoke coal-fired power plant, on Lake Erie, is Canada's #I air 
polluter. In total, Ontario's five coal-fired power plants produce as much 
depends on being able to maintain the networks that support the quasi-object, but focus less on the 
potential this creates for transformation through circulation. Therefore, while normatively I agree with the 
need to recognize the uncertainty of the knowledge claim, I would argue we have to also understand how 
the knowledge claim creates a potential for a continued transformation, and think about how to intervene 
in this process- it is necessary to call a public into being. 
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air pollution as 6.2 million cars. Fortunately, Premier McGuinty has 
promised to phase-out our dirty coal plants by 2007. 
The concept of air quality, and the reporting of smog alerts, despite all its scientific 
flaws, is central in maintaining the impetus for coal phase-out. The public is actualized 
by the OCAA emails, which allow a person to address their concerns about air pollution, 
and the disruptions it causes in their lives, in a fairly non-intrusive manner- it asks little 
of the individual. However, the actual public assemblage is a complex and 
heterogeneous assemblage. On the one hand are statements about air quality and the 
health impacts of poor air, which is supported by a network of monitoring stations. On 
the other hand, there exists a personal experience of smog that occurs at the conjunction 
of multiple technical networks (e.g. transportation, electricity consumption), natural 
flows (e.g. air masses, sun, biological sensitivity). The public assemblage continues to 
exist only so long as these networks are maintained and allowed to come into 
conjunction. Within this conjunction a responsible subject citizen-subject is called into 
being. As was argued in the previous chapters, we can understand subjectivity here as a 
product of these of the conjunction of these networks- a networked subjectivity-
whose will is not determining in the causal sense, but who nevertheless acts as a relay 
and active force around which the whole is either recreated or fails to actualize (Michael, 
2000; Mackenzie,2002). 
Within this framework, critique remains immanent to these networks as an expression of 
the possible permutations that can be understood as a reasonable response to smog for a 
subject within the assemblage. The conceptualization of what is possible is never 
imagined outside of such networks. As Deleuze argues, the great insight of 
diagrammatic thinking is that "Each age says everything it can according to the 
conditions laid down for its statements" (Deleuze 1999 p.54 ). The threshold concept of 
air quality polarizes air quality debates between two types of claims, and so polarizes 
subjective positions. On the one hand, there are claims for the reform of an existing 
network (e.g. replacing coal by nuclear, gas-generation and wind-turbines; replacing cars 
by high-efficiency or hydrogen fuel cell vehicles). On the other hand, there are claims 
that call for the replacement, or radical reform, of the network (e.g. replacing centralized 
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electricity generation by decentralized renewable sources; building mass transit, more 
dense and pedestrian friendly cities). With regard to the first, the basic claim is that we 
can, through monitoring and technical advancement, achieve the 'necessary' efficiency 
gains to 'clean the air'. In response, the second argues that it is not a matter of 
incremental improvement and monitoring, but of creating a system that will not require 
this kind of real-time interactive monitoring and control. The first relies on a more 
individuated and intensive form of remote control to maintain a version of what exists, 
the second relies on coordinated and collective decision to switch to a network that 
requires less individual control (which, it needs to be stressed, would place less burden 
on the individual to 'be efficient'). 
Here we have a version ofthe familiar left-right binary, individual responsibility facing 
off against collective responsibility, both promising more 'freedom'. Any claim will fall 
somewhere along a continuum between these two poles. However, this is not in the first 
instance a question of ideological belief, but of the limits of technical and subjective 
possibility, and so the limits of control (what is it possible for me- a subject with an 
identity and social expectations -- to see and do today?). Both types of responses are 
'reasonable' given the framing of smog as a question of a threshold measure of air 
quality. However, there remains the question of 'reasonable when and for whom'? 
Given that the existing relations in which a person lives and works, and given that urban 
networks are highly individualized in Toronto, as in other North American cities (e.g. 
car-based patterns of commuting, toll highways, cameras monitoring traffic flow and 
violations, cell-phones and wireless internet hook-ups), the question of network, or 
infrastructure reform will always be the more 'radical' reform for many subjectivities-
it will take thought, and it will take time to make such change desirable and make visible 
the limits of individuated and intensive control as a path to reduce emissions- time that 
is in no way predetermined, it may not happen at all (see chapter six for more on the 
reactions to transportation reform in Toronto). 
For example, if we accept this model of public assemblages and networked 
subjectivities, it allows us to see in what way 'reformist' approaches to smog and air 
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quality are the one's that are dominant in public discourse. For example, with regard to 
transportation reform, there has been little advance on the implementation ofpublic 
transit reform in Toronto, but there is active promotion of the purchasing of fuel-
efficient vehicles (including subsidies for the purchase of electric-gas hybrids). 19 The 
legitimacy of the role ofthe fuel efficient car in addressing air quality is maintained by 
the implementation ofthe 'Drive Clean' programme, in which cars undergo a year ly test 
for emissions, and must be undergo the necessary repairs if they fail the test 
(www.driveclean.com). The actual value of this program in reducing ambient 
concentrations of pollutants is hard to quantify, especially given that most late model 
cars easily pass the emissions test (Ontario Ministry ofthe Environment 2001).20 The 
risk of such a program is that it may perpetuate the idea ofthe guilt-free car, as is 
captured in the Drive Clean logo (Figure 4.3), which is a small car with an angel's halo 
on top of it, symbolizing the 'innocence' ofthe well-tuned auto. 
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For the air we breathe. 
Figure 3: Drive Clean logo (source:www.driveclean.com) 
A person interested in more substantial transportation reform may then be frustrated by 
this reformist, perhaps even apologetic, approach to controlling vehicle emissions. They 
may, for example, point out that in the past efficiency gains have been offset by 
increased numbers of automobiles, and that without more mass transit this pattern will 
19 Ontario provides a $1 000 CDN tax rebate on all 'al ternative fuel' and hybrid cars. 
20 The Ontario government claims that in 1999-2000 the tests resulted in cutting NOx and VOCs from 
vehicles by 11 .5% in the Toronto-Hamilton corridor. On being launched, the aim was to reduce emissions 
by 22% by 2004 (Ontario Ministry of the Environment, 200 I). There has been no report to say whether 
they have reached this goal, but it is likely that Drive Clean will produce diminishing returns as late model 
cars easily pass its standards (interview, Drive Clean manager, 2003). For example, while 14.3% of cars 
tested to date have failed the test, this number is sure to drop as older model cars are taken off the road 
(www.driveclean.com). As a result, the 'returns' of the Drive Clean program will also diminish. At the 
same time, it has been found that emission standards drop quickly after the car has been on the road, and 
so a regular testing could have a positive impact if people keep the car tuned and drive 'responsibly' 
(Pickrell, 1999). 
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repeat itself (Gilbert, 2000; The Centre for Sustainable Transpottation 200 I). However, 
just as one would no want someone to think that there is such a thing as the 'innocent' 
car, it is not credible to suggest that tracking, monitoring and designing fuel efficient 
automobiles is not a legitimate course of action. The critique cannot simply oppose 
emission testing, but must focus on the failure to experiment with a flexible range of 
transportation alternatives, and on any attempts to reactively defend a particular option. 
Air quality and efficiency name the problem of air pollution in such a way that a 
government program like Drive Clean can 'buy time' to find a course of action for 
transportation reform that will be politically feasible- if we wanted to be cynical, such a 
period could be seen as 'stalling' in the face of pressure from auto manufacturers,21 but 
it is more productively understood as a period of repetition, during which time a 
potential is building that can legitimate future action. It is a tactical move on the part of 
the State that sets the (admittedly conservative and reformist) terms of the debate, and it 
is dependent on a complex mediation of the smog-event that we have traced in this 
chapter. This same mediation, however, also allows for legitimating concrete actions 
such as the phase-out of coal-generation. The question, then, for a concerned air quality 
activist, is not to disprove or dismiss the 'reformist' position based on monitoring and 
control, which would be to suggest that people are being 'duped' by this moderate 
approach, but to think about how the limits of such a reliance on control can be made 
visible within existing networks, and then used to encourage experimentation with the 
limits of existing networks (Latour, 1999a chap.9).22 
What is at stake in a politics of air quality are the limits of control- what kind of control 
21 Canada accounts for only 8% of the North American automobile market, which means that it is difficult 
for Ontario (Nantais, 2003), or the federal government, to unilaterally implement stricter emission controls 
given that cars are built largely for the North American market (Bates and Caton, 2000; Boyd, 2003). 
This is further complicated by the fact that the automobile manufacturing industry accounts for 20% of 
Ontario's GDP, which gives it a sizable influence on government policy. Canadian vehicle emission 
standards follow those of the United States 
22 Latour ( 1999a chap.9) argues that critical politics too often proceeds by 'smashing' the factish, or quasi-
object, under the misguided view that the problem is that people 'believe' what quasi-object symbolizes, 
and once it is gone people will be free of their alienation. However, he shows that the quasi-object is not 
strictly believed, but expresses a much larger set of relations, both material and social that need to be 
changed in order for the quasi-object to become illegitimate. 
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is legitimate in order to make the air 'safe enough'. Smog, as we have seen, is a 
molecular entity that exceeds our attempts to measure and decisively state how we can 
capture and contain it. As a result, there is no definitive answer to what course of action 
will promote air quality, and which particular course of action becomes legitimate and 
stable is itself an event and not a teleological progression of reason. This is not to say, it 
must be stressed, that there are not better and worse options- on the contrary, this is 
precisely what is at stake. There are not only better or worse technical options from the 
point of view ofthe limits of what we can reasonably expect to monitor and control, but 
there are also better and worse options from the point of view of social justice and an 
accessible and inclusive urban form. It is possible to have clean air in a segregated and 
inequitable city. The 'solution' to cleaning the air, then, does not present itself merely 
as a technical problem, but as a problem of social control and the legitimacy and 
implications of social control. Therefore, within an urban form that is increasingly 
dominated by interactive, remote and individuated technologies, it is possible that the 
path ofindividuated monitoring and control will gain prominence as a 'solution' to the 
air pollution problem, even if it makes the less sense technically and is least desirable 
from a normative social point of view. Which option is chosen with regard to any 
particular future decision (i.e. which option will legitimately speak for 'air quality') will 
be determined with each conjunction and not in advance- it is an incorporeal 
transformation, or event, that must be fought for and for which the ground must be 
prepared. What matters for a politics of becoming that wants to resist reactive or 
conservative framings of the possible, is to experiment with how the repetition ofthe 
smog-event in the present can be used to keep the question of control visible. 
Within smog-politics there exists an opportunity to make visible the limits of control and 
to encourage experimentation with the subjective positions that are called into being in 
different networks and public assemblages. The opportunity for experimentation is 
immanent to the 'reformist' stance of controlling through monitoring, because it implies 
that individuals will be responsible for their own particular 'quota' of emissions. 
Therefore, everyone is asked to justify their energy use. At present in Toronto, this is 
reflected in the focus of smog politics on what individuals can do to 'spare the air'. This 
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means that a concerned individual is going to be constantly asked to consider what kind 
of control of their actions they feel is legitimate in order to mitigate smog. This opens 
an opportunity within repetition for a politics of becoming that problematizing existing 
solutions and raises the question of control; it is possible that the struggle with control 
opens the subject up to a process of becoming in the wake ofthe smog-event. However, 
there is a risk that rather than recognizing that all solutions are premised on a denial of a 
more pervasive instability, a recognition that ultimately expresses a world of perpetual 
uncertainty and an open future, politics can too easily degenerate into a 'blame game' 
(Serres 1995). For example, the quasi-object of air quality allows publics to identify 
those who transgress a particular articulation of a standard of efficiency, and so harm 
nature, and those who are within the standard, and so are ecologically sensitive. Rather 
than systematically dealing with the question of energy efficiency on a social and 
structural scale, there is a risk that subjects may reactively defend their positions while 
politics degenerates into a hunt for which actor is to blame, and in so doing political 
discourse avoids addressing more 'radical' reforms that are raised by the problem of 
controlling a molecular population. This is apparent in the targeting of Sports-Utility 
Vehicle (SUV) owner's as particularly irresponsible, self-indulgent and venal character 
(Caldicott 2003; Meeson 2004).23 However, while this works as a symbol of excess, it 
hardly works to promote experimentation with the more pervasive problem of auto-
infrastructure in the city, and the limits it places on the urban imagination. Therefore, in 
the next two chapters, I want explore how the control of the subject can trigger a 
becoming that moves beyond the positions of responsible and irresponsible action, and 
how a politics of becoming can engage with this to try to encourage a process of 
experimentation with what is possible to see and do today. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter started with a person driving down the highway and encountering a smoggy 
horizon, and who in that instant is jolted by the anomalous only to have it almost 
13 Meeson (2004) notes in an article the Toronto star newspaper "Despite being a whipping boy for most 
of society's ills, sales ofthe more than 30 [makes of] SUVs available in Canada show no signs of hitting 
the brakes" 
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immediately fall into the recognition of smog as a question of energy efficiency. This is 
an actualization of a public assemblage, and is made possible by the mediation of the 
smog-event into a measure of air quality. Smog becomes familiar with repetition. But 
it can also become disruptive and frustrating- if we know what needs to be done to 
reduce smog, why are we not acting? If our answer is that it is because it would be 
politically risky to tackle smog aggressively, then does that mean that 'the public' is ill-
informed? Is it that people are unable to see beyond their own personal interests or are 
'duped' by dominant ideologies? Perhaps, but this would be a very base interpretation 
of our fellow citizens, at best it would capture only a very reactive moment of the 
different subjective stances that can be taken towards smog, and of the problematic 
nature of our relationship to smog. Nobody, after all, wants air pollution, which points 
to the fact that it is not the air pollution that is in contention, it is the control that is 
needed to get rid of it. Controlling the molecularity of smog is controlling my 
molecularity, making smog molar is protecting my molarity. 
Why should we today submit to a particular regime of control in the name of air quality? 
Can we be sure that it will actually provide clean air? If, as has been argued in this 
chapter, the answer to the second is 'no', that all we can manage is a relative 
improvement in air quality (which is already enough), then it changes what kind of 
control can become legitimate. But it does not answer the question of what kind of 
control will be desirable and legitimate- that is a matter of political struggle, creating a 
public assemblage that will support a particular course of action will require a creative 
and attentive effort to the conditions under which people encounter smog in their 
everyday lives. Whether or not a group, can succeed in assembling a public that will 
sustain itself in repetition is a matter of an empirical conjunction that cannot be 
determined in advance. However, what we have seen in this chapter is that the potential 
to launch a claim depends on an already complex tracking and mediation of the 
molecular smog-event so that it can be treated as a measure of air quality. 
The framing of smog in terms of air quality and energy efficiency both makes possible 
claims to reduce the levels of pollution in the air, and limits the kinds of claims it is 
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possible to make today. At the limit of all claims about air quality, is this question of 
control, and the limits of control- smog always escapes its control. Smog requires a 
constant experimentation to find what might be a better way to reduce smog-producing 
emissions. Hence, it is necessary that the public sphere keep the limits of control visible 
as the problematic excess of all solutions to the problem of smog -- this is the task of a 
politics of becoming in relation to a politics of air quality. In repetition, in the moment 
between sensation and recognition, there is an interval which needs to be re-opened such 
that the moment of recognition does not only trigger indignation/fear/resignation in face 
of the question 'what must be done?', but also musing about the question 'What might 
be tried differently today?' 
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CJHIAJP'TIEIP?. IFJIVIE 
Every smell is now a possibility, a young man 
passes wreathed in cologne, that is hope; 
teenagers, traceries of marijuana, that is hope too, utopia; 
Smog braids the city where sweet grass used to, 
yesterday morning's exhaust, this day's 
breathing by the lightness, the heaviness of the soul. 
Every night the waste of the city is put out and taken away 
to suburban landfills and recycling plants, 
and that is the rhythm everyone would prefer in their life, 
That the waste is taken out, that what may be useful 
be saved and the rest, most of it, the ill of it, 
buried. 
Sometimes the city's stink is fragrant offal, 
sometimes it is putrid. All depends on what wakes you up, 
the angular distance of death or the elliptic of living. 
Dionne Brand- Thirsty (2002) 
While it is clear that governments must do more to reduce air pollution, they 
cannot be expected to act in isolation of the daily habits and routines of the 
population. No government can hope to fight pollution without involving real 
people where they live and work. 
Toronto's Medical Officer of Health, Dr. Sheela Basur, press release June 20, 
2002 
There is a telling disjunction between Dionne Brand's poetic evocation ofthe smells and 
smoggy air ofthe streets of Toronto and Dr. Sheela Basur's bureaucratic statement of 
the responsibilities of every citizen. On the hand a life lived at edge of spinning into the 
'angular distance of death', on the other the rational march of the State that does not 
speak of its destination; on the one hand a life filled with excess that takes a person off 
course, on the other a rational process that takes care of the excess by making sure it is 
taken away every night. But with smog, of course, it is not taken away, but returns 
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('yesterday morning's exhaust, this day's breathing by the lightness'). As a result, the 
State wants to enrol the subject in a project of waste management, to heed the warning 
that smog presents to their health, to change how they live in light of the risk that it 
poses to them and others; but how do such messages play out in the singularity of a life? 
It 'all depends on what wakes you up'- one day a person may be a 'good citizen', on 
another they may, in the crush of routine forget, or dismiss, such distant concerns 
(Hinchliffe 1996; 1997; Darier and Schule 1999). As was discussed in the opening 
chapters, it is the challenge of inserting a political message into a routine composed of 
multiple speeds that captures that problem of speed for politics, rather than the sense of a 
subject 'overwhelmed' by a singular speed. A person lives in a duration composed of 
multiple speeds, a life that is punctuated with myriad events that a person must contend 
with in piecing together a functional subjectivity. It is in this context that it was argued 
that it is best to approach the question of speed and politics in terms of repetition, 
disruption and becoming. Rather than focussing solely on what is, it is important to also 
be able to see the potential that has been created at the limits of what it is possible to do 
today; beyond the recognized, we have argued, is the potential of becoming leading 
towards 'a people to come'. However, we have as yet to engage directly with what is 
meant by 'becoming'. In this chapter I present how the continued disruption of the 
smog event, and its political insertion into routine in the form of messages about 'energy 
efficiency', can be said to make visible a process of becoming as a potential for political 
engagement at speed. 
The potential for disruption to open subjectivity to a desire for change is suggestive, but 
it also risks being read too optimistically as the hope in the inherent 'goodness' of 
humans and oftheir potential for enlightenment. Becoming is nothing of the sort, it is 
much more ambivalent a profoundly post-humanist concept that must be unpacked if we 
are to better understand the perils and potentials of a politics of becoming at speed. The 
last chapter presented the diagram ofthe assemblage of the smog-event, and this chapter 
presents how a responsible subjectivity that emerges in this diagram is never firmly 
actualized, but is constantly being repeated and re-negotiated in relation to claims about 
air quality that call on them to 'be efficient.' In order to see this, I present the subject in 
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two passes, each a different aspect on how we can think of subjectivity in terms of habit, 
or what Deleuze and Guattari call the refrain. In the first pass, the subject is presented as 
a person in relation to the physical environment of the city, and subjectivity as a 
rhythmic passage through this 'coded' milieu. I will show how this rhythm is changed 
by the smog-event, which in turn opens the subjective refrain to change. However, 
whether and how a subjective refrain actually changes in response to this disruption will 
be constrained by recognized norms, and so in a second pass I explore a different aspect 
of the refrain in relation to the 'moral overcoding' ofthe milieu. Here I show how the 
milieu becomes 'expressive' as a 'territory', which allows a subject to be recognized as 
(ir)responsible. I show how the subject is continually negotiating what is 'reasonable' in 
relation to the new moral overcode calling on them to 'be efficient.' By presenting 
repeated encounters and negotiations with smog and the call to be efficient, I aim to give 
a sense of the varying degrees to which the refrain can be affected by the smog-event, 
and how repeated disruption opens the refrain to becoming; in the final section I discuss 
the concept of becoming in further detail, stressing its ambivalent potential to create a 
desire to move beyond, or experiment with, the existing refrain. 
Field note: 
The material presented in this chapter is based on a series of interviews conducted in 
Toronto in the summer of 2002. In the process of assembling and conducting these 
interviews I was also assembling an example of the public sphere itself, an actualization 
of a public concerned about smog. Therefore, in keeping with the argument developed 
thus far, it is best to understand the participants as presenting themselves in public, 
rather than representing themselves in any objective and essential manner. As one 
participant stated, when conversation started to stray too much into her personal life: 
"[laughing] but the smog! I want to talk about the smog! " 1 Participants were not 
presenting themselves, but themselves in relation to the issue of air quality. Therefore, 
in a dialogical frame we can say that the interviews does not "reflect a situation, it is a 
situation. "Each time we talk, we literally enact values in our speech through the 
1 Participant #3 
143 
process of scripting our place and that of our listener in a culturally specific social 
scenario" (Bakhtin 1986; Holquist 1990; Shotter, 1999).2 Therefore, in the brief 
encounter that is the research interview (including diaries and photos), it is untenable, if 
not unethical, to argue that the researcher is able to understand the other, and be able to 
represent (literally speak for) their motivations. The interview actualizes a public in 
which a person adopts a subjective stance. What is taken away from this encounter 
between interviewer and interviewee, within the context of myriad circulating texts 
about air-quality, and of political discourse about responsibility, is an understanding of 
the potential for transformation of the subject in the repetition of the smog-event. In the 
interview, and by reviewing diaries and photographs, the researcher develops a sense of 
what is reasonable to say about smog, and why, but he or she also gets a sense that what 
can be said about smog- one's public position- does not capture the entirety of how 
smog has disrupted a life. In short, it captures only the position at the time of the 
interview, and not the potential for change. The challenge in this chapter is to present 
this potential. 
As noted in chapter three, the challenge for an experimental critique and a politics of 
becoming is to re-actualize the event so that we can propagate its potential (see chapter 
two and three). In this regard the presentation here will differ, but not contradict, those 
studies which seek to represent the 'public perception' of environmental issues, 
including work on air quality (Bickerstaff and Walker 1999; Bickerstaff and Walker 
2003).3 In this literature, as has been noted in the previous chapter, the goal is to 
2 At its simplest, dialogism "refers to what other writers would call the intersubjective quality of all 
meaning: the fact that it is always found in the space between expression and understanding, and that this 
space --the 'inter' separating subjects -- is not a limitation but the very condition of meaningful utterance". 
This reflects the fact that "implicit in the very idea of communication .... is the sense of an event which is 
not so much reproduction as response" (Holquist, 1999) (see also chapter two on iterability). 
3 It would be possible to present the material collected in interviews in this manner, and in this regard we 
can note that my 'findings' do at various points reflect those of earlier studies. As summarized by 
Bickerstaff and Walker (2003) these can classified under the following four themes: I) Knowing 
Pollution: Stresses the role of practical everyday experiences in how people "come to know air pollution" 
and relate the local to the global; noting in particular the role of the senses, in particular vision, and how 
these different senses are organized spatially, temporally and socially (e.g. smell is more important as 
pedestrian, vision on the road) 2) The polluters: who is responsible? Generally research shows how 
people focus on motor vehicles as the primary source of air pollution. However, it has been suggested that 
people transfer responsibility away from private autos to unpopular transport modes (e.g. buses and 
trucks). It is possible that this is a form of distancing that absolves individual responsibility. This 
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understand why 'the public' adopts the positions they do with regard to environmental 
messaging, which once again presumes the existence of the public as a pre-existing 
group. What gets lost in such representation is the sense of movement and becoming 
that is precisely what I aim evoke in this chapter. If in the last chapter the assumption of 
a pre-existing subjectivity was suspended in the effort to understand how a public is 
assembled; in this chapter I accept that participants in an interview are in an important 
sense 'nonrepresentable', because always in the process of becoming, and the focus is 
instead on presenting how we might sense in their statements a potential that goes 
beyond any particular subject positions, and which needs to be captured in order for a 
public to actualize. Therefore, the quotes and images used here are not meant to reflect 
the attitudes or intentions of any particular subject. They are used as details to animate 
the conceptual tools used to think through the disruption of the smog-event, its 
circulation as air quality and calls for energy efficiency, and the political potential that 
this sets in motion. In what follows, direct quotes will be placed between quotation 
marks, and a footnote will indicate the number ofthe participant (e.g. participant I -20) 
(see similar in Wylie, 2002). 4 However, what is presented goes 'beyond' what any 
participant intended to say and is meant to reactivate the potential that I sensed and 
documented in interviews, and through my engagement in air quality politics in Toronto. 
Photographs are used to animate the statements in the text and give them more 
resonance. This is done by juxtaposing participants statements, or sometimes my text, 
with pictures taken by participants; sometimes the picture was taken by the same 
participant being quoted, at other times I am using a picture from one participant in a 
connects with larger discourse that reconfigures air pollution in terms of individual responsibility. The 
individualizing is said to reinforce processes of social fragmentation, powerlessness and anomie and a 
belief that governments should provide better policy frameworks combined with a lack ofbeliefthat they 
will. 3) Polluted Places: People try to distance their local places from polluted places. Some authors 
claim that the desire to distance air pollution from the local community was also related to attachment to 
place and a desire to 'purify' and maintain order and boundaries. When people did not have a strong 
commitment to a neighbourhood they were more likely to attribute negative qualities, like bad air. 4) 
Polluted People: explores the physiological problems associated with bad air, again the focus is on 
localized experiential 'knowledges'. Some studies show how ingestion of air pollutants leads to the break 
down of corporeal security with the realization that bodies leak. On the other hand, air pollution is 
considered only one factor among many that could cause physical illness (e.g. asthma) so people are 
hesitant to draw strong links. But still there are cases or 'overprotective parenting' when there is a 
perceived risk. Studies also show that while most people link air pollution and poor health, few make this 
link in their own lives (it is suggested that this is question of denial or fear). 
4 Textual quotes are taken from interview transcripts, diaries or time-diaries. 
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section of text that quotes another participant talking about the same context (in effect 
putting two voices into circulation, to different approaches to the same moment). The 
pictures repeat the textual narrative. The chapter will unfold in a series of repetitions 
that seeks to mimic how the smog-event enters a life as a routine disruption. 
The need for 'efficient subjects' 
There is always a risk of being overly critical about the possibility for individual action 
on air pollution when we live with inefficient technical systems, and within a social and 
economic system premised on continual growth. Calls for individual responsibility can 
be read as a form of 'green govemmentality' whose purpose is to enrol the citizen 
subject in reproducing a structurally flawed, or at least problematic, status-quo- it 
protects existing values (Luke 1999). This is certainly a legitimate concern, but the 
answer is not to do away with such discipline, but to push it to its limit so that it acts to 
progressively transform, and not preserve, the status-quo. No matter how technically 
efficient or socially just the system, the individual consumer plays a crucial in 
determining whether or not energy consumption, and hence the resulting air pollution, is 
reduced.5 Indeed, we might say that the individual forms the limit of efficiency, because 
5 For example, consider residential energy consumption, which accounts for 22 percent of global energy 
consumption. In California, government incentives to reduce energy consumption during peak months 
resulted in a reduction of 3100 MW in a one month period in September 200 I, including growth in the 
region- the whole of Ontario requires about 18 000 MW of generating capacity so this saving is 
significant (Stewart, 2002). The pragmatic programme, then, is to create enough incentives, and public 
acceptance, for energy conservation measures in everyday life so that, when combined with technical 
gains in energy efficiency, there is the possibility of a net reduction in energy demand and emissions. In 
Ontario it is estimated that there could be a 65% reduction in energy demand under technically optimal 
conditions, but when one accounts for what residents are willing and able to implement under current laws 
and incentives, potential reduction is expected be closer to a maximum of25%. In Ontario, even with 
increases in technical efficiency, it is estimated that residential energy consumption will rise to 13% above 
1990 levels by the year 20 I 0 if no further effort is made to increase up-take of energy conservation ( 1990 
acts as a baseline measure because of the Kyoto protocol on climate change). The impact on the 
emissions of smog-precursors, in turn, would be dependent on the source of energy production (e.g. coal, 
natural gas, renewable), but one can assume that given Ontario's reliance on coal generation until 2007-
2015 (depending on the pace of phase-out), there will be an increase in emissions- certainly it would not 
improve (Parker, 2003). A similar scenario exists in the transportation sector. The reduction in smog-
producing emissions from cars in North America has been close to 99% since 1978 (the emissions of one 
1987 model year car are equivalent to twenty two 2002 model year cars) (Nantais, 2003). However, 
efficiency gains are stabilizing and not considered sufficient offset growing numbers of vehicles (in 
addition, emission from vehicle use does not take in the pollution created in building more cars or the 
pollution created by having a 'car-based' urban form) (Gilbert, 2000). The efficiency of a vehicle is also 
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without successful individual discipline any system will lose legitimacy; in addition, 
within a context where individual consumption can never be fully controlled, there will 
always be an excessive component through which one can start to glimpse the limit of 
any system's 'technically optimal' conditions. Accepting a particular form of efficiency 
discipline is to suggest that the 'remainder' of the efficiency gains have to come from 
technology, which in turn is implicitly to accept that there will always be some excess, 
some amount of pollution that is not 'my fault'. However, just because it is not 'my 
fault' does not mean that it is not 'our problem', and hence pollution remains a 
problematic excess, which from the perspective of ecological politics needs to be 
harnessed to encourage experimentation and transformation of existing networks and 
subjectivities, and to question a social and economic model based on continual, and 
ecologically damaging, growth. 
Given this technical-political scenario it is clear that a public must be sustained that is 
open to the changes to routine and convention that will be necessary in order to be more 
energy efficient, a public open to beginning to experiment with different ways of 
reducing energy use. This is often quite pragmatically framed as a problem of incentives 
and communication of information (Kassirer and Boddy 200 I). However, this still 
frames the challenge as a purely technical problem of how to insert individuals, as self-
present subjects, into an efficient system. Yet at any given 'level' of technical 
development and social incentive, there will always be the properly political question of 
why 'I' or 'we' should make an investment in efficiency beyond what I am currently 
doing and able to sustain. So, for example, why should I give up using my car or pay a 
road-toll to be used to support public transit I never use? On cannot assume that 
environmental concerns I ike smog are recognized as affecting 'everybody', and that 
political subjects, reflecting on this situation, will want to, or can convinced, to do their 
bit (Hinchliffe 1996; Jasanoff 1999; Bulkeley 2000; Bickerstaff and Walker 2003). A 
public, as we have seen, must be sustained in an assemblage. The logic of current 
dependent on how it is driven (e.g. quick acceleration bums more fuel), under what conditions (stop and 
go is more fuel inefficient), and whether the car is well maintained (Pickrell, 1999). Therefore, ifmore 
people continue to drive it will offset gains in efficiency for the automobile. In short, Ontarians need to 
use less electricity in their homes, and need to drive less, not just produce more efficient systems. 
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approaches is to hit 'the public' with a big stick of morality (you should be energy 
efficient, or support higher taxes, or we will all be in trouble) and disguise it as the small 
carrot of future benefits (IF we all participate it will be better in the future for your kids, 
you will save money on your energy bill). 
This is politically a very weak strategy, which appeals to a subject's supposed self-
interest as a motive for action (Slocum 2004). But its weakness is not just a question of 
poor enforcement and incentives, but of the dynamics set in play by approaching energy 
efficiency as a question of individual responsibility and self-interest. This approach 
implicitly assumes that 'the public' and 'the subject' are essentially good or selfish, but 
above all self-present, and respond to appeals to virtue or self-interest. However, it is 
also possible to argue that self-interest is a defensive reaction to a moral imperative - i.e. 
in this case the edict 'be efficient' -that creates the conditions under which the subject is 
given as 'selfish' and 'self-interested'. The challenge is not to judge in terms of the 
binary selfish or not, but to explore what it makes visible as conditions for moving into a 
more affirmative discussion of alternative forms of subjectification. 
In what follows I seek to develop an immanent presentation from 'within' the smog-
event in order to provide a sense of the potential created to move beyond recognized 
identities every time a legitimately recognized subjectivity is actualized. Deleuze 
writes: 
A process of subjectification, that is, the production of a way of existing, 
can't be equated with a subject, unless we divest the subject of any 
interiority and even any identity. Subjectification isn't even anything to 
do with a "person": it's a specific or collective individuation relating to 
an event (a time of day, a river, a wind, a life ... ). It's a mode of intensity, 
not a personal subject. It's a specific dimension without which we can't 
go beyond knowledge or resist power (Deleuze 1995 p.98-99). 
A subject as 'a way of existing', 'a mode of intensity' and an 'individuation relating to 
an event' (like smog), does not have an interiority- here the subject is part of an 
assemblage, rather than a causal force. To understand how subject provides a 
'dimension' from which we can go beyond knowledge and resist power in relation to air 
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quality politics, it is necessary to understand the subject as an expression of a particular 
performance of the moral code to 'be efficient'. Exploring the moment of 
subjectification involves adopting an immanent perspective that makes sense of a "set of 
ambiguous signs arise, which become diagrammatic features, or infinite movements and 
which take on a value by right, whereas in the [transcendent] image of thought they were 
simple, derisory facts excluded from selection .... "(Deleuze and Guattari 1994 p.55). As 
this quote suggests, this is not a mapping of static space, but engagement in relations that 
are always shifting, and any particular articulation of these 'diagrammatic features' is 
always exceeded by the potential of different articulations. It is this potential for other 
actualizations that I want to make visible in the following descriptions of the smog-
event. Therefore, without further preamble, we can now move to the first presentation 
of subjectivity in terms of the relation between a person and the physical milieu of the 
city. 
The Smoggy Milieu: 
"My average day would be, I live at Yonge and Eglington, would be walking to the 
subway, getting the subway down here to St. Andrews, walking over to [Work] and 
being at my desk at 930. And then have a meeting, and other meetings, whatever. Take 
an hour for lunch. And leave at, pffft, 6,7,8 depending on what's going on. And it's 
five days a week."6 Five days a week a person runs through the same loop, there is a 
certain degree of automation. It's not that it doesn't take some thought, but once routine 
is in place there's a practiced body that can go through the motions 'on its own'. "So I 
always leave 20 minutes before my train. Always, I mean that's, well, subject to 
whatever, but that's my kind of rule of thumb. It means a total low stress drive, I can 
relax, I don't have to cut people off or drive at 10000 miles an hour ... be relaxed, get out 
of the car, walk out into the station and still have a minute left to stand for the train"7 
The subject is always embodied, there is no subject without a body and no body that is 
already subjectively disciplined by the spaces and routines it moves through; but a body 
6 Participant #4 
7 Participant #9 
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also exceeds the subject, buffers it from all kinds of interruptions and makes connections 
the subject may never know about, or which precede conscious reflection (Harrison 
2000; Simonsen 2003). It's the practiced, embodied, routine that is 'first' disrupted by 
the smog-event in the way that air pollution subtly changes the space of routine in which 
the body-subject takes shape. 
On this particular day it's hot, its 34 Celsius, humid, the air is heavy, the body lethargic, 
sweaty. A particle of nitrogen dioxide is heated by the sun's rays as it wafts out ofthe 
tail pipe of a car, a particle of ozone is produced- invisible, odourless ozone. This 
happens countless millions of times. Ozone is poisonous to the body, when the ozone 
enters the respiratory track it enters the blood stream where receptors on the immune 
systems 't-cells' sense the presence of a foreign body and trigger an immune response-
mucus formation, constriction of airways and blood vessels. If this happens repeatedly, 
as it does, the t-cell becomes more sensitized and reacts more quickly, and not just to 
ozone but to any contaminant. The body becomes more sensitized, a body develops 
allergies to substances that had previously triggered no reaction. "I don't, I don't know 
if it is getting worse, I know that I'm developing allergies, I don't know if its as I get 
older or if its being in Toronto, but I didn't have allergies before moving here and I 
definitely have them now."8 Constricted airways and blood vessels mean that lung 
capacity is reduced, the body gets less oxygen. A body feels tired, limbs feel heavy. 
This reaction varies for every body, by age, by genetic make up, by location in the city-
different bodies need greater exposure to be triggered, and some will have a reaction that 
will be immediate, others only by the next day, some will have a reaction that lasts for a 
day or more, others it will pass in a few hours. 9 But the point is that it is coded, and a 
body doesn't even have to sense it consciously for it to take place. A person has a 
different body when circulating in smog, and each time the body is exposed to smog it 
changes again, and some of the changes are permanent, setting the stage for a more 
sensitized body during the next smog-event. 
8 Participant #20 
9 The scenario described here is based on a presentation given by Dr. Ted Boadway of the Ontario 
Medical Association, at the 2003 Smog Summit in Toronto (Boadway, 2003). 
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The body copes with smog: shallow breaths, slowing down; but at some point the 
changes taking place in the body accumulate into a conscious retlection . "Man, I can't 
believe I have the voice of a fishmonger." 10 What happened? I feel exhausted. Maybe 
its that I am ''fighting the urge to breathe deeply, which I think really exacerbates the 
stress levels. And, I certainly feel that way. I go for like days without, consciously, you 
know .... like, like conscious of the fact that I haven't actually breathed in a really healthy 
way." 11 With repetition a person can start to consciously sense the smog event even if it 
has no definite form, no defining characteristics: ''Sometimes even before it's actually a 
smog day, officially. I can tell, I don't know, like the air just feels thick, its harder to 
breathe, and it makes me very tired"; 12 or again and more enigmatically "you just know, 
you know.'' (Figure 5.1 ) 13 What triggers the awareness of this accumulative exposure? 
"Oh everything, I'm always aware." 14 To say that it is triggered by 'everything ' is to 
say that it is triggered by nothing in particular that a person can definitively point to; the 
body is taken up in the smog-event and it comes into the mind as an irritant, for most 
nothing more than an irritant and then it is gone. "No, I think when, I think when the air 
dissipates then, you know, you're not so conscious of it. But its, its, I'm very aware of 
it, I just, its just there." 15 
Figure 5.1: 'you just know, you know' 
But what exactly does the body-subject know? lt knows how to cope by setting a 
rhythm, which is different than saying it is necessarily a fully conscious reflection. 
"But, yeah, living in downtown I 'm constantly ... aware, actually not constantly aware, 
10 Participant #5 
1 1 Participant # 14 
12 Participant # 11 
13 Participant #5 
14 Participant #8 
15 Participant #4 
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but I constantly have the feeling and when I pay attention , I know its there. So, you 
know, I kind of ignore it a lot ofthe time. But, as soon as I think about it, I' m aware of 
it. It's a constant.. .state ... of, of, yeah, a kind of claustrophobia, and a kind of shrinking, 
if you think oftrying to shrink your way from all these, urn, toxic, sort of, things, around 
me."
16 Claustrophobia- space is shrinking, getting smaller, but also space is getting 
bigger because it takes more time to cross space in this conscious/sub-conscious state. 
" I don ' t care if I' m late, to hell with it. I'm not going to hurry, because I don't want to, 
you know, do that deep breathing where you ' re really sucking those particulates down 
into your lungs. I just take my time, and that's it." 17 A constant modulation of the daily 
rhythm in response to the air. Where can I go today, what can I do today? Smog 
changes what is considered possible. 
Figure 5.2: let me see what it looks like out there ... 
" I ta lk, in my self-talk in my head? You know, some of the bad air days? The first thing 
I wonder about when I wake up, that's what it is man. You know, and how to get 
through the day. And you don't say to yourself[mock tone] ' Oooh, how to get through 
the day?' [Normal tone] But you say [gets up and walks around, like someone who has 
just gotten out of bed, talking in a whisper] ' I wonder how hot it is, fuck, let me see what 
it looks like, let me see what it looks like out there ' (Figure 5.2). Because it, it ' s already, 
you know its eight o ' clock and it's lookin ' , lookin' thhhick, and you ' re starting [choking 
16 Participant # 10 
17 Participant #4 
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noise] [back to whisper and re-enactment] 'Oh fuck. Alright, what can I do? Well 
there's no point thinking about doing anything before, one or two, its just going to 
unbearable' [normal voice] And I realized, wow, away you go, away you go". 18 Away 
you go but without every asking yourself consciously 'Oooh, how to get through the 
day?" This, of course, does not apply to every body." ... I'll be damned if lousy weather 
is going to ruin my enjoyment of going somewhere." 19 But it can influence any body. 
Smog can change the spatiality and temporality of the city. A city without smog is a 
different city because the body can do different things, or at least has to put in more 
effort to defy different constraints. After all, "I mean the air you have to live with", you 
must go on.20 
A person gets out of bed and paces around a room mumbling to herself, checking out the 
window. What is she doing? Praying? Singing? Yes, perhaps it's like a chant: 'Lost, 
[a child] takes shelter, or orients himself with his little song as best he can. The song is 
like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, centre in the heart of 
chaos ... [the song] jumps from chaos to the beginning of order in chaos.'(Deleuze and 
Guattari 1988 p.311) The morning ritual starts to plug the body back into routine 
spaces: listen to the radio and hear the traffic and air quality reports, check the time to 
see if you have to rush, smell the air coming in through the window (Figure 5.3). There 
is nothing overly mysterious about this, even if is essential; it can be quite mundane and 
it doesn't necessarily tune the body into the air quality- it can be a ritual that reflects a 
body oblivious to the air, and so of the air absent from conscious reflection. "The 
mornings are pretty normal ... I always have my showers in the morning. I always have 
my coffee. I got fish, and we have a dog ... so I feed the fish, I feed the dog ... "21 
18 Participant #3 
19 Participant # 19 
20 Participant #8 
21 Participant #9 
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Figure 5.3: building momentum 
In the morning ritual the body begins to build momentum to launch into routine, but 
what does a sensitive body ' look for ' as it builds momentum? " I' m looking for the tone, 
looking for colour tones, and I figure I' m starting to get pretty, some pretty 
subtle .. . gradient [laugh] perception, maybe, you know. I feel like I am. And, uh, sort of 
the more colour the worse. You know, basically, whoa! It's a very colourful morning 
out there . .. would you call that orange or yellow or green? You know, that' s getting 
scary. Urn, direction of, you know, wind - is there wind? Uh, what direction , what 
strength?" And what' s good direction for wind? "Well , North of course ... If its coming 
down from the North its coming from the clean air zones, and you ' re thinking its going 
to blow the shit away, its probably going to be cooler, you know a little bit cooler, 
maybe high pressure, maybe more high pressure, [unclear] feeling good! Coming from 
the south , mm mm m, you know. And in the heart of summer, you go, oh gosh, its just, 
when it comes from the south it feels like, urn [laugh] sometimes, you know how you 
can feel the heat coming up off the cement, like when you ' re riding your bike, off the 
pavement, I mean, especially off the dark pavement? Like it' s pushed, eh? Cause, uh, 
hot air, it is moving, it ' s full of energy and its pushing at you. And that's what the 
southern wind feels like. Uhhhhh, here I come mother-fuckers, pardon my language. 
Coming at ya, bringing shit, you know, I' m loaded, I' m dusty, I' m ... . particulate, and 
hell you can taste me."22 All this grasped in a few seconds at the edge of conscious 
reflection - heat, wind , smell, take a shallow breath, cough, sigh, here we go. 
22 Participant #3 
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The smog-event is like a force pushing down on a body: "here I come mother-fuckers'. 
But that's just the end point, the moment of conscious realization. The body senses a 
conjunction of a number of flows, a number of forces impacting the body whose effects 
become recognizable with repetition "I'm starting to get some pretty subtle gradient": 
Colour -light energy diffracted through the atmosphere 
Wind direction-- temperature differentials in the atmosphere, the force of falling air mass 
Heat and dust-- light energy warming black asphalt and air and pushing air upwards. 
Mucus- the force of attraction between ozone molecules and receptors on T -cells 
Figure 5.4: smog-event as a conjunction of forces- wind, hot pavement, tired limbs 
These are forces of constraint as wel l as dissipation and relief (winds from the north), 
forces that open space as well as pushing against the body. These are also forces that 
come from within (immune system response, conscious intentions and perceptions) as 
we ll as from without. A conjunction of flows and forces creates a smog-space, a 
transient or temporalized space, which can be- but need not be-- sensed as a space to 
be avoided, or to pass through slowly or with a degree of resignation. The natural and 
built environment plays an important ro le in adding to the intensity of these forces. Hot 
pavement is different from the sheltering shade of trees, tall buildings different from 
residential streets. "When I set out from my house ... you can see in the neighbourhood 
there's quite a few trees, and when I'm going on the side streets the air is fine, but its 
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like once I get to that corner, I usually get my first sort of, like a smell, and sometimes a 
burning feeling of bad air." (Figure 5.5) 23 
Figure 5.5: I get to the corner ... a burning feeling of bad air 
Buildings also channel air in cities, trap pollutants in eddies and swirls, that are never 
detected by the AQI. "Now what you have here [figure 5.6] is this sort of ... this is a hill , 
and there 's these two walls, on either side. So I. .. the air, the kind ot: the heavier air, 
which is often the smoggy air, kind of falls down. And then combines with the fact that 
there's ton of traffic on that street, coming off, because that 's the last exit off of the 
Gardiner [highway] ." 
Figure 5.6: the heavier air, which is often the smoggy air, kind of falls down 
23 Participant #2 
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Inside air conditioned buildings the forces are different as well, the body is different-
what path does a body take on a smog day? "I'm actually surprised I walked right into 
the subway, because on a smog day, I would actually go down to the corner and wait for 
the bus ... and if I had to go from here to City Hall, again, I would always go outside, but 
again I would choose to go underground through the shopping areas, just to stay out of 
that air."24 Even if a person does not plan their day consciously in regard to smog, the 
body builds momentum in the morning routine and develops a rhythm of passage, 
moving through points of convergence and intensity, points of dispersal and release. 
'One ventures from home on the threat of a tune. Along sonorous, gestura!, motor lines 
that mark the customary path of a chi Id and graft themselves onto or begin to bud 'lines 
of drift' with different loops, knots, speeds, movements, gestures, and sonorities.' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.312) 
The rhythmic passage through a conjunction of forces can be described as a refrain that 
takes shape in a 'coded milieu'. 'Every milieu is vibratory, in other words, a block of 
space-time constituted by periodic repetition of the component. Thus the living thing 
has an exterior milieu of materials, an interior milieu of composing elements and 
composed substances, an intermediary milieu of membranes and limits, and an annexed 
milieu of energy sources and actions-perceptions. Every milieu is coded, a code being 
defined by a periodic repetition; but each code is in a perpetual state oftranscoding or 
transduction. '[ibid. p.313]. The subject is a passage of a body through a coded milieu. 
It is affected by an exterior milieu of materials- pavement, wind, dust, cars, buildings 
etc. It is affected by an interior milieu of composing elements and composed substances 
-ozone molecules, T -cells mucus etc. It is affected by an intermediary milieu of 
membranes and limits- skin, eyes, nostrils etc. It has an annexed milieu of energy 
sources and actions-perceptions by which it can discern and affect other bodies- food, 
technology powered by energy that add to what the body can do, places to avoid, places 
of intensity and relief. A refrain is a way of going on, it creates a stable repetition 
between coded forces; this repetition forms habit, and habit is the basis of a recognized 
24 Participant #4 
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subjectivity. However, coding is always in a process oftranscoding and can open habit 
to change. 
As already noted in chapter one, it is not possible to objectively see the forces in a 
milieu, only sense their effects as a qualitative difference: 'Force is infraempirical. No 
scientist has ever observed a force ... Only force-effects are observable. 'Force' is a 
word used to designate the repeatability or iterability of effects.'(Massumi 2002a p.160) 
A body is affected by force, is an effect of force, but also a source of new forces as it 
feed backs into the infraempirical realm of forces that compose the milieu. A repetition 
in a field of forces, the body takes on a recognizable pattern of effects and affects. But 
pattern is too static, a subject is a rhythmic repetition, a way of moving through and 
between coded milieus, it becomes a refrain that exists only in passage through the 
coded milieu. The subject emerges and develops through 'creative involution' in the 
refrain (when the body stops it is dead) (Ansell-Pearson 1997 p.139; 1999 p.178-79). 
But what kind of body, and so what kind of subject, is this? It is not the sealed body 
with a clearly defined inside and outside- it is not what Deleuze and Guattari ( 1988) 
would call an 'organized body'. It is a body of thresholds, which means it is a body that 
is in flux with its environment (Grosz 1995 esp. chap. 5, 6, 8; Olkowski 1999). It's 
exterior milieu leaks into the interior milieu in air particles, its membranes are more or 
less sensitive creating thresholds that make the separation of outside and inside variable 
depending on intensity, the variable sensitivity causes reactions-- folds --that leave the 
body more or less open to further stimuli or able to make connections to different bodies 
('So I wouldn't even consider going outside until after those cars have gone, for the day. 
Even long before I had a lung problem, I just didn't choose to be out, until after that was 
over.'
25). It is a body whose code is not 'in' the body, but takes shape, actualizes, as part 
of a coded milieu and rhythmic passage through it. It is a body that is continually 
making connections and so it is a body that is born again everyday, even if the new body 
is 'older' because more creased and folded, each new fold is also a new - but not 
necessarily greater- potential. 
25 Participant 20 
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A subject that is not separable from its milieu, a subject formed at a conjunction of 
forces, a subject that is a repeated passage between forces -- in short, a subject that is 
immanent. Deleuze and Guattari conceive of this subject as a body-without-organs 
(BwO), it has yet to be organized and sealed and remains at the mercy of the forces in 
the milieu, which also means it is open to changing with the introduction of new forces 
in the milieu. It is a subject formed not of extension, but of intensity: 'A BwO is made 
in such a way that it can be occupied, populated only be intensities. Only intensities 
pass and circulate. Still, the BwO is not a scene, a place, or even a support upon which 
something comes to pass ... The BwO causes intensities to pass; it produces and 
distributes them in a spatium that is itself intensive, lacking extension. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1988 p.l53) In the 'first' instance there is a 'program' for making a BwO, a 
program involves practices for going on through the city (a rhythm of passage, practices 
and places that allow one to go on), which expresses a conjunction of forces, an intensity 
that holds different forces together; the program folds the BwO in a way that opens it to 
certain forces, which can affect the body, while excluding others --and then there are 
still forces which can come from the 'outside' and disrupts the sustained intensity, or 
what Deleuze and Guattari call a 'plane of consistency'. 
As a result, the BwO can be deviant, it is always open to deviating with each repetition 
as it passes through invisible intensive thresholds. Snotty nose, sweaty skin, wheezing 
airways, the BwO creates a pause in the day, perhaps this deviance changes the day 
altogether. Organized bodies are easier to deal with, they don't get in the way and 
embarrass or anger us, it is easier to tell where their limits are, the folds are tighter and 
repetition deviates little- even ifthe body is still 'open' in the sense described here, it 
does not allow the intensities to become excessive and disruptive, it is able to contain the 
intensity of the event. 
The subject as a BwO is a subject that connects and is pulled in all kinds of 
unpredictable ways, it is an intensity that forms as an unruly desire: "The BwO is desire; 
it is that which one desires and by which one desires."(ibid. p.l65) But desire is not, as 
159 
in psychoanalysis, a lack that the body fills; desire as lack, as desire-for (e.g. a new car), 
misunderstands the desire that is gained by maintaining intensities on the plane of 
consistency. This is an original concept of desire, because it is never a question of 
wanting something that can then be supplied to fill the gap, it is a question of creating a 
body that maintains itself as desire, as a positive potential for connecting to the 
intensities which it brings together (ibid. p.l54-157). The desire here is produced within 
a milieu, it is an expression of a differential between forces that shapes the body and 
what it can do. For example, when it is said that someone desires a flash new car, while 
another a bicycle, it is possible to understand this not in the first instance as a desire for 
the object, but instead as a BwO in which a car, a bike, or any other object of desire, can 
be incorporated into the refrain in such a way as to maintain its intensities and its rhythm 
of passage- it is an object that amplifies or modulates intensities and so maintains its 
consistency. A desire, then, can also be framed as a potential. 
It is in relation to the subject as a field of intensities, or plane consistency, that 
'smog ... messes with your good times'. 26 Smog is a new force, a new intensity, and the 
question is how this new intensity will be incorporated, embodied, in the BwO. Will it 
cause a rupture that needs to be repaired by a new rhythm of passage? Will it lead to a 
shifting of intensities that changes desire? Or will the new intensity simply magnify and 
amplify the intensity that was already there, making its loops and knots ever tighter and 
more insulted from new forces? It is not at all clear that a BwO will react 'progressively' 
to this disruption, it may react in a profoundly destructive manner, the encounter with 
the hazy horizon may lead to "desiring one's annihilation, or desiring the power to 
annihilate."(ibid. p.l65). In the openness ofthe BwO there is a problematic potential as 
regards the goal of creating the efficient subject who is responsive to smog. We will 
return to this ambivalent potential in the final section in the discussion of becoming. 
However, we can note that in this first presentation of a subject which emerges within 
the passage through a milieu, that the subjective refrain is always being modified by air 
pollution, a continuous modulation that has the potential to pull the subject towards a 
new 'rhythm of passage', a new speed, that allows for new connections and so carries 
26 Participatn #3 
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the potential to provoke new thoughts. However, in order to understand this potential 
better we need to take on a different set of intensities than those of the physical spaces 
and individual routines, we need to understand the moral 'overcodes' that enter into the 
plane of consistency and, and the way in which the rhythm of passage gains expression 
in a territory. 
The Efficient-Subject 
"One ventures from home on the threat of a tune. Along sonorous, gestural, motor lines 
that mark the customary path of a child and graft themselves onto or begin to bud 'lines 
of drift' with different loops, knots, speeds, movements, gestures, and sonorities." (ibid. 
p.312). However, the tune has become strained, and it is said that it is smog that is 
causing the strain and fatigue, smog that is causing the watery eyes, the runny nose, the 
allergies, the gritty taste in the mouth. It has a name, but where is smog? " ... When you 
get up on the ridge with Keele St., and you get up, then you really smell the stuff that is 
coming out of these small factories around here. There's all sorts of flavours in here, 
that add to the pollution. And then I'm looking over to Brampton and Mississauga, and 
then I see this purple haze over here- pollution .... a brown haze .... and I'm looking down, 
I'm not kidding myself, I know that, in the horizon I see this brown pollution, and I look 
at it down here. But I also realize that I'm driving right through it, it's just optically I 
can't see it."27 At first it is the smells and other senses that trigger reflection, but the 
visible haze combined with the scientific claim that smog is a pervasive problem, 
confirm that what has been sensed. Ifthe body is unaffected, then the visual cues and 
scientific knowledge make a person question whether or not he or she is exposed to 
smog. "I've heard that [the suburban community of] Oakville has the worst air quality 
in, I don't know what kind of radius, but I can't smell it. I don't believe it. No. No."28 
Or again, overlooking a clear blue sky over Lake Ontario in a suburban part of the city 
one can see a whitish haze. That could be smog. "I don't know ifthat is what we're 
looking at really ... Well I'm not an expert, but on a sunny day would you normally see 
27 Participant # 19 
28 Participant# I 
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that?" (Figure 5.7 middle panel)29 Science says smog is pervasive, and so it is no longer 
sufficient to rely for a person to rely solely on the senses, a person uses the eyes to look 
for evidence that can be shared with others. " I don ' t know if this light [is good], or if 
you can actually see it.. .. Just, uh, if your outside, and you ' re looking that way [west] 
you can see that apartment building, and this the other direction, you can really 
[emphasis] see the smog" (Figure 5.7 right panel)30 But I don ' t see the smog, would I 
have seen it if I were there? The question is debatable, and that is exactly the point -
smog mediated as air quality is ' subjective' and debatable, it is no longer just an 
embodied experience, but a question of right and wrong. 
Figure 5. 7: you can really see the smog 
There has been a shift in how the subject is being imagined here. No longer only the 
subject that is immanent to the smog-event, but the subject that observes space from a 
point removed from the action; space is seen from a linear objective perspective from 
which to reflect on where and why smog is a problem. Search what you can see for 
confirmation of what you feel. This reflects the western epistemological bias of vision 
as the privileged sense in revealing truth (Crary 1992). No doubt this is not without 
contention- some 'just know' and refuse the need for verification, others can refuse any 
evidence in the absence of sense evidence and remain sceptical. Another way to make 
the smog-event visible is the Air Quality Index (AQJ) and the smog alert, which acts as a 
kind of mediated smoggy horizon. But again with the AQI the discrepancy between 
what one senses and one hears through the media leaves room for scepticism and doubt. 
Many people ignore the AQI because of its flaws, but also because it wouldn't change 
how they go about their day, and it would be "too depressing" 31 (Stieb, Paola et al. 1996; 
29 Participant # 13 
30 Participant #8 
31 participants who expressed distrust of AQI # I ,5,6,8,9, I 0, 12, 13 , 15,19,20 
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Bickerstaff and Walker 1999). However, the AQI , just like the smoggy horizon, can be 
a reminder of a problem in regard to which a person is expected, and wants, to act 
responsibly. A person no longer only encounters the smog-event as a nuisance that 
changes what the body can do, but also as a moral dilemma that dictates what a subject 
should do ; how a person responds to this dilemma is a moment of subjectification. 
If it is now possible to see smog as a concrete and visible presence in the world, the 
scientific knowledge of smog also presents a subject with a moral problem -- smog is 
said to be caused by our behaviour, and smog kills people. What's more, because smog 
is related to heat, the problem of smog is also related in public discourse with that of 
climate change. The same actions that will influence the emissions of smog-pollutants 
will a lso help curb climate change, any increase in average seasonal temperatures is 
likely to mean more smog (given stable emissions). Therefore, the moral dilemma is 
also that smog is potentially a sign of how society is irrevocably changing the conditions 
for life in general. A reflective subject looks with anxiety over the landscape that it has 
changed, a landscape of hazy skies and hot temperatures: "Heat!! When is this blistering 
hot summer going to end? I don ' t like it - it feels spooky and makes me anxious and 
fearful for the future. Increasingly more preoccupied with anxieties about an oncoming 
' Thermageddon'! Worried about what the world holds for my son. My zucchini plants 
have al l dried up - way to early- and my tomato plants have continuall y shrivelled up 
for lack of rain this summer. Certain the climate is changing. Nobody tries to keep the 
grass alive anymore- brown is everywhere."32 
Figure 5.8: brown is everywhere 
3 ~ Participant # 18 
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Smog is no longer just visible in the sky, or in the air we breathe and the way our bodies 
feel. Smog is everywhere there is excessive heat, brown grass and wilting gardens, and 
it is present as a moral problem. Or again: "You know I might sound like a hippie of 
something, it doesn't feel the same as it did five years ago ... Yah it doesn't feel right, 
you know. It's like so blistering hot you don't even want to be out there. And you gotta 
wear a hat. I remember years ago I never wore a hat, now you have to wear a hat, 
because, just because the sun is so strong that, if you don't you get home and you have a 
headache."33 Smog as blistering heat, smog as the memory of not wearing a hat, a hole 
in the ozone equated with smog, smog as climate change and brown grass- these 
conjunctions take on moral weight because of the scientific perspective that links these 
together and then ties them to human behaviour. 
Some scientists profess distress at this public 'confusion' about issues with separate 
causes, but if we put aside the technical inconsistencies ofthese statements, we can see 
they are not statements that premise action on correct knowledge, but a recognition of a 
trajectory that needs to be changed, a recognition of what is at stake. To try to correct 
such statements with facts (e.g. it is often said we can 'solve' air pollution and still have 
climate change because C02 is the target in the latter, NOx, VOCs and PM in the 
former) is beside the point, because such statements are essentially reflexive and build in 
the possibility that they could be 'wrong' ('I may sound like a hippie'), while at the 
same time reflecting the need to make a choice in the face of uncertainty ('Certain the 
climate is changing'). To express such concerns is to claim that smog, global pollution, 
is ultimately a moral question about ends, about the responsibility to the future, and as 
such it has no resolution, no right answer. Smog, as an example of global pollution, 
places the subject and his or her actions within a properly historical, even eschatological, 
frame (Virilio 2003). 
But it is too much to think that way all the time. I want an alibi, it's not all up to me 
after all. If smog is 'present', then one needs to respond, to be responsible. In the mail 
33 Participant #5 
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today is a booklet, it has a picture of an electricity outlet on its cover in which the 
sockets are shaped like the snouts of pigs, and it ask rhetorically 'Need to cut back?' It's 
a 'practical guide to reduce energy use' from the 20/20 The Way to Clean Air 
programme, administered by the City of Toronto Clean Air Partnership. 34 A person 
might just throw out such information with the junk mail, just another piece of eco-
propaganda that makes one feel guilty or depressed. "Well, [it's] depressing to kind of 
be inundated with information, detailed information about how .... how awful the air is. 
Which I'm guessing that's the kind of information they're going to, I guess they would 
be telling you pro-active things that they are doing, yah, which would be a good thing. 
But I automatically thought, oh, I would get e-mails every day about how awful things 
are."
35 Who needs that? But maybe there is something pro-active. On the first page: 
"Tired of smog? Looking to make a difference? Some small changes can go a long 
way ... By focussing on some simple changes to reduce your energy use you can help 
make significant improvement to air quality in your community. The reason? 
Thousands of other residents will be participating in 20/20 as well -with more joining 
every day. Everyone reduces energy use. Everyone saves money. Everyone breathes a 
little bit easier."36 It sounds a little too glib-- 'thousands of people' in a region of 
millions (tens of millions if we consider the mid-westem United States)? It's hardly 
'everyone', but perhaps it's a start. The public sphere as 'social-marketing' campaign-
'there is something you can do' (Thomson 2003). In the place of larger questions about 
morality and ends, the call to turn off your lights provides a welcomed (if dubious) alibi. 
It is against this backdrop that a fold of subjecti fication takes place in relation to smog as 
a person consciously negotiates how to insert 'responsible' behaviour into their everyday 
routines. What is reasonable to do today? "Smog Alert day in Toronto! Should I ride 
my bike so that I don't add to air pollution? If I do, the exercise will force me to take 
into my lungs more toxic gases and all that particulate stuff. Rode my bike anyway."37 
Being able to accompt ish such goals gives a sense of accomplishment. Insert into a 
34 Similar program is run by EnerAct in Toronto called Smart Living, and the Federal Government 
promotes energy conservation through its EnerGuide for Homes programme. 
35 Participant# 15 
36 20/20 The Way to Clean Air brochure, page I 
37 Participant# 18 
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routine "all the little things"38 that reflect concern for the air- start noticing light 
switches, idle computer terminals, idling cars, paper to be recycled, opportunities to take 
public transit, energy saving appliances, air conditioning set too cool. The habit of 
switching of lights becomes part of the refrain that positions oneself in relation to the 
moral imperative ofthe smog-event. A whole set of recognized elements, or motifs, 
emerge that defines a territory of risk and morality (Figure 5.9). "I feel, things like 
pollution, I feel very keenly and I, I , see it all the time, and I experience it as poison, 
and its, whether its cars idling, or,uh, lawn pesticides, I feel this destruction very keenly. 
It's not just a, its not just a, uh, intellectual abstraction for me, its heart felt and visceral. 
And I, don't feel that when I'm on the TTC, when I'm on public transit, I don't feel like 
I'm contributing to the sort of destruction ofthe whole, the whole, ecosystem, the way I 
do when I'm in a car."39 
Figure 5.9: Territory of risk and morality 
38 Participant #2 
39 Participant #6 
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The intensity of the concern and moral outrage triggered by smog and other pollution is 
relieved by the moral action. But it then follows that when a person sees people engaged 
in 'irresponsible' actions it can provoke outrage: "I see people idling particularly on 
those [smog] days, I get angry when I see daycare kids, outside playing, you know. And 
school kids, or school kids are playing in the playground, or kids are playing soccer, or, 
whatever, and I think this is so stupid! They're putting the kids at risk, you know."40 
Similarly, but conversely, failing to act responsibly can provoke feelings of guilt: 
"Feeling guilty as hell today. A smog alert day and I'm driving to work ... Just one guy 
in a car like almost everyone else. We can't go on like this" (Figure 5.10). 41 
Figure 5.10: just one guy in a car like almost everyone else 
If the body-without-organs develops a rhythm and a plane of consistency that allows it 
to cope with smog, then the moral 'overcode' adds new beats and intensities to the 
rhythm that can be prob lematic. The dai ly rhythm is a practiced passage through 
different coded milieu, but there are always a whole host of moral overcodings (you 
must show up at work on time, you must look presentable, you must be fit, you have to 
have fun) that also discipline how a body can go on. The claim for efficiency is just one 
more. Is it more important to be punctual, or to be efficient, to be presentable or to ride 
your bike? In the abstract, against the backdrop of' global thermaggedon' the answer 
may seem self-evident, but in the cut and thrust of daily life it is harder to fall in line. 
40 Participant #4 
41 Participant# 18 
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The moral overcode puts the subject on the defensive. Do you change your behaviours 
on Smog Alert Day? "Nope. Because I avoid the city anyway. I do all ofthose things 
they say to do during the smog alert, I do those anyway." [So it doesn't change what you 
do]" No, I don't want to know."42 It's too depressing, leave me alone, I do my bit. 
How can you be efficient without being 'unreasonable'? "I guess I, quote, 'do my part', 
as they say. Trying to reduce smog. Could I go farther? Absolutely, I think everybody 
could go farther. Even the guy who walks everywhere could still do more. You do, you 
find a balance in your life, in terms of your personal priorities. Some people have no 
balance, they just abuse everything, others are at the complete other extreme, you know, 
their vegans and they, you know, don't use leather, you know. So there's like two levels 
of extremes. I'm kind of in the middle. I'm a realist in that, you know, I have to deal 
with technology clients and stuff, and can't very well be promoting [radical views], and 
yet I can't, I don't want to, just abuse everything and waste, waste, waste. So, definitely, 
that's one ofthe prime motivations for [using public transit]. It's not really about the 
money, because I could afford to drive. It's not a price issue. [My employer] will pay 
my parking, they'll even pay for my gas. It's not about money at al1."43 Doing 
something because it is the right thing, not because you have to, is a moral action, but 
even so there is a need to defend oneself against doing more. There are all kinds of 
limits to what is reasonable depending of the moral overcodes and milieus one has to 
negotiate-- sometimes it is money, sometimes its time, sometimes it's the recognition 
that no moral overcode should be followed dogmatically 'you've gotta have fun'. "I do 
a whole lot, so I figure I should at least have a little bit [of indulgence ]."44 A very 
reasonable approach, who could disagree? But it doesn't mean you are acquitted; on the 
contrary, at every turn your actions can be judged by your peers and found guilty. The 
subject is placed in a reactive position, justifying their actions. The subject is on the 
defensive, the signs of smog- horizons, heat, wilted grass- are also accusations. 
42 Participant# I 
43 Participant #9 
44 Participant #I 
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At this point the smog-event starts to move from consistency and intensity to 
territoriality and extension. The rhythm of passage gets converted into a territorial 
assemblage. In a milieu the codes are infraempirical forces through which the subject 
emerges in repetition; forces are 'directional' and 'functional' in as much as they give 
rise to a particular state of affairs. However, "there is a territory precisely when milieu 
components cease to be directional, becoming dimensional instead, when they cease to 
be functional becoming expressive ... What defines a territory is the emergence of 
matters of expression (qualities)." (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.312). A territory 
emerges when it no longer simply a body sensing a force, but the association of that 
force with a particular object or place (it becomes dimensional e.g. a particular road or 
behaviour like idling a car), and with a particular meaning (good or bad, joyful, sad etc. 
-it becomes expressive). A territory, or assemblage, as we have seen, is a combination 
of matters of content and matters of expression, visibil ities and statements (e.g. riding a 
bike, on a smog day, even given the intensity of pollution= good). If the body-without-
organs is formed within a coded milieu, then the organized body ofthe subject is formed 
and becomes visible within a territory. A subject can be seen to be 'good' or 'bad' 
depending on what it is doing, and this judgment has a force that limits what a body can 
do. 
In other words, the territory is also an expression of power. "There is no confusion ... 
between the affective categories of power (of the 'incite' or 'provoke' variety) and the 
formal categories of knowledge (such as to 'educate', 'look after', 'punish', and so on), the 
latter passing through seeing and speaking in order to actualise the former." (Deleuze 
1999 p.77) In the territory knowledge (statements) are connected to visibilities through 
affective styles of presenting images and speaking that are used to 'provoke' and 'incite' 
action (to which we can add a whole list of qualitative descriptors of how power works 
in the territory: 'persuade', 'deceive', 'seduce'). Hence, the outrage that one can express 
on seeing an idling car, or the calm indifference, depending on how knowledge passes 
through content and is given expression. Here power is immanent to the assemblage; it 
is relational and must be actualized and repeated to be sustained. In order to sustain a 
public assemblage that sees an idling a car as wrong, there must be an affective spark 
169 
that makes the idling car 'bad'. Therefore, even though the refrain takes on 
dimensionality in the territory, it still remains a dynamic model of subjectivity, for it 
exists only in repetition as a body and a subject are 'coerced', 'enticed', 'incited', 
'provoked' etc. into repeating habits that recreate a particular territory. 
It is now possible to see why, and in what sense, Deleuze says that subjectification is "a 
specific dimension without which we can't go beyond knowledge or resist power" 
Deleuze, 1995 p.99). The subject is able to experiment with a particular conjunction of 
statement and visibility in light of new 'visibilities' that come from the 'outside' of an 
existing territory and provoke thought (e.g. new forces, that make a person 'see' new 
potential or accept the truth of a statement). A new force can provoke thought, and a 
new conjunction can be an act of resistance (however slight) to existing power relations; 
what's more, it can be a creative act that has nothing to do with a reaction. It is an 
attempt to 'go beyond' knowledge as expressed in the territory by combining elements 
that may not have previously been brought together in a given refrain. From the point of 
view of accepted knowledge, such conjunctions can seem 'irrational' or 'just opinion', 
but this judgment does nothing to dissuade the individual if the new conjunction allows 
them to maintain a particular intensity and refrain, i.e. to go on (Haghighi, 2002). In this 
sense "The refrain is a prism, a crystal of space-time. It acts upon that which surrounds 
it, sound or light, extracting from it various vibrations, or decompositions, projections, 
or transformations. The refrain also has a catalytic function: not only to increase the 
speed of exchanges and reactions in that which surrounds it, but also to assure indirect 
interactions between elements devoid of so-called natural affinity and thereby to form 
organized masses." (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.348). It is within repetition that the 
subject is able to experiment with new ways of going on and with the limits of existing 
statements and claims about air quality. This is not all necessarily a 'progressive' 
experimentation, nor is it without risk, nor does it lead to immediate or rapid change. 
"You don't do it with a sledgehammer, you use a very fine file. You invent self-
destructions that have nothing to do with the death drive." (ibid. p.l60) It is to tracing 
this potential that we must turn next. 
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The Play of Judgment 
The territory gives expression to a milieu, and in its repetition the subject emerges as 
'good' or 'bad' in relation to the moral 'overcode' to 'be efficient'. However, we can 
distinguish between the moral code as enshrined in law that the state enforces through 
policing, and the moral overcode of efficiency that as yet has no, or next to no, 
enforcement. In both cases the law (a statement) is empty of content (it always requires 
a judge to interpret the law), but in the first we come to know the law through 
punishment (How bad was the crime? Look at the sentence.)- all law grounds itself in 
force (Derrida, 200 1 ). We have already seen in chapter two how the judgment can act 
an 'incorporeal transformation', an event that actualizes identities. But there is no 
punishment in Ontario for leaving the lights on.45 Without punishment a law's demands 
are infinite because its content remains unspecified. 'Consequently, the person who tries 
to obey the moral imperative of the Law no longer even feels righteous; on the contrary 
the Law makes one feel guilty, necessarily guilty" (Smith 1998 p.255). A person needs 
protection against this kind of 'tyranny'; they have to become their own judge. 
However, being one's own judge is not protection to the extent that judging leads to 
increased guilt, ressentiment and bad-conscience-- what Deleuze characterizes as a 
turning-inward ofthe active forces ofthe subject, which in turn renders a body inert 
(removes its ability to affect others and be affirmatively affected by others) (Deleuze 
1986 see chapter 4, esp. p.146 on the different qualities of' will to power' that emerge 
within assemblage). Therefore, any act of judgment on the part of the subject must go 
'beyond judgment', i.e. beyond any purely reactive stance that lets it be defined by 
universal and imposed principles that are ignorant of the singularity of a life. The 
45 In Toronto there is an Anti-Idling bylaw which states that you cannot idle your car for more than three 
minutes in a sixty minute period. But the bylaw is not readily enforceable because the bylaw officer 
would have to observe the infraction, which would mean observing a person idling for three minutes 
rather than just telling them to shut off their engine. The bylaw also has many loopholes, including the 
right to idle your car at temperatures in excess of27 degrees C in order to keep the air conditioning 
running (for 'safety' reasons). And it exempts buses, or other working vehicles. The bylaw is a 
formalization of a moral proscription, the signs not to idle a reminder. In the suburban community of 
Mississauga this is publicly admitted, there is a bylaw, but no fine or enforcement- purely voluntary. 
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incorporeal transformation, the event, that calls an efficient subject into being and so 
actualizes 'the public' is then going to always be an act that goes 'beyond judgment'; as 
a result, given the singularity of a life, a public will always be a heterogeneous and 
unruly actuality with competing and perhaps even contradictory actualizations from 
different individuals, or perhaps even the same individual at different times and places. 
In order to get a sense of the unruliness and volatility of the public-- we might even say 
the speed with which claims shift and fluctuate -- we can return to our discussion of air 
quality as a quasi-object. Serres describes the circulation of the quasi-object as being 
akin to a ball in motion in a game; this is a particularly apt metaphor because it diffuses 
the tendency to judge any particular actualization of the quasi-object and replaces it with 
an appreciation of how the game is, or can be, played (Serres 1995; Henaff 1997; Brown 
2002; Massumi 2002a chapter 3). In a game the ball (the quasi-object, efficiency 
claims) is constantly in motion in a field of potential created by the goals at either end; 
rather than seeing the players (the subjects) as the cause of the ball's movement within 
this field, it is possible to see the movement of the ball as the cause of the players' 
responses. The rules only formalize- i.e. limit the variation of- the relations that keep 
the ball in motion and make the game work; they do not explain how the game works. 
The players have a goal (to score, to get through the day, to earn a living), and rules (no 
tripping, be efficient), but how they achieve the goal will change with each moment as 
the ball moves across the field and (de)potentializes certain players and regions ofthe 
field- a forever shifting intensity. This only stops when the ball goes in the net, or 
leaves the field. A player that constantly and consciously reflects on the movement of 
the ball and how it fits with the rules and pre-game strategy is a poor athlete; the pre-
game strategy has to evolve with the movement of the ball, the rules fall into the 
background as an outer-limit that is constantly tested for their breaking point. The 
sociality ofthe game (of society) is not defined by the rules, and the positions (subjects) 
they define, but by what happens in between these positions, in their relation, and in the 
event. Each shift ofthe ball changes the whole field of play, changes what each position 
can do, and so it is always a global-event. A game is constantly in a state of becoming, 
even more so when there are no formal rules. 
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There are no formal rules for energy efficiency. There are rules- don' t idle your car, try 
not to use your car, use less energy etc. -- but when they should be followed is not 
codified, there are always extenuating circumstances that can be brought to bear. 
Instead, there is a field of potential created by the circulation of the quasi-object and its 
polarization of political debate (see above p. 134). This is not just a fluid situation; it is 
also a frustrating situation. I leave the house with the intention of playing by the rules, 
get on my bike or head down to the subway on foot. But no one else seems to know the 
game. Cars cut me off on my bike, make it difficult to cross the road, cars stuck in 
congestion pollute the air -I am tripped at every turn and no referee to call foul. "And 
again it ' s another indication [whisper] that people really don't give a shit. They' re not 
doing anything about it".46 " I generally just feel that people are ignorant about it, and, 
they're very selfish, and they take, and they know what they problems are, but they 
don't care because its not directly affecting them, so while they still can do it they will" 
(Figure 5.11) 47 
Figure 5.11: people really don't give a shit 
The game doesn ' t sound like it is much fun, in fact it sounds pretty masochistic- I'll try 
to be energy efficient while everyone does anything they can to make my efforts 
46 Participant #4 
47 Participant # I 
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difficult and unpleasant. But such frustration only emerges when a person stops and 
looks at the scoreboard to check who is winning, but the play actually never stops. 
To play the game is not a question of being energy efficient, but to try to get people one 
encounters to agree on what energy efficiency should be in a particular context- it is 
about the becoming of efficiency. This game involves being noticed, or making people 
notice their own behaviour. "I mean, I do what I do, I try to get my family to do the 
same thing, every opportunity I can, and at work I do it. And then l just go on and on at 
people [chuckle] makes me feel good. But its, its ... an awareness raising, or something, I 
don't know. Even my friends they see a piece of paper and they think 'Oh God its not 
double sided! Here she is ... ' And I don't mind because at least its making them think, 
when they might'n have bothered, or they may have dismissed it, or they may still 
dismiss it but at least it will make them think for, a little minute or something like 
that."48 The chuckle is important- this is not a dogmatic denunciation of friends, it's a 
well placed jab that shows them that their technique is poor, you 're skating circles 
around them, and you're angling for a response.49 
48 Participant #4 
49 Some other examples of this constant negotiation of style that keeps a public circulating: Approaching 
idling cars, trucks and buses and asking the drivers to turn off their engines. He actually enjoys talking 
with, or confronting, people who are idling because he constantly notices the cars idling, but is always 
wondering if he should say something- so "it's a constant anxiousness with me" (participant #6). He 
knows he can't fight the whole world, so it's frustrating and yet he feels oddly compelled. But when he 
does intervene, on a smog day, he inevitably feels better. This is not always without confrontation, or the 
frustration of being dismissed, but sometimes it is met with humour ("Stop idling? For you, sure!" 
(participant #6)) or even an apology. How to approach, and when? "I regret not going up to the drivers of 
those buses and asking them to shut down their engines. I should have. I will next time" (participant# 18). 
Missed the play, next time. Another strategy is to revel in anomalous behaviour, a stance particularly 
favoured by cyclists- "It's funny, the motorists are always looking at the cyclists, and you know, usually 
the cyclists are zipping up here, and the motorists are going very slowly, and, you know as they're looking 
at you they're going 'Gee, I should think about cycling once and while, that guy's really moving pretty 
fast there', I always feel that's what people are thinking" (participant# 18). Or again a cyclist wearing a 
air filter mask" 'Look, he's wearing one of those face things!' a youngster said to the others in the group. 
I guess they will think about why. So I wear it for education as well as to protect my lungs" (participant 
# 18). Finally, one last example, a courier riding his large 'cargo-bike' around town attracts a lot of 
attention and uses it to promote the idea that bikes can be working vehicles, not just for recreation. He 
jokes about how many cases of beer you can carry: "I get comments [about the cargo bike] all the time ... 1 
came out of a building one time and there was tourists around the yellow bike posing, taking pictures. 
Kids love it ... [mock tone] Wow man! Wicked bike! [Normal tone] Which is great because I think there's 
not enough emphasis put on biking in our culture and kids ... love biking because that's how they get 
around when they're kids" (participant #5). 
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There is no better word for this negotiated rhythm of encounter than style. A style 
describes how a person performs the moral overcode in different milieu and territories 
(Spinks 2000; Warner 2002 p.73). A style sustains an intensity and 'makes me feel 
good'. A style is not independent of context and constraint, and so is not to be strictly 
judged as right or wrong, but evaluated as an attempt in context. "I'm very cautious 
now about preaching and converting and chastising and exhorting to do things ... it 
actually works against you, people just become resentful. .. Ifyou've got two kids, and 
you've got to pick up two kids are you going to take your bicycle? Well, no your not. 
Do I think it can be done by bicycle? Sure, but given how people are brought up, and 
the way the world works and is set up, you know it makes it a very, very perverse 
option. You know, if you chose it you are a perverse individual. So I think I tend to 
live more by example [unclear] to live a joyful example. You know, say, it can be done 
without being a freak about it. And I, I don't even talk about it anymore. Y ah, I ride my 
bike, its just what I do ... so."50 A style is not to be taught as a method, it is to be 
appreciated, learned from and experimented with -can I do that to? Style affects what 
a body can do. There are two words in the above quote from the cyclist that we can 
dwell on -- 'perverse' and 'joy'. It is perverse to ride a bike in a congested, pot-holed, 
polluted city, but one takes joy in it. Joy in perversion, joy in a masochistic game? This 
perversion is a 'leap of faith' that has to be made to go beyond judgment and maintain a 
refrain, and what draws them there is 'joy', i.e. an ability to maintain the intensity of 
desire on the BwO. This particular refrain is not possible for every body, although it 
-I 
could be for any body.) 
50 Participant #20 
51 The concept of a 'leap of faith' is taken from Kierkegaard's essay on the 'Knight of Faith', but it is 
taken up by Deleuze in his critique of a transcendental view morality. Deleuze argues that with 
Kierkegaard the knight of faith still hopes for a final transcendental salvation, a time in which his or her 
faith will be proven correct. And so the thinking of such a figure is today filled with 'ressentiment' in as 
much as we no longer believe in God- as in Pascal's wager, you might act as if God existed, but this is a 
weak and cynical position if you think God is dead. Therefore, from an immanent point of view, the leap 
of faith has no alibi, it is made purely with the joy and affirmation of playing with chaos without hope of 
transcendence. So it must ground itself in something in existing reality, something in the milieu. This 
points to the importance of sense and desire for Deleuze and Guattari in making the evaluation of the 
milieu, and for regaining our 'belief in the world' (see chapter six below). See Deleuze, G. (1986); 
De1euze, G. ( 1998); on the need for a belief in the world see Deleuze, G. ( 1995). 
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Deleuze draws out the relationship between a transcendental moral law and perversion 
in his study of Sacher-Masoch (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.l50-152; Holland 1996; 
Deleuze 2004 p.131 ); the moral law comes down from a transcendental plane and judges 
everyone guilty in advance, the masochistic move is to design a 'contract' or 'program' 
in which this transcendental punishment is anticipated and submitted to under set 
conditions that remove the participants from the usual social convention (e.g. tie me up, 
whip me etc.); here a new relationship with pain, punishment and authority is set up that 
has specific limits, and these limits suspend the judgment ofthe transcendental moral 
law. The pleasure comes in knowing these limits and being 'absolved' from blame. 
Masochism, then, is a form of subversion of the moral law in the name of alternate 
reality. However, Holland (1996) points out that in the literature of Sacher-Masoch that 
gave expression to this masochistic contract, the mistress (or whoever administers the 
pain) is joined in dispensing punishment by a sadistic father-figure who does not 
recognize the alternate reality and the limits of the contract, and so the now betrayed 
masochist is made to suffer. Therefore, in practice Masochism does not resolve the 
power relations that support the infinity of the transcendental judgment (there is no 
escape), and so the jaded masochist becomes cynical, and in a second moment desires 
revenge on those who broke the contract- while revenge is still a reactive quality, the 
point here is to point to the potential for a program that then sets up a potential for a 
transmutation of force from the passive to the active. 
The masochist-cyclist, then, is also in a similar situation, submitting to an at times 
painful and perverse joy in cycling, in an attempt to subvert the moral judgment to be 
efficient, and in particular the power relations that impose constraints on what a body 
can do while at the same time pronouncing a interminable set of judgments that say, in 
effect, that one's attempts to be energy efficient are 'not good enough'. When cycling 
the cyclist is in an alternate refrain, an alternate reality, but when this 'contract' is 
exceeded, when the cyclist has 'had enough' of a punishment that will not end, then 
there can be a conversion to a cynical 'rant': "the worlds going to hell, why have kids, 
you know [laughter] there's going to be no air for them to breathe, kind of thing. Which 
then goes into how we set up our cities, and out addictions to cars and blah blah blah 
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blah blah. So, I can work myself into a lather [unclear] as my friends will attest 
[laughter]. 52 The point, then, is not to judge masochism as an (in)valid response, but to 
show that through a refrain a person sets up a 'program' that allows particular intensities 
to pass, and which then also opens them towards accepting the legitimacy of particular 
claims. It gives them force. [t is never a question of judging, but of evaluating the 
refrain and asking what it can do. The 'contract', the refrain, sets up a potential for 
action and transformation. As in the case of the cyclist, there is a leap-of-faith that takes 
one beyond judgment that requires humorous and ironic stance, a joy in the perverse. 
There is a qualitative evaluation to be made here, take this too far and one risks passing 
into a destructive and resentful cynicism in which transgression seeks simply to snub its 
nose at what exists- this is particularly destructive when it is the cynicism of the 
powerful. The challenge is to maintain an ironic or humorous stance that sustains an 
intensity that creates the potential for transformation (Braidotti 200 I) . 
There are times when it is necessary to take a stand because a decision has to be made, 
or one has decided that this time there will be no compromise. "And I think, where do 
you fight and when do you just become plain unpleasant to everybody, you know? And 
if the issues is strong enough, I risk being unpleasant."53 'There are time when 
debunking is necessary. But if applied as a general operating principle it is 
counterproductive. Foster or debunk. It's a strategic question. Like all strategic 
questions it is always a question of timing and proportion. Nothing to do with morals or 
moralizing. Just pragmatic.' (Massumi 2002a p.l3) The game is not as simple as 
blaming another, because it also a matter of doing the right thing yourself. Nor is it 
simply a matter of finding a happy synthesis between competing options. Instead, it is 
always a question of 'how efficient and in what way?"; efficiency is always being 
pushed beyond any particular solution, beyond what is reasonable. But this need not 
mean it is moving towards 'greater' efficiency; it is possible to label fuel-inefficient cars 
as irresponsible, but an individual can make this irresponsibility understandable and 
reasonable within a given context. "I have a, yah, Ford Mustang, 5.0 litre". So why did 
52 Participant #20 
53 Participant# t 6 
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you buy such a fuel inefficient car? "Cuz its cool [laugh, mock tone] Cuz its fast [switch 
to normal tone], and, you know, its got a big engine. And its cheap, my neighbour 
practically gave it to me. And .. .I figure, you know what? People do so many things [that 
are ecological insensitive], that...I think I [who am otherwise responsible] can have one 
or two things sometimes, you know. I can't do everything, I can't drive an electric car, 
too. You know, I have to have some things for myself. And when people ask me, I 
often get asked that, I just tell people the stupid I ike, the stupid typical reason that you 
get from a politician or developer. Well, its better that the car's in my hands than some 
18 year old punk who would be slamming on the gas, you know its better that its in my 
hands, were I drive in carefully, cautiously, not too often, you know, so in a sense its 
better that I have a car than the people who are less responsible environmentally. It 
makes sense doesn't it?"54 Of course it doesn't make sense from a strict energy 
efficiency point of view, but it makes sense in relation to what others are doing, and in 
relation to the refrain that one maintains. The rationale for a 5.0 litre Mustang 
acknowledges the irony of owning such a car when one professes concern for the 
environment, but it is an irony that is playful and humorous, and in doing so it 'goes 
beyond' judgment in order to secure itself as a legitimate claim. What's more, if we 
focus only on the position and content (i.e. 5.0L Mustang as fuel inefficient), we miss 
the critical potential of a refrain that resists the duplicity of a system that speaks of 
efficiency but regularly gives weak rationales for ecologically insensitive actions ('the 
stupid typical reason that you get from a politician or a developer'); a refrain which is 
sustained in part by the 5.0 L Mustang. 
Evaluate and experiment, the territory is never fixed but in continual process of 
repetition. The risk comes when the play stops and a person looks at the score-board, 
and then risks loosing momentum. "We're doing things, the whole global issue too, of 
we're putting things in check, and we, we're back peddling, and we're, we're working as 
hard as we can to save our environment. But I look at the same time, sort of free market 
economy, and, and, sort of globalisation, and just, the biggest and the best will win. I 
think that will. .. outweigh our efforts. And, that's kinda a pessimistic way of viewing 
54 Participant #I 
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things, I just.. .. I think when push comes to shove I think that capitalists and big money is 
going to win out and get what they want...maybe we can slow down the destruction, the 
further destruction of our environment.. .. but I can't see that we're going to make it any 
better" (Figure 5.12 next page).55 It is not that this kind of statement does not contain 
some truth, but as we saw in chapter two, the truth value is 'undecidable' and so there is 
a 'falsity' here, the statement says too much. What's more, it is again a question of what 
this kind of refrain can do, and the answer is very little. It is a pause or retreat that we 
all adopt from time to time. "I know, we're all going to die, we're on the point of like, 
you know, were on that track where were going in that direction, and one day 
everybody's going to be sorry![light tone, almost flippant]."56 The tone is again 
important, it shows that this is a momentary pause, and not a tight spiral into nihilism. A 
sense of futility can be also turned inwards into a guilty reflection on the self which is 
then projected outwards to characterize others as well: "You know, sometimes I think 
I'm greedy when it comes down to it, yah its all about me and what makes my life 
easier. And I think that's one of the traps we get in, being urban, because our lifestyles 
is so, ahhhhhhhh, you know, every little second we can save, is so valuable to us, we'll 
do it. Um ..... so to say that...I think that in my head and in my spirit, I'm, so, burdened 
and conscious and worried about what's going to happen, and how I'm contributing to 
that, and yah, and feeling a bit guilty that, I, still... be sort of selfish in my decisions."57 
Similarly, in the face of an apparent futile task it would also be possible to walk away 
from negotiation of responsibility in disgust: "I mean it's very simple in my terms. The 
ozone's broken because you [politicians and industrialists] broke it, because you wanted 
to produce plastics for the industry and for the consumers, and you wanted formica ... we 
got it, the ozone died. You wanted to cut down the trees, you wanted the urban sprawl, 
there you go, this is what it costs you. Well, get up there and fix it. Like, figure it out! 
... I do my bit for the planet."58 In all of these moments a person stops experimenting 
with the subjectivity, and adopts a more rigid (resigned or resentful) refrain that turns 
inward on itself and away from the disruption of the event. These are moments of 
55 Participant# 15 
56 Participant #I 
57 Participant #15 
58 Participant # 17 
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nihilism, the subject is an expression of a will to nothingness, rather than keeping 
problematic the search for alternative values. 
Figure 5.12: I can't see that we're going to make it any better 
All of the positions discussed above are passing and repeated moments of 
subjectification in response to the moral over-code to be efficient. However, a person 
can adopt all of these positions at different moments in a day, and in a life. I am the 
activist, the moralist, the masochist, the cynic. In all cases it is not, for example, 
masochism, that is ' the problem ' , but it is a question of evaluating what it is possible for 
that refrain to do. In terms of a critical politics, is it a refrain that opens the subject to 
others, and to transformation, or is it a refrain that closes the subject down and pushes 
them further into a reactive and defensive posture? Or perhaps it is a refrain that leads 
simply to a kind of suicidal reaction that does not even preserve any subjective 
dimension from which a person could resist. If we overlay the two presentations of 
subjectivity given above - the BwO and the territorialized refrain- we can see that on 
the one hand the refrain is always making connections, being pulled in new directions 
and subtly changing the rhythm of passage. This disruption then introduces play into the 
territoria lized refrain that challenges the moral overcode to be efficient; but how that 
will then lead to change is a process that unfolds through small movements and 
experimentation that may not be easily recognized. However, these small movements 
are what a politics of becoming seeks to amplify in hopes of moving a subject towards 
being open to an affirmative experimentation with the new forces in the refrain. Such an 
outcome is far from predictable, which is why the formation of a public remains an 
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event, and remains 'volatile'. ln order to see this more clearly, we can turn in the final 
section to considering how the subject as refrain opens on to a becoming-minoritarian. 
Becoming-smog 
Why do we say that all 'solutions' to the moral over-code 'be efficient' (e.g. take public 
transit) are shadowed by 'falsity'? First, it is because the subject adopts a position 
initially in a reactive mode. The subject reacts to the 'coming Thermagedon', to the 
immensity of the moral weight of global ecological destruction, or even the sight of 
young children unable to play outdoors because of poor air. In the face of such a moral 
dilemma, the subject also reacts against taking on the full burden (the impossible 
burden) of the moral overcode 'be efficient,' and seeks to deflect blame by justifying 
what it is they are doing- 'I do my bit'. Finally, the subject can react against those 
who are not 'being efficient' and whose apparent indifference becomes a target for 
blame (including governments or industries that refuse to provide more energy efficient 
alternatives). Given all of these reactive moments, anything a subject can do as an 
individual or group will always seem to be 'not enough', and the claim that 'everyone 
reduces energy use, everyone saves money, everyone breathes a little bit easier' will 
carry the ring of falsity (i.e. undecidability)- it says 'too much'. The second reason 
claims for energy efficiency and individual responsibility carry a ring of falsity, is that 
on a molecular level, smog continues to act as a disruption, as a force whose intensity 
disrupts, more or less, the refrain. The disruption that smog causes is all the more acute 
for those who have tried to incorporate the moral over-code into their refrain because on 
a daily basis they will be reminded of the 'masochistic' position of someone who tries to 
transgress or resist the dominant organization of society (e.g. by riding a bike, or even 
trying to get their colleagues to conserve energy at work). Here the disruption will no 
longer be only a molecular disruption from smog particles, but the molecular intrusion 
of an idling car, or a pesticide sign- all the little irritants that show 'people don't care'. 
In this second case, the disruption remind us that of the 'falsity' ofthe idea of total 
control, given the molecular nature of the problem of air pollution. Both ofthese 
moments mean that any subjective refrain in relation to smog is always being opened 
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again to the question of what else can be done, and always open to the risk of closing 
back down against this question. 
It is these disruptive moments that the potential exists to open a subjective refrain to 
becoming, a potential that is also the peril of a politics 'at speed'. We need to first 
define how Deleuze and Guattari's concept of becoming in more detail to understand 
this ambivalence (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 chap. 9 and 1 0). The first thing that can be 
said about becoming is that it is a process that is instigated by the encounter with the 
anomalous or exceptional - something which fascinates, or irritates, and which creates a 
'snag' that pulls at the edge of the refrain. Therefore, all becomings are always multiple 
and in relation. Second, becoming is always molecular, a product of a proximity, or 
encounter, that starts to pull the subject in ways that go beyond conscious intention. 
Even when it is a molar individual that fascinates, it is always parts of body that create 
the connection (e.g. a fascination with a bird's colour, or the irritant of smog as grit in 
the mouth). Third, becoming has no end- it is never a question of becoming-like that 
which one enters into relation with, becoming never finishes. Instead, becoming is a 
process of 'leakage' (variously called a 'line of flight' or 'deterritorialization'), in which 
the refrain starts to unravel and pull the subject towards a destination that is never a 
simple imitation. If we take these three points together, the grammar proper to 
describing becoming is the indefinite article, the infinitive verb and the proper name -
e.g. a becoming-smog. The indefinite article indicates it is part of an assemblage (i.e. 
impersonal), the proper name indicates the relation, and the infinitive verb indicates an 
indeterminate time with no end or beginning (Aeon instead of the pulsed time of 
Chronos). 
It is a process of becoming that drives a micropolitics and which takes us beyond 
recognized identities: "It is wrongly said ... that a society is defined by its contradictions. 
That is true only on the large scale of things. From the viewpoint of micropolitics, a 
society is defined by its lines of flight, which are molecular. There is always something 
that flows or tlees, that escapes the binary organization ... things that are attributed to a 
'change in values', the youth, women, the mad etc.' (p.216). This is because becoming 
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is always in the first instance a becoming-minoritarian; if we recall from chapter two, the 
minoritarian is always that which not an already recognized identity, that runs between 
recognized identities. A minority has nothing to do with number, it can even be that 
which exists in all majoritarian (recognized) identities as a molecular component that 
disrupts, or creates a connection with others. Therefore, becoming is always in the first 
instance a connection and qualitative change towards the molecular and minor. 
There is a universal figure of minoritarian consciousness as the becoming 
of everybody, and that becoming is creation. One does not attain it by 
acquiring the majority. The figure to which we are referring is 
continuous variation, as an amplitude that continually oversteps the 
representative threshold of the majoritarian standard, by excess of default. 
In erecting the figure of a universal minoritarian consciousness, one 
addresses the powers (puissances) of becoming that belong to a different 
realm from that of Power (Pouvoir) and Domination. Continuous 
variation constitutes the becoming-minoritarian of everybody as opposed 
to the Majoritarian Fact ofNobody. Becoming-minoritarian as the 
universal figure of consciousness is called autonomy (p.l 06). 
The becoming-minoritarian, as this quote suggests, is a process that is open to any body, 
although not every body will open themselves to it or allow themselves to be 
transformed by it. Indeed, if becoming is molecular it is first sensed, rather than 
recognized, and it can be disorienting or threatening. A subject may pull-back and be 
confused. That is why becoming must always be approached with "Sobriety, Sobriety: 
that is the common prerequisite for the deterritorialization of matters, the 
molecularization of material, and the cosmicization of forces." (p.344). It doesn't begin 
with a grand declaration and certainty, but with a process of experimentation which 
begins with a 'becoming-imperceptible' in which one makes oneself indiscernible and so 
allows oneself to open to the assemblage without judgment, without detection. That is 
why becoming-minoritarian is equated above with 'autonomy'. It is never a question of 
imitating of copying, but of finding a singular becoming, a becoming is always haeccity 
-which is not to say it is wilful or individualized, it is always a collective-singular 
because part of multiplicity (Guattari 2000). 
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Even if becoming itself has no end, the subject never disappears into becoming, but is 
transformed by it-- at some point it will be reterritorialized on a particular refrain. 
These are the stakes of a politics of becoming, for if deterritorialization happens too 
quickly, the subject can enter a 'suicidal' line of flight in which they become recklessly 
and hopelessly tied to a path that leads to their destruction or enslavement (e.g. the 
cynicism and nihilism of those who see smog as a sign of unstoppable greed). It is also 
possible that the subject reterritorializes on even more reactive and defensive refrains-
paranoid or Fascist refrains that seek to exclude and regulate. Therefore, given that 
smog creates a disruption that opens a subject to deterritorialziation, it is possible that 
this disruption is quickly reterritorialized on a reactive refrain. For example, perhaps a 
person fears for their health, or that of their children, and so reacts by trying to contain 
smog by creating 'safe' environments in an air conditioned home, by driving the kids to 
school, by leaving the city whenever possible. In addition, as we have seen 
contemporary capitalism works 'axiomatically' and recognizes deterritorializations as 
potential markets. Indeed, capitalism thrives on constant de/re-territorialization and a 
reactive subject seeking to contain or repress the new intensity that is driving it beyond 
itself (Olkowski 1999). In this reactive mode the new intensity, and the new desire it 
could create, is experienced instead as 'a lack' (e.g. of security, of a future for the kids, 
of health) that one can seek to fill with a consumer product that has little to do with 
addressing the new intensity proactively and affirmatively (indeed, it may in fact 
exacerbate the situation- e.g. an SUV sold as a safe vehicle, signifying country life and 
youthful vitality). It is also possible to accept the new intensity with the greatest degree 
of naivety (or is it cynicism?) as a simple fact of I ife- in Toronto the first 'Oxygen Bar' 
has opened, and new cars are sold with air filters on the air intake vents. If there is a 
becoming-smog, then it can be a whole becoming-reactive that leads nowhere even as 
the same subject retrofits their home with new insulation, and switches off the lights. 
However, it is also possible that the disruption of the smog-event opens the subject to a 
more affirmative stance towards the new intensities, a realization that it is not a matter of 
excluding smog, but of becoming with smog. "That's what I've learnt from being [in 
this housing estate surrounded by a factories and freeways] .... urn, there's a continuum, 
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urn, both in terms ofthe environment, but also in terms of the environment internally. 
And I can, I can, urn, balance out, what the external environment is doing by my internal 
environment. By drinking more water, by eating better food, by taking 
supplements .... urn, I don't have to be afraid, and I can go out there, and breathe that 
smog, and not be so afraid of it." These habits allow a new refrain to take shape, one 
which allows a person to also feel comfortable walking and cycling in the city - it opens 
other possibilities. However, making such a change requires new limits as well: "You 
know, there's a lot of jobs that I don't think I could do. That I wouldn't feel comfortable 
with, urn, doing it. You know, where I could make a lot of money. So, in terms of 
success, on a ... cultural level, definitely, yeah, it hampers my style."59 The privilege of 
those 'who don't have to', 'who refuse', cannot be reduced to wealth, but it is privilege 
nonetheless, and so it has to be recognized that such a life is not for everybody. How 
does a person find the time and privilege to engage in this 'becoming-smog'? - by giving 
up the privilege of status and wealth, by raising a family in a home that is shared with 
others, by living in a place where 'good food' is close at hand, but which is a place 
exposed to the pollution of industry and heavy traffic. The conjunction of factors is 
incidental to the point being made because- the specifics don't apply to you. It needs to 
be stressed again that it always a question of style and transmission of the force of the 
event, and never a question of 'imitation'. It is a matter of exploring potentials for 
turning from reactive stance to an affirmative and experimental stance in which one 
explores the potentials that exist in one's milieu. Becoming-minoritarian is an 
opportunity to deviate from the majority because one has the 'privilege' of not suffering 
the consequences of a repressive force. How can one create a routine with gaps or holes 
that go 'unnoticed' by everyone but you? This is not a question of 'hiding' what one is 
doing, but of creating a style that does not set itself up in imitation or opposition. --
'becoming-imperceptible' or 'becoming-everybody/everything (tout le monde)' (p.280). 
Becoming, then, is not a determined process and there is no promise of a better future. 
In addition, becoming is not something that someone plans or wills, it the unintended 
effect of assemblage and its constant repetition in world of multiple flows and speeds, its 
59 Participant #10 (both quotations) 
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constant circulation between the virtual and actualization. Therefore, a politics of 
becoming is not charged with instigating becoming, but of thinking about how to 
'capture' becoming in ways that 'do justice to the event' by affirming the new 
intensities.60 Speed here is not 'fast speed', these are not changes one expects to see 
overnight; it is instead a process of encouraging the search for the 'right speed', a 
qualitative evaluation of rhythm that allows for a new connection to take place. 
'Intensity of deterritorialization must not be confused with speed of movement or 
development. The fastest can even connect its intensity to the slowest, which, as 
intensity, does not come after the fastest but is simultaneously at work on different 
stratum or plane" (ibid. p.l74). The repetition ofthe subjective refrain, the play of 
judgment and subjectivity, can appear as stagnation but politics is characterized by 'the 
infinite slowness of the wait (what is going to happen?)' during which time becoming is 
at work, and 'infinite speed of the result (what happened?)' in which a new identity 
emerges (ibid. p.281). It is possible to 'botch' a politics ofbecoming, and to try to 
'reterritorialize' too quickly on a majoritarian claim. It is always a matter of timing and 
evaluation, of sensing the potential of a refrain. 
In light ofthe molecularity ofthe smog-event, the critical project is one of always 
keeping visible the limits of control, so as to then always question the degree and kind of 
control that is legitimated in the name of controlling smog. This involves ensuring that 
the circulations of claims to 'be efficient' to not simply result in a reactive 
subjectification that seeks to avoid or contain. Therefore, we can see that the strategy of 
circulating claims that individuals should 'be efficient' is not sufficient in this regard- it 
will require the addition of a different kind of circulation to take a subject beyond the 
reactive stage. At least in its initial stages, efficiency claims contribute to a thoroughly 
reactive subjectivity of someone who has 'done their bit' and who is ready to point to 
'who is to blame'. What's more in justifying actions based on concern about personal 
and collective health (fear) and obligation, it also contributes to a reactive stance. This 
is even more problematic when one takes into account power differentials in a 
60 Which does not mean passively accepting, it means actively engaging them rather than trying to 
reactively exclude them. 
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hierarchical society, where there are institutional subjects who can mobilize immense 
resources to 'blame' others rather than seeking to affirm and experiment with change 
(e.g. the car industry, the 'clean coal' lobby). 
All of this, however, is a reflection of majoritarian politics, a politics that will proceed 
by binarized choices. But there is also a minoritarian politics set in motion by the claim 
to 'be efficient' that can be used to get beyond the impasse of opposition. A politics of 
becoming would seek to instigate what Nietzsche calls a 'transmutation' of the reactive 
forces into an affirmative becoming-smog that seeks to explore how to live with smog 
rather than seek total control. To do this we have to look to see how smog-events 
instigate deterritorializations of certain elements in an assemblage, which can then react 
back on the whole and transform it. However, this process is not abstract, but concretely 
related to particular contexts, and so it will require that we look more closely in the next 
chapter at how we can sense, and encourage, a process ofbecoming-minoritarian in the 
transportation reform debate in Toronto. 
CONCLUSION 
Produce a deterritorialized refrain as the final end of music, release it 
within the Cosmos --that is more important than building a new system. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.350) 
The smog-event is global event, both in the sense of global ecology and the 
interdependence of regions and individual actions, but also in the sense that the smog-
event changes all the subjectivities in play in the social field- it gives them a different 
expression and potential. A person does not have the same body as they did 'before' 
the smog-event. Smog opens the organized body and reminds us of the body's potential 
as a disorganized body-without-organs, and points towards the ambivalent potential of a 
subject's 'desire'. The subject is composed within changes in intensity, it is a rhythm 
through a coded milieu that allows us to go on; as long as it is successful the subject 
remains organized on its surface, or remains as a surface of organization. The subject 
does not do this independently of its milieu, the distinction between inside and outside 
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comes after the fact, the body-without-organs (BwO) is open to its milieu and a 
successful rhythm is not independent on the built and natural environment that sustains it 
- hot pavement/air conditioned buildings, dirty air/filtered air, outside/inside, the BwO 
moves between these binaries. But the BwO never exists alone or 'first', it always 
exists in tandem (below, behind etc.) with an organized body and its recognized 
subjectivity. The BwO becomes disciplined, or oscillates between discipline and 
unruliness. 
Central to the disciplining of the body is a space organized to sustain a particular 
disciplining, and a series of moral statements that give expression and legitimate this 
state of affairs. The moral overcode is 'second' layer of force and relation within the 
coded milieu, and it limits what the body can do. It is at this point that the subject and 
the milieu cease to be only directional and functional, and become dimensional and 
expressive as well -they form into a territory and become visible. The subject exists 
within a territorial refrain, and a territory is defined by the relations between matters of 
expression that define an 'inside' (territorial motifs) and 'outside' (territorial 
counterpoints). However, the territory is not fixed, it does not pre-exist the rhythmic 
passage it expresses. Therefore, the territory exists only in repetition. That means that 
what is considered 'good' or 'bad' is not a fixed practice that can be determined by 
virtue of its 'content' (e.g. how much it is technically efficient). Instead, moral 
judgments of this nature are always relational and dependent on context. 
Rather than defining fixed subjectivities, the territory that finds expression in the moral 
overcode to be efficient actually makes possible a range of subjective positions that can 
be occupied by the same person during different moments of subjectification. I am a 
cynic, a devout eco-virtuous citizen, a sceptic etc. But the range of different positions, 
as well as the content they contain, is constrained by social hierarchy and sedimented 
power relations. There is a surface of stability and predictable visibility in any given 
territory. It is not a question of complete fluidity, but of a repetition that is open to 
change, which in turn requires experimentation to go 'beyond judgment' and set up a 
new refrain, a new territory. It is also not a question of 'expecting' an individual to 
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change, not a matter of telling them what they should do, but of making visible what 
they can do. 
Within every majoritarian position is a becoming-minoritarian that is excessive to any 
position. The challenge of a minor politics of becoming is one of thinking about how to 
use the circulation of claims in the public sphere to release the potential of this 
minortarian element and open existing positions to transformation. It is a matter of 
thinking about how one can see the potential for 'a people to come' and engage in the 
labour of calling a public into being. Rather than supporting one or another majoritarian 
claim solely by virtue of a moral judgment (e.g. it is more efficient, more fair), it is 
necessary to also evaluate the problematic question for which different majoritarian 
positions (and their accompanying subjectivities) are a 'solution'. All territorial 
assemblages discipline and limit what a body can do, and so it always a matter of 
evaluating whether such disciplining is 'acceptable', or whether we can go 'beyond 
judgment' in order to affirm new relations, and in order to let the body go further along 
towards the limit of what a body can do. In smog politics, it is not only a question of 
simply dictating efficient behaviour, but of making visible how efficiency requires 
control of an open body-without-organs, and its accompanying 'distracted' subjectivity. 
In posing the question of smog in this way, the problem of efficiency becomes 
'problematic' (without solution) and 'radical' inasmuch as it connects the problem of 
smog with a more general problem of subjectification in contemporary capitalist society. 
Because there is no single solution to this process of disciplining, it always a question of 
encouraging the experimentation with what a body can do by using political claims to 
make visible the disciplining of the body. I turn now in the final chapter to an example 
of such an attempt. 
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CHAPTER6 
EXPERIMENTING WITH CIRCULATION 
The pedestrian, painstakingly circumscribing the blocks of the old city, 
harbours no doubt about what moves and what is fixed ... the speeding car 
projects itself into a space that is never formed, forever evolving, emerging 
ahead while disappearing behind. This creates a liquidity in which the 
dance and dancer are fused in a swirling, self-engendering motion promoted 
by the darting driver's eyes, touching (because so intimate, so familiar) 
street, canopy, house, adjacent car, red light, side street, radio station Tejano 
I 06.5, car upon car, instruments, tree trunks, joggers, barking dog, drifting 
leaves, large welt and dip, patch of sunlight. This is navigational space, 
forever emerging, never exactly the same, liquid rather than solid, 
approximate rather than precise, visual but also visceral in that it is felt by 
the entire body, not just through the eyes and the soles of the feet. The 
body in this liquid space is suspended, held and urged by the trajectory. 
Lerup (2000 p.55) 
Once again Lars Lerup evocatively captures the experience of living in the mobile city, at 
the confluence of multiple flows and speeds. Here in 'liquid space' the body is urged by 
the trajectory, but as we saw in the opening pages ofthe thesis, it is precisely this 
distracted and mobile body-subject that is of concern for those engaged in politics and 
political analysis- how can the political subject be engaged for more than a fleeting 
moment, how can one sustain a claim in a world 'forever emerging'? In the preceding 
chapters I have tried to chart a path that unpacks the processes that form this temporalized 
space in order to understand how to engage the public assemblage at speed. The first move 
was to argue that the body and the subject are not overwhelmed by a singular speed, but 
instead emerge within duration formed at the confluence of many speeds. Duration is 
stabilized in routine, and repetition forms the foundation around which a subject can 
engage and experiment with a problem manifest as repeated disruptions. The smog-event 
is an example of such a repeated disruption. Therefore, and second, I explored how the 
molecular smog-event is captured by the speed of the networks of measurement and 
monitoring, and how this then allows the smog-event to be inserted into political discourse 
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in terms of a molar entity called air quality, which legitimates calls for energy efficiency. 
This does not eliminate the disruptive quality of the smog event, but it makes it 
comprehensible and repeatable, and so open to political debate. It is now possible to 
actualize moments of subjectification as individuals engage with (play with) what it can 
mean to 'be efficient'. The task of making a public within this repetition is still radically 
indeterminate, and the 'incorporeal transformation' is always prone to disruption with each 
repetition. Therefore, and third, I unfolded the nature ofthis indeterminacy in more detail 
by following the circulation of claims about energy efficiency; we saw that the subject 
emerges within a continually shifting and negotiated refrain and territory, which both 
contains the disruption of the smog-event by allowing the subject to maintain a functional 
subjectivity, but which also opens the subject to becoming-minoritarian- a becoming that 
can just as easily lead to a reactive turn away from the smog-event, as it can to the opening 
of the refrain to becoming-smog. Becoming is the potential that moves between 
recognized majoritarian identities, but it is an ambivalent potential. We are now able to 
return to the question of how to engage the mobile and distracted subject in the public 
sphere, because we now no longer have a se If-present subject opposed to 'speed' 
(singular), but can think of a subject that has been opened to becoming within an 
assemblage composed of multiple speeds, and which is sustained through repetition. As a 
final pass, I will now turn to address how to affirm becoming as the shifting terrain on 
which a political claim is maintained, and think about how one can experiment with 
intervening in this process in the hope that a claim might influence the trajectory of 
becoming. 
ln this chapter l explore the use of images and artwork to intervene and support claims in a 
politics of becoming in relation to debates about transportation reform. Moving away from 
a car-based transportation system is, of course, central to the politics of air quality. A very 
strong case can be made for why the car will have to make room for bicycles in Toronto 
and other North American cities, just as they will have to make more room for transit and 
pedestrian safety (Freund and Martin 1993; Newman and Kenworthy 1999). Not only are 
there issues of air pollution and health, congestion, access to mobility and the impacts on 
sociability ofpublic space, but there is also the problem of dwindling oil supplies in the 
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coming decades without as yet a reliable alternative to the internal combustion engine 
(Roberts 2004). It may be tempting to suggest that we are at the end of the auto-age in the 
city, but everything is up in the air as to how long that will take and what shape it will take. 
The normative concerns- whether it be pollution from smog, health and safety, or the 
inequity of who has to suffer congestion and time constraint- do not require the removal 
of the car in the short term because there are other options that can be attempted. 1 In 
addition, as was discussed in chapter four, it is difficult to begin to implement such reforms 
when subjectivities are formed within existing infrastructure, and in this case an 
infrastructure dominated by the automobile (Sheller and Urry, 2000). The case for 
switching away from the car, and car-based design, cannot be based solely on the argument 
that it is ultimately technically necessary and feasible, but must also include an 
engagement with why it is desirable -- the force of the better argument is not in its 
technical merit alone, but in its ability to deterritorialize the dominant car-based 
subjectivities. 
In what follows I will look at different ways to problematize transportation-based 
subjectivities. This is an experiment is how to intervene in an example of a 'hard 
opposition', which was identified in chapter one as one of the risk of a politics 'at speed' 
within the controlled and disciplined spaces of the city. In order to this, the discussion will 
have to move away from a strict focus on smog and air quality, to engage with how claims 
associated with air quality- such as reducing car-use- must enter into a conjunction with 
a wider range of claims when trying to call a public in to being and becoming. In short, we 
1 For example, in the short to medium term it is possible to imagine extending the life of the car through 
hybrid electric/petrol vehicles, or even a switch to hydrogen fuel cells; while this does not solve the problem 
of energy consumption in the long term, it does push back the date at which we (in the first world) will face 
an energy crisis (The Centre for Sustainable Transportation, 2000). Similarly, it does not solve the problem 
of pollution if, as has been suggested, the electricity demand is met in by increased burning of non-
renewable fuels (Pembina Institute, 2000). On the issue of congestion, it is possible to extend the car age by 
attempting to address congestion through charging tolls at peak times and congested places, a scheme that 
could be implemented through GPS units embedded directly in the car, and which could even be used to 
control the speed of the car in order to address safety and emission concerns . It has even been suggested that 
the private car will become part of integrated 'smart-car' network in which freeway travel will involve the 
car becoming fully automated through a system of traffic monitoring so as to maximize the efficiency of the 
road for all users (Monbiot, 2004; Zielinski, 1995 ). As concerns the health problems related to obesity 
caused by car-based city design, we will need to ask why people who are at present willing to seek fitness 
through private gyms in compensation for sedentary car-based routines would rather seek fitness through the 
design 'active' living spaces. 
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do not abandon the car only because of air pollution, but air pollution provides one of the 
grounds on which the subject is actualized as someone who is aware of the need to live 
without (or with less of) the car. The examples that follow then reflect the arguments in 
chapter two that a public is formed when a claim creates a conjunction between a disparate 
set of statements in a particular context- this is particularly clear in the final example, 
where the politics of the war in Iraq come into conjunction with the ecological arguments 
to use a bicycle as a mode of personal transportation. In all of the examples, smog is still 
present within the conjunction, but not necessarily central. The chapter will begin with an 
engagement with photographs of roads and highways in Toronto taken by participants as 
representations of places that reminded them of air pollution. I will argue, through an 
engagement with the art of Martha Rosier, that as a series, these pictures can be understood 
to critique and judge car-based urban design, but they do little to encourage 
experimentation. Therefore, I engage in more detail with the conflict between cyclists and 
car-drivers in Toronto, and ask how such a conflict can be used to encourage 
experimentation with mobility in the city. I use the artwork of Rainer Ganahl as an 
example of a successful experiment in re-activating the becoming-minoritiarian of all 
positions in relation to the opposition between car and bike-based subjectivities, and in 
doing so problematizing the relations and control that support existing transportation 
infrastructure. 
The affect and percept of gridlock- the end of the road 
The goal of an experimental critique, one that would seek to support a politics of 
becoming, is two fold. First, it is necessary to make visible the fact that the subject 
emerges within an assemblage, and so is not 'in control', but continually open to forces of 
becoming that pull beyond the self. This is a problematizing moment, and a moment of 
humility. It is a moment where critique makes visible the power of 'falsity' - i.e. the 
indiscernible dimension of truth that renders all claims problematic. However, this in itself 
will not be enough, for as we have seen becoming can lead to a reactive stance, or worse a 
spiral toward nihilism (some would rather will nothing, Nietzsche argues, instead of 
affirming the limits of our will). Therefore, there is a second moment that is needed, a 
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moment of experimentation where a subject affirms the radical indeterminacy of action, 
and so the necessity of choice. Choice as necessity is not free will, and is not the choice of 
unconstrained liberal individualism. It is choice that emerges within the context of the 
necessity to act, and so a constrained choice that must be evaluated -what can I see and do 
today? Choice, as understood here, is better framed as what Nietzsche calls the 'dice 
throw', or gamble, in which one acts into indeterminacy with the hope that what will return 
(what will actualize), will affirm and strengthen what one is doing- 'whatever you will, 
will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return' (Deleuze 1986 p. 68). It is 
therefore necessary for circulation within the public sphere to encourage this gamble, this 
experimentation, and such an attempt to encourage experimentation will itself be a form of 
experimenting- a 'dice throw' into an assemblage in the process of becoming. 
Experimentation with becoming when circulating texts (broadly understood as not just 
words, but images and sounds) in the public sphere is experimentation with re-activating 
the event, with making the charge of the event live again, and so be able to draw those who 
encounter a text out of the habitual in order to form a connection with the 'forces of the 
outside' (those forces excluded from the refrain, that disrupt the refrain and throw us into 
becoming) (Deleuze 1999 p. 70, 120). However, as we have seen in the last chapter, 
becoming is a process that is not recognized, but sensed at the limit, or in between, 
recognized identities. That is why it always 'falls back' into reterritorialization. Making 
becoming visible, then, is a process of maintaining an intensity, a sense, of a world where 
what exists is always a partial expression of a more excessive reality. Therefore, to 
experiment with becoming is to experiment with sensation. It is a question of thinking 
about what is sensed in the problematic moment of disruption, and then creating a text that 
will re-activate that sense and allow it be circulated and repeated, such that sensation can 
problematize the oppositions ofmajoritarian politics. This is necessarily experimental 
because the attempt always risks failing to re-activate intensity, which means that it falls 
back into the 'mere opinion' of the phenomenological subject, which does nothing to 
promote a becoming-minoritarian ofrecognized identities. If successful, a text will 
reactivate a sense of world that is excessive to representation, and so will delegitimate 
(humble) the certainty of any authentic grounding, or transcendental authority. 
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Experimental attempts, then, are not true or false until they actually do something, and 
aesthetic analysis is an evaluation of 'more or less' interesting, rather than the binary 
true/false (Deleuze 1986 p.1 05; 1994 p.54). The aim of such an aesthetic analysis would 
be to describe how the claim is understood to work, how its components form an 
assemblage with the viewer to re-activate the event. This leaves open the question of 
whether such an actualization will come to pass in a different repetition of the event. 
Those people who agreed to talk with me about their experiences with smog were asked to 
take pictures of times and places where they encountered or thought about air pollution. It 
is perhaps not surprising, then, that a majority of those pictures are of roads, cars and 
grid lock. Changing transportation design and behaviour is at the heart of addressing air 
pollution. However, it is the utter banality of such pictures that makes them difficult to 
talk about- in describing their pictures, participants would often just move through the 
pictures with little commentary ('this is another road scene'), the rationale for taking a 
picture of a road being implicit. When asked what bothered them about the road, answers 
were again often unsurprising, including frustration over the lack of proper transport 
alternatives, the desire for more green landscapes, the stink of the air. In short, the road 
pictures prompt cliched questions from me and cliched answers. Deleuze has often 
remarked that it is not error or untruth that is the enemy of thinking, but cliche, because it 
signals our inability to think- or at least articulate- beyond what is recognized and 
accepted as 'common-sense' (Smith 1996 p.33, p.50-5l ftn 9; Rajchman 2001 p.138). 
Therefore, it is necessary to think again about such road scenes, and try to understand why 
they provoke such a gridlock in thought. This can be done by addressing all ofthe 
participants photographs as a series, taking them beyond what any given individual 
intended and presenting them here as a series of images circulating in the public sphere. 2 
In doing so we are looking to evaluate their potential to provoke thought and re-activate 
becoming. 
2 Some photographs pointed to spaces that displayed alternatives- such as green spaces, roads without cars, 
or in one case a bike-lane that was illegally spray-painted down the side of the road. Had there been enough 
of these I might have also tried to make a series out of them. 
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In evaluating the images through a Deleuzian lens, the focus is on how images create 
sensations that impart sense to the claims that are associated with the images, and so 
influence what the claims can do (Deleuze, 1994 chap. 7, Deleuze 1998; Smith, 1996; 
Zourabichvili, 1996; Kawash, 1998; Rajchman, 200 I chap. 6; Massumi, 2002b; Bogue, 
1996, 2003a,b). For Deleuze, a picture or painting is not first and foremost about its 
contents (meaning), but the way in which it assembles colours, shapes, textures etc. in a 
composition that transmits 'affects' and 'percepts'- i.e. sensations that come before fully 
formed affections and perceptions.3 A percept and affect, then, are forces of sensation and 
as such non-representable. A picture has content (a car, a person, a bowl of fruit etc.), but 
what gives it sense falls between what we see and what we can say about the picture. 
Zourabichvili ( 1996) describes the percept as the 'spark of sense' that exists whenever a 
field of affects and percepts is depontentialized within a particular knowledge claim- the 
claim is always exceeded by these forces (the spark) that gives it sense. An artist 
assembles affects and percepts in such a way that what is 'intolerable', 'shameful' or 
problematic, becomes 'visible' (Deleuze 1995 p.36).4 To use a simple example, Deleuze 
notes "it is easy to articulate the madness of a monomaniac, but it is very difficult to see it 
in time and to intern him when we ought. Many people are in the asylum who ought not to 
be there, but many are also no there who ought to be" (Deleuze 1999 p.64). Sensation 
opens thought to a world of non-representational forces that exceed it, and so renders 
visible the limits of any given representation. 
Since we cannot represent affects and percepts, the analysis of images works through the 
analysis of composition- if we think it works, how does it work (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994 p.191 )? For Deleuze this means that analyzing art and film is an analysis of signs, as 
distinct from symbols and signifiers (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.67-68; Bogue 2003a). 
While symbols have fully coded meanings dependent on interpretation (the tower as 
3 Deleuze and Guattari write ( 1994 p.l64 ): "Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a 
state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength 
of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects, are beings whose validity lies in themselves 
and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the absence of man because man, as he is caught in 
stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects". 
4 Deleuze always uses these melancholic descriptors, but it follows that art can also make visible what is 
joyful. 
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phalus), the signs are created through a relation between components in the picture and 
transmit sense that admits no final resolution or certainty: 
[signs] are no longer even recognizable as objects, but rather refer to 
sensible qualities or relations that are caught up in an unlimited becoming, a 
perpetual movement of contraries. A finger is never anything but a finger, 
but large finger can at the same time be said to be small in relation a 
third ... Recognition measures and limits these paradoxical qualities by 
relating them to an object, but in themselves these 'simultaneously opposed 
sensations' ... perplex the soul and set it in motion, they force it to think an 
demand further inquiry (Smith 1996 p30-31) 
The components that can be thus composed are of colour, shape, texture, volume etc. The 
analysis of images works by pointing to the relations amongst these, which means that the 
sensation exists in the very materiality of the image itself, and never strictly represents a 
reality that exists beyond it (although a viewer can, and will, draw connections). The role 
of art is to transmit affects and percepts (sensation) and so reactivate the event in a way 
that can make it can provoke thought, and play a part in the production of a new reality that 
goes beyond what is- following Paul Klee, Deleuze argues that the role of art is "not to 
render the visible, but to render visible" (Smith 1996). "In art, and in painting as in music, 
it's not a question of reproducing or inventing forms, but of harnessing forces" (Deleuze 
quoted in Bogue, 1996 p.257). We can now turn now to analyze the images participants 
created as part of this project. I am not addressing my participant as 'artist' (as if they had 
an artistic intention in making these), but presenting this series as my own composition as 
a way to think about how different kinds of images work in the public sphere- there is an 
'art' to any intervention- in order to evaluate whether or not such images would work to 
encourage experimentation and engagement with issues of mobility.5 The pictures on the 
following pages are presented not as individual places, but as a single series (Figure 6.1 
below p. 198-209); however, they are all of the streets of Toronto, or the highways that 
surround it. I have included a large number of photographs (23) in the hopes of 
5 Deleuze and Guattari display a rather elitist approach to the artist; not all art is good art, and not all art is 
able to transmit affect and percept. This move anticipates critiques of relativism in their aesthetic theory. 
But strictly speaking this cannot be avoided, for what works for me may not work for you, what Deleuze 
senses in art of Franc is Bacon another may sense in Las Vegas. Deleuze and Guattari seem to recognize this 
in as much as they encourage, and believe in, an art of living, an art of the everyday, that is accessible to 
anyone (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988 p.321 ). Ultimately, then, their elitism is not about 'good art', but about 
art that can provoke thought- it is a question of what it can do. 
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encouraging the reader to linger in the series for awhile, but also to try to present the force 













The first thing I would note about these photographs is the lack of bicycles or pedestrians; 
their absence is for the most part not one of timing, but of the fact that these are roads in 
which bicycles and pedestrians do not often venture or are banned. In other words, the 
dominant fact of these pictures is apparent lack of transport alternatives, and when we do 
see a streetcar it is trapped in traffic. The sense of being trapped by the lack of alternatives 
is also echoed and magnified by the way in which the pictures reveal a body that is trapped 
and controlled within the road system. This is most obvious in pictures of congestion; 
however, it is also made apparent by the fact that in many of the pictures parts of the car 
windshield, a rear-view mirror, or steering wheel intrude awkwardly into the edges and 
foreground of the frame, disrupting a linear perspective and the flow of 'navigational 
space' so familiar to the driver of highway, and obscuring the photographer's intended 
subject matter.6 This affect is also created by road infrastructure, such as the concrete 
barricades along the side of the highway that bisect some pictures, parts of bridges or the 
lampposts that intrude into other pictures. In some the rear-view mirror even captures a 
scene that was behind the lens, again disrupting the traditional linear perspective of the 
photograph and immersing the photographer and viewer in the space. In these pictures, 
then, we get the sense of body being controlled (and so being themselves out of control). 
This in turn is related to a second key point, which is the dominance of the technical 
infrastructure over the human presence- not just the car, but also the electrical and 
communication infrastructure and, in one case, the fossil fuel storage tanks, and in another 
a gas station. In most of these photographs there are no people; it is a landscape of 
machines, and even when the photograph is one that is taken at a human scale (i.e. close 
up, for example in congestion), we are often struck by the size of neighbouring vehicles, 
especially trucks and truck tires and by the sheer volume and density of machinery and 
infrastructure. 
Finally, I would note that the affects and percepts ofthese pictures call on all the senses -
we see chipped and dirty windshields, dusty clouds and hazy horizons, sun shinning 
6 I owe this insight to Alexander Alberro's reading of Martha Rosier's Rights of Passage, see below in main 
text. 
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directly into the lens backlighting some scenes, glinting off car hoods and windshields, or 
casting hard shadows on the ground (this is a direct light and hot one). While many shots 
are of congestion, there are also many shots in which movement is suggested by the 
blurring of vehicles. Together these signs evoke our senses of touch, smell, hearing and 
even taste (dusty air); they evoke the sense of space that is visceral, dynamic and 
multidimensional, relating us back to the observation above that the photographer and 
viewer are immersed in what is at times a chaotic and disorienting space, rather than being 
removed and in control as in a traditional linear perspective of landscape photography. 
What role could such images play in the public sphere within a politics of transportation 
reform? What I like about these photographs is the way that they vividly capture the way 
in which the body is controlled by transportation infrastructure, and so transmit the sense 
that change is necessary, a sense of something 'intolerable'. I would argue that these 
images act as a critique ofthe current state of affairs, an interpretation that is inspired by 
the artist Martha Rosier's Rights of Passage (Rosier 1997). This work consists of a series 
of panoramic shots of highways and roads around New York, and they bear a striking 
resemblance the photographs taken by the participants in this research project (I have 
included three ofthem below). 7 The pictures evoke the same sense of being trapped, the 
same prevalence of the technical over the human, and of an encompassing, visceral and 
disorienting space (Alberro 1997; Vidler 1997). 
7 The most obvious difference with Rosier's photographs is the inclusion of billboards and corporate logos, 
an indication of the kind of ideological interpretation that Rosier wishes to impart to these images. Some of 
the photographs are also more technically sophisticated, using long exposures to blur lights, or paying 
attention to balance and cropping to draw the viewer in to the frame even as she presents a bleak landscape. 
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Figure 6.2: Images from Martha Rosier's Rights of Passage (from top to bottom): Routes 1 & 
9, New Jersey, 1995; Donuts, New Jersey Turnpike, 1995; Greenpoint, under Brooklyn 
Queens Expressway, 1994 
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Rosier's goal in such a series is an explicitly ideological diagnosis and critique of capitalist 
production and culture, as is all her artistic work (Alberro 1999 p.73). The image is meant 
to confront and disorient the viewer, and so make them think again about the mundane and 
everyday. In Rights of Passage, the photographs are accompanied by a text that asks the 
viewer (her public) to consider how these images challenge the ideology of speed, progress 
and freedom associated with the road. "The twin dreams of escape and of possession [of 
novel consumer goods c.o.] are foreclosed by the advancing sameness of the landscape 
called into being by the advancing progress of the road ... This mirage of liberation has as 
its unintended end-point the redundancy of the entire world, demolishing place and time in 
favour ofspace ... Together, the glossy and the stolid are the orb and the sceptre of the 
present kingdom of desire" (Rosier 1997 p.l5). The critical lament is augmented by the 
photographs, in which the cluttered composition mimics the loss of progress, but which 
also carry with them a sense of exhaustion, risk and foreboding. This is most clear in the 
photograph reproduced above where a skeleton is reflected in the windshield, and so floats 
above a smoggy skyline traversed by an airplane; the horizon is foregrounded by the road, 
and a sea of cars which sits in front of a now marginalized railroad and some oil storage 
tanks. The photograph reminds us of how oil corporations and car manufacturers played a 
key role in ensuring the car dominated American transportation (Alberro 1997), while the 
skeleton and smoggy horizon traversed by the plane remind us of the cost to our health and 
environment of the dream of total mobility. I would also add that her pictures, just like 
those of my participants, force us to contemplate a landscape that has been built to an 
increasingly inhuman scale; with Rosier this is also an explicit critique of capitalism and 
the profit motive that drives its relentless (re )construction and expansion. 
We can thus appreciate Rosier's and my participant's photographs as a critique of a society 
that restricts mobility, and imperils health and ecology in the name of profit. Aesthetically 
the pictures work as a bleak condemnation, they confront us with that which is usually 
simply endured and forgotten. However, the sense of being trapped and overwhelmed also 
risks arresting critical thought. This is especially so when tied to the ideological narrative 
of progress, where we understand the pictures as signalling its end- "the underlying theme 
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of all these photographs: that of the ' Road Closed ' whose interminable psychic and 
physical repairs signal the end to our twentieth century ideology of the free way" (V idler 
1997 p.25). As a result, the pictures work as a lament for "a lost dream or absent utopia" 
(Aiberro 1997 p.43). As an intervention in the public sphere, then, pictures such as these 
contain the force of judgement and moral conviction. What ' s more, in Rosier' s 
photographs, and the text that accompany them, there is a clear corporate subject who can 
be held accountable. Taken together, statements and image present a resentful take on the 
modern landscape, one that wants to turn away in disgust and point a finger in 
condemnation. In doing so, the photographs say too little because they confront us with 
the all too familiar signs of our failures without engaging us in a contemplation of how we 
might move forward. In addition, the pictures say too much because driving can be 
pleasurable. As much as one may be horrified by such landscapes, or the problems of the 
automobile, we cannot deny that there is another experience of the automobile- one of 
convenience, safety and freedom- that has not wholly come to an end, and which is daily 
promoted by the automobile industry (Wollen 2002; Edensor 2003). Rosier places her 
images (and I would argue those of my participants would carry the same affective force) 
in opposition to this positive evaluation of the car, but given the dominance of the car 
indignation risks sliding quickly into resignation and scepticism. While opposition may 
provoke the desire for change, it is also against the backdrop of such a mundane and 
daunting everyday reality that advertisements such as the one below gain their force: 
submit and dominate (Figure 6.3 directly below). 
We can understand the series of pictures taken by participants as a collective expression of 
frustration, while Rosier' s are a more explicitly ideological critique; yet if we are to 
214 
evaluate how they would work in the public sphere, I think they will ultimately deflate 
critical momentum. In Rights of Passage Rosier has used her art to call a public into 
being, but the moment of moral indignation that accompanies the actualization of a public 
on viewing such images, is one that risks immediately falling back into bitterness and 
resentment. The images mark only a lack- a lack of a public and public space from which 
we could launch an affirmative critique, and a lack of vision from those 'in power'. 
However, while such moments of judgment and condemnation are unavoidable and 
perhaps even necessary, such images risk becoming complicit in the absence they lament 
because they impart the sense that there is nothing we can do, or more to the point, would 
want to do.8 This is not to dismiss the aesthetic impact of Rosier's work, nor even what it 
does. However, it is also possible -and I would say necessary -to create something that 
takes us beyond the negative critique of the everyday. In particular, what I would say is 
lacking in these photographs is a clinical (as opposed to critical) approach in which one 
might harness those forces that trap a body within the transportation infrastructure. We 
have here images in which the body is at the centre of a complex assemblage (road, car, 
dust, sun, body, speed), but no sense of what the assemblage might provoke us to think, 
and so what the body might then be able to do, and desire to do. In order to engage this 
problem, I turn to look at the conflict between cyclists and car-drivers in Toronto. 
Once we get off the highway, the bicycle is an obvious alternative to the car as a form of 
urban mobility, but my interest in the bicycle is not with how we might get people to ride a 
bike (although I don't exclude that), but with how encounters between bicycles and cars 
8 The limits of Rosier's critique is, I think, well caught in a set of images in Rainer Ganahl's photographic 
series SIL Seminar/Lectures. In this series Ganahl photographs famous intellectuals giving lectures as well as 
photographing their audiences. One of his photographs is of Martha Rosier giving a talk about the loss of 
public space (see www.ganahl.info/s_sl_rosler_moma.html). The picture shows Rosier from the vantage 
point of the auditorium seats; she is partially obscured by the podium and in the background is a large 
projection of one ofher airport photographs from her work In Place ofthe Public (a work which challenges 
us to think of the control, exclusion and banality in travel spaces created for and by capital) (Rosier, 1998). 
Another picture shows a large auditorium filled with attentive listeners. Rosier is clearly in a position of 
authority and influence here, and yet we are confronted with the contradiction of the artist telling her public 
about how contemporary spaces lead to the absence of a public and in doing so overlooking the fact that she 
is, at that very moment, constituting a public. What will/can this public do with Rosier's work and with their 
own absence? This interpretation is my own, and in his commentary on this work Ganahl seems more 
concerned about the commercialization of educational spaces and questioning who will have access to these 
ideas- a concern that parallels Rosier's concern with airports, but which I think in Ganahl's work is more 
reflexive in its focus on our own intellectual production and consumption. 
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can be used to make visible the need and desire to experiment with personal mobility. In 
order to do this, I will examine first how the conflict between bikes and cars in the 
congested streets of Toronto is an example of how identities, which emerge partly in 
relation to the smog-event, can become entrenched as hard oppositions in political debate, 
while at the same time being open to becoming. I will then look at how Rainer Ganahl's 
art engages this becoming as an example of what I take to be a successful experimentation 
with affects and percepts in re-activating becoming and encouraging experimentation. 
The car and bike in Toronto's gridlock 
As part of efforts to mitigate air pollution, as well alleviate congestion, the City of Toronto 
is trying to move away from its car-centred urban design and encourage people to use 
alternative forms of personal transportation. While there are clearly many reasons why 
someone would choose not to give up the car, including convenience and social propriety, 
safety is certainly a key concern that prevents people from making the choice for 
alternative forms of personal transport- the roads are designed for cars and so other road 
users (pedestrians, cyclists) are at a disadvantage not only in terms of convenience, but in 
terms ofpersonal safety as well (Lucas 1998; Decima Research Inc. 2000). 9 While safety 
could be improved by building pedestrian and cycling infrastructure, this would require a 
redistribution of road 'resources'- not only money from the transportation and planning 
budgets for construction and maintenance, but more importantly actual space on the road. 
Smog provides a moral imperative for why such a redistribution should take place (as well 
other as issues such as promoting healthy, or fit, lifestyles and access to mobility for 
different classes and ages and global warming), but when the issue of road re-design 
emerges as a political conflict it does not get discussed primarily in terms of moral 
overcodes (the 'right thing to do'), but in terms of a reactive defence of which road users 
have a right to the road, and what kind of redistribution is reasonable to accommodate that 
right. So, for example, while there may be agreement that more people cycling is good for 
health and air quality, it does not follow that improvement in air quality legitimates taking 
9 In Toronto, while cyclists make up only 2 per cent of the traffic, they account for 8 per cent of the injuries 
and 5 per cent of the fatalities. Similarly, half of all traffic fatalities in the city of Toronto involve 
pedestrians (Lucas, 1998; DeMara, 2002; City of Toronto, 2004b ). 
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road resources away from car-drivers. Instead, one can argue that it is a matter of sharing 
the road, and it is here that an opposition between transport-based subjectivities emerges 
and acts to slow down attempts at reform. The conflict I want to focus on, is that which 
takes shape between the 'irresponsible, uncaring, car-driver' and the 'self-righteous, 
reckless, cyclist.' 
In Toronto there is vibrant activist community focussing on transportation reform, and 
Toronto is a North American leader in limiting car use, although a laggard by European 
standards (Newman and Kenworthy 1999). 10 That being said, the status quo in Toronto is 
biased in favour of the car- cars are the baseline against which the possibility for change 
is measured. Ultimately the car-inertia comes to a head whenever road redesign is 
proposed that would redistribute road resources (Egan 1995). 11 The question asked in each 
10 On the pedestrian front, Toronto has recently adopted a Pedestrian Charter, which officially commits the 
city to trying to encourage pedestrianism in all of its urban design (this not a legally binding document, but 
an expression of intent) (City of Toronto, 2000). This document was the result of lobbying by the Pedestrian 
Planning Network, a dedicated group of citizen activists who are intimately involved in planning issues in 
Toronto. With regard to cycling, the City of Toronto has an official Bike Plan, which involves creating a 
network of bike lanes on city streets (City of Toronto, 2002b). However, the implementation of the plan is 
behind schedule, and cycling activists note that it does not adequately meet the needs of cyclists in the urban 
core (which accounts for the majority of cyclists). There is also a vibrant and active cycling culture. The 
Toronto Bike Network promotes cycling and monitors the city's progress on creating bike infrastructure. 
More pro-actively, the group Advocacy for Respect for Cyclists (ARC) promotes cycling by providing legal 
information and support to cyclists who have been in collisions, educating cyclists about their rights, 
engaging in direct action to promote cycling culture and awareness of cyclists rights, and publishing an 
annual report card that tracks the city's progress in implementing the bike plan and addressing other cycling 
related issues such as policing and education. Finally, as a statement of general intention, the City of 
Toronto Official Plan commits the city to a program of urban densification, with the goal of promoting more 
pedestrian and bike travel (Dill and Bedford, 2002). See also www.getoutofthebikelane.com which fights to 
have the city enforce the no-parking bylaws in the bike lane, as well annual creation of car-free zones during 
the summer to promote car-free urban spaces e.g. www.pskensington .. ca and www.carfreeday.ca 
11 In a recent court case a cyclist the city was found liable for the injuries incurred by a cyclists who was 
'doored' (knocked of their bike by a driver getting out of their parked car) on a busy downtown street (Queen 
St) that cuts east-west across the city (the Bike Plan has be critiqued for its failure to provide east-west 
linkages in the core). However, in order to provide a bike lane on most downtown streets in Toronto it would 
be necessary to remove on-street parking. In their reaction to the ruling, the City of Toronto Planning 
Department suggested that the present time this was not feasible for political reasons. In another case, the 
implementation of a bike lane on Dundas St. East, which was included in the Bike Plan, met with opposition 
from commuters who were worried about congestion caused by the loss of one lane of car traffic (a fear that 
turned out to be unfounded, but which was supported at the time by analysis from city traffic engineers). 
Finally, the plan to put a dedicated right-of-way for the streetcar on one of North Toronto's main east-west 
arteries (St. Clair Ave.) is presently meeting with intense opposition from businesses and residents worried 
about the impact on car traffic. The city planners have been forced into a position where they must promise 
to maintain existing car volumes in any road re-design, even if it could be argued that more people could 
access the area by bike, foot and transit. This has precluded any redistribution of road space to encourage 
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case is whether encouraging cycling or walking requires road-redesign, or is the lack of 
safety a result of irresponsible behaviour by road users? The expert/technical evaluation is 
moving on balance towards the latter, but the public debate and political opposition takes 
place along the lines of the former, because there is opposition to displacing car 
infrastructure. The National Post, a Toronto-based paper, ran two articles in the summer 
of2004 under the headline "Door prize! Bikes v. cars" that captures the essence of the 
divisions at work. 12 The pro-car article ran under the headline "It's cyclists' hatred of cars 
that's so troubling" (Richter 2004) and captures the story from the driver's side of the 
windshield: 
The roads of Toronto are a testy and hostile place in which to operate. At 
every intersection a cabbie lurks ready to jump the next green light and race 
you to the back of the traffic jam waiting across the intersection. Thanks to 
our ridiculous streetcars, the traffic never flows ... But nothing contributes 
more ill will to the daily commute than that angry bang on the roof-- and 
"F--- you, asshole!" --as said biker weaves off bitterly into the traffic 
battleground up ahead. Try and catch up to give him a piece of your mind, 
and you cannot, because the cyclist does not stop for the red 
light.. .. Automobiles, like [sic]. The single most valuable invention since 
the printing press. Cars, and their drivers. The people whose registration 
fees, taxes, fines and parking tickets generate the government income used 
to build and, after a fashion, maintain the roads we now have to cede, chunk 
by chunk, to the freeloaders in the bicycle lane. If they insist on sucking up 
a pack of Marlboro's worth of industrial smog on the way to work each day 
and call it exercise, that is their business. But they should do it quietly and 
stay out of my way. Because the days when I think I've saved enough of 
you from your own stupidity are getting more and more frequent. Squashed 
cyclists can be sad to look at, but at least they can no longer swear at you. 
Driving is a highly disciplined activity, the driver is focussed on the road ahead of them, 
and the cyclist literally comes out of nowhere and breaks all rules. The cyclist appears to 
be taking undue risk, and what is perhaps most annoying for the driver, is making better 
headway in downtown traffic, sometimes by ignoring traffic regulations and sometimes by 
using sidewalks or pedestrian paths. The driver stuck in congestion, then, harbours a 
cycling (all examples based on my own experience in cycling activism in Toronto, as recorded in my field 
diary). 
12 A 'door-prize' in cycling lingo is when someone in a parked car suddenly opens a door into a traffic lane 
and cuts off a cyclists before they have time to stop, causing injury and at times fatal accidents as cyclists are 
pushed into motorized traffic. 
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certain hostility towards the cyclists, but so too does the driver who is moving freely but 
has to contend with cyclists moving in what appears, from the driver's seat, to be an erratic 
fashion. Therefore, when it comes to redistributing road resources, there is a twin 
resistance as summarized in the above rant: I) there does not appear to be enough cyclists 
to justify redistribution; a claim that gets framed as the- incorrect- assumptions that 
drivers pay for the roads through licensing fees. 13 2) Cyclists could make do with existing 
'road share' if they rode safely. This twin claim support the perception that it is just not 
reasonable to redistribute road resources to the cyclist and that cycling is not a 'serious' 
mode of transport, but one for children or those who do not have 'adult' responsibilities. 
As a result, the cyclist is seen as unnecessarily putting themselves at risk of accident and 
pollution. 
From the cyclist point of view, of course, the road looks very different (Kuitenbrouwer 
2004): 
Why the hostility? I'm doing a public service when I commute by bicycle on the 
half-hour trip from home to my office (dropping my daughter, who still fits in 
the bike seat, at daycare along the way). I don't pollute or bang up the streets. 
(When I hear my young son coughing in the morning, I blame the cars.) I don't 
take up a parking space or add to traffic jams. Plus, I stay fit, arrive where I'm 
going faster and save money. My company benefits because I don't bill for 
mileage, parking or cabs when I ride my bike to an assignment. Taxpayers are 
happy because I stay healthy and out of the doctor's office ... Motorists stink up 
the air, idle in the drive-through burger joints and clog the streets. Cars are 
ridiculously large and getting larger, which is strange, considering even the 
biggest ones tend to have a single person sitting in them. Drivers apply makeup 
and chat on cell phones, threatening cyclists and pedestrians with their hurtling 
hunks ofmetal. To say nothing ofthe perils of drunk drivers. (Drunk cyclists, 
meanwhile, imperil only themselves.) 
In this excerpt it is the driver who is irresponsible, cocooned in their steel machine they are 
unaware of the road around them, and portrayed as wilfully neglecting the environmental 
and social consequences of car-based transport. The cyclist has moral leverage over the 
car-driver- first, the cyclist does not pollute the city, congest the streets and lead to 
unhealthy lifestyles, and second, the cyclist does not kill others when they are inattentive 
13 License fees and gas tax are only a portion of the total tax revenue that is used to construct and maintain 
roads. All Ontarian 's subsidize the car. 
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(the cyclist is the more vulnerable road user, and so also has a moral claim to be protected 
from the excesses ofthe stronger). From this point of view, the car-driver seems brutish, 
oblivious of the needs of those who do not drive. But despite their real domination ofthe 
road space, the car-driver also seems somewhat pathetic from the point of view of the 
cyclist. This is reflected in nicknames given to car-drivers by cycling activists, such as 
'car-head' or 'eager', which are meant to reflect the fact that the cyclist enjoy greater 
freedom on the road. The driver sees a cyclist being 'irresponsible' for sneaking through 
stop signs, hoping on the sidewalks or pedestrian paths in parks, cycling the wrong way 
down one-way streets or hoping road medians on multi-lane roads; but the cyclists 
understands these to be perfectly 'natural' and safe manoeuvres, it is a flexibility that 
makes the bicycle "the ultimate urban vehicle" (quoted in Porter 2002). 
The binary opposition created in the newspaper articles overplays the division that 
characterizes hegemonic discourse, where it is recognized there must be some form of 
redistribution of road resources (Dill and Bedford 2002). Yet this moderation and 
reasonableness plays to the favour of the status quo (the car), and what these articles show 
is that that hegemonic discourse is removed from tension that exists in everyday 
confrontation, and so downplays the divisiveness that can characterize actual political 
confrontation in particular cases of proposed design change. What is of interest here in 
relation to our discussion of speed and politics in chapter one, is how these subjectivities 
are examples of 'hard oppositions' that develop within multiple speeds of the city, and in 
particular in relation to the control and discipline the city imposes. It is precisely this kind 
of hard opposition that was identified in chapter one as one ofthe risk of a politics 'at 
speed.' We are now in a position to use the conceptualization of a public, and its 
subjectivities, as formed in an assemblage as a way of understanding how one can 
intervene in the tension, or intensity, set up by this binary, not in the interest of resolving it 
into one or the other side (or even sedimenting it in a compromise), but instead in order to 
use this intensity to keep open the desire for experimentation with alternative forms of 
personal mobility. 
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The encounter between the car driver and the cyclist is a momentary disruption in both the 
cycling and driving refrains- a disruption which is intimately related to the disruption of 
air pollution in as much as pollution provides the cyclist with a moral leverage against the 
'inconsiderate' driver, while at the same time placing the driver in a reactive and defensive 
stance that labels the cyclist as crazy for 'sucking up a pack of Marlboro's worth of 
industrial smog'. However, these defensive and moralizing subjective moments, are also 
surpassed, I would argue, by a more ample movement that has nothing to do with who has 
the right to the road, but with glimpsing of the limits that the transportation infrastructure 
places on what a body can do. 
Both the cycling and driving subjectivities emerge within an assemblage that limits what 
they can do- both through material control (e.g. lights, lanes, medians, congestion) and 
through moral overcodes (e.g. drive responsibly) (Michael, 2000). When not in congestion 
or dense urban traffic, these become fused for a car-driver into an automatic space; but in 
the urban core this control starts to break down- the driver is cut off by the cyclist, the 
pedestrian suddenly steps off from the curb etc. and control becomes contested. It is in 
congestion and dense urban traffic that the bike is suddenly able to 'deterritorialize'- it is 
able to break rules by hoping curbs, weaving between traffic etc. Elements within the 
transportation territorial refrain can be recombined by the cyclist- a sidewalk can be a 
cycle path, a post can be a parking space, a park can be a short cut. These are moves that a 
car could never do without reeking havoc, and the cyclist senses freedom: 
Setting out along the cracked pavement of Queen St., navigating the fissures 
carved into the concrete by streetcar tracks ... the traffic stops and starts, 
smog rising. Weaving in and out, through the snarl of bumpers and tires, 
horns blaring, there's a settling calmness as you transcend the rules of the 
road. Technically, you're a vehicle, subject to them, but in practice, you're 
free: Such rules are for clunky cars and the fools that feel a need to use 
them. It's the satisfaction of self-righteousness, and it feels sinfully 
good ... In a vast city where we are more subject to its rhythms- of traffic, of 
time, of regulations and transit schedules- than it is to ours, that freedom is 
rare, and to be savoured (Whyte 2004): 
In congested traffic, the bicycle is the most deterritorialized component of the traffic 
assemblage, even pedestrians are still largely constrained to the sidewalk. The cyclist 
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experiences this as freedom, while the driver experiences this both as a further constraint 
(they have to be more attentive for cyclists) and as an indication of their own relative 
immobility. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the most deterritorialized element is that 
which "bring[s] 'play' to what it composes; it fosters the entry of new dimensions of the 
milieus by releasing processes of discernability, specialization, contraction and 
acceleration that open new possibilities, that open the territorial assemblage onto 
interassemblage" (Deleuze and Guattari 1988 p.336). The bicycle, then, introduces a 
degree of play into the traffic assemblage and opens it to an 'interassemblage' that points 
towards an alternative reality. 
For a brief moment the whole becomes uncoded, as the quote above indicates, even the 
threat of smog can be forgotten as the cyclist weaving through traffic: "You are longitude 
and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed particles, a set of 
nonsubjectified affects. You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life 
(regardless of duration)- a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of 
regularity). Or at least you can have it, you can reach it. (ibid. p.262 my italics). As the 
cyclists weaves off ahead in traffic, the car-driver is pulled into a 'becoming-bike' that 
makes them aware of the limits on what a body can do in traffic, while the cyclist gains 
force in this moment and becomes temporarily dominant- a becoming-car of the cyclist 
that makes them aware of what a body can do. Together the two speeds connect and form 
a 'block of becoming' that pulls both subjectivities beyond the territory for even the 
briefest of moments, before reaction sets in, or before the traffic starts to move again and 
the cyclists dutifully takes their place in the bike lane and signals their turns properly. 
Here, then, is an example of the kind of encounter in which a subject might be encouraged 
to consider the limits of existing subjectivity in relation to an issue intimately connected to 
smog. In this moment of disruption, a subject can sense the extent to which their own 
perceptions and beliefs are forged within an assemblage that goes beyond their subjective 
intention. It needs to be stressed that it is not that a subject can see the bicycle is 'better'; 
what is made visible is the necessity to choose to make a transportation system that 
maximizes what a body can do- this will require a willingness to experiment and the dice 
throw of affirmation. However, this moment of becoming can in turn fall back in reactive 
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positions- the moralizing of the cyclist or the reactive vitriol of the drive-- and so we 
must now turn to consider how this block of becoming might in turn be sustained within 
the circulations of claims in the public sphere and used to encourage experimentation with 
the networks and infrastructures of control. 
Bicycle by Rainer Ganahl 
Rainer Ganahl is an artist whose work has been centrally concerned with the question of 
knowledge, communication and language, and the impact that technology and global 
capitalism is having on these. Running through all his work we can see an attempt to 
question the production and circulation of critical knowledge, as well as how that 
knowledge might inform practice (artistic or otherwise) (see www.ganahl.info for his 
various projects past and ongoing). While his past work has focussed on reading, 
education and language ( e.g.Ganahl 2001 ), his more recent work, in the wake of 
September 11th and the 'war on terror' focuses more directly on how to intervene in high-
speed mediated communication, and its domination by the propaganda of President Bush's 
administration. 14 The exhibit I will focus on here, called Bicycle, is connected to his 
interest with the war on terror, but the primary focus is on questioning how the bicycle is 
seen as an innocent escape from the complexity of the current global reality. In the 
exhibition statement Ganahl writes: "Bicycles have very complex social realities and in 
developed rich countries stand for some kind of utopian environment-friendly mobility. 
Bicycles belonged to the first products that were outsourced to China and other low cost 
producers, where bicycling today means being poor confronted with the new exploding 
14 Ganahl (2004b) is aware of the limits placed on written communication and reflection under present 
conditions: "Reading has become very difficult for me. I simply don't dare easily to risk that much time 
away with books. Reading is as painful as writing since it often pressures me into writing. With the arrival of 
a high-speed Internet connection, I feel my mind has gone public, consumed by messages, by news, by these 
wars, by the terrifying politics of this current Bush administration. I switch nervously back and forth between 
the intemet browser, this writing platform and e-mails. The world on the net is now vaster than the map that 
wrapped the globe of Borges. Whatever comes to my mind can be instantly corroborated and multiplied with 
the help of powerful search machine on the Google empire of references. My private world more and more 
dissolves in conversations catatonically scattered over e-mails I misspell throughout all day. The 
concentrated containment of a book, if it not only looks like a book but is written as one, is provocatively 
challenging. It suspends me. It renders me incompatible with the rest of my activities and obligations. I am a 
very slow reader if the text isn't just a text, a text, a text. And as I practically miss out on the requested time 
frame of a book, I am also unable to write or finish my own writings. Remaining remnants of bitter-am er 
feelings of failure to address fully the complexity of things linger on. I walk away and move on to the next 
assignments, the next tasks, the next attempt, the next deadlines." 
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class of car owners" (Ganahl 2004a). This statement captures the essence of the problem 
Ganahl wants to address with the bicycle - in rich countries a bicycle is viewed as a purely 
innocent alternative to the automobile and the oil based economy, but it is not enough to 
simply blindly embrace the bicycle when it is immersed in a complex global reality. 
Bicycle works as a celebration of the bike as an alternative form of transportation, but not 
without also using it as a means to pry the viewer open towards a broader reflection about 
how to experiment with our (controlled) existence within an image mediated global 
capitalism. Ganahl's art is related to the concerns about air quality not only because the 
bicycle is a 'clean air' alternative ('utopian environment-friendly mobility'), but also 
because we have argued in chapters four and five that it is precisely the question of control 
that is made apparent by the smog-event, and which needs to be kept in the forefront in any 
politics ofbecoming. The smog-event makes us aware ofthe molecularity ofthe body 
politic, and Ganahl's work engages with this molecularity, and the assemblages that try to 
contain it. By looking at four of the pieces from this exhibit, I think we can trace a 
progression between critique and a clinical diagnosis of the need to experiment, which 
culminates in a video that manages to re-activate the block of becoming that is glimpsed in 
traffic when bicycle meets car, and in doing so transmit the joy and desirability of 
experimentation. 15 
The first piece that one sees upon entering the exhibit is a large montage of postcards 
entitled use a bicycle. mail art project with se(( made stamps, which consists of 18 
commemorative postcards of the World Trade Centre with the message "USE A 
BICYCLE" written on them. 
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Figure 6.4: Detail of use a bicycle. mail art project with self made stamps by Rainer Ganahl, 
2004 
Ganahl sent these postcards from New York, through the US postal service, to the gal lery 
in Toronto with self-made stamps carrying messages such as "War on Terror", "Shock and 
Awe", "Evil Doers" and ''AI Qaeda". Ganahl is playing with the heightened sense of 
security and loss of innocence in the US post-9/ 11 , and in particular with reference to the 
fear of 'anthrax ' being circulated through the mail that was prevalent just after the attacks. 
The postcards and self-made stamps are remaking the 'patriotism' that has been so stifling 
of public discussion about terror (especially in the US), and which is represented by the 
stars and stripes on the postcard- it is patriotic to ride your bike. The bike here is 
presented as a somewhat subversive, but nevertheless innocent technology, slipping 
beneath the radar. The bike, like the postcard, is a do-it-yourself technology; we can here 
recognize the virtuous bike that was part of our discussion above, and so the explicit focus 
on the politics of9/11 relates also to other concerns, such as air pollution in our homes and 
cities. The DIY, or self-made, character of this piece is also stressed by the fact that 
Ganahl is using 'snai l mail'- the postal service- to send his message and reach across 
borders. He is then explicitly 'slowing down' and stepping outside the high-tech system 
that is used to monitor and control; in doing so he is pointing to the subversion that can 
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come from simply 'opting out' and finding different technologies to connect-- this is not, 
to be sure, to say that the postal service is not (and has not historically been) monitored and 
censored; however, it works here in contrast to instant telecommunication as a message 
about re-appropriating the means of communication and transport. This first piece carries 
a rather simple and positive message, if a bit na'ive- get on your bike, do-it-yourself, reject 
a reliance on a system that propagates violence and threatens your everyday well-being. 
If we consider how this piece works, we can see that it works by creating a synthesis 
between two things that might not otherwise have been related and gives both new 
meaning- terrorism and the world trade centre is brought closer to the everyday life of the 
city, and riding a bicycle is given more historical resonance. Therefore, this piece works 
through the content ofthe postcards- not just the words, but the symbolism and the 
viewers understanding of the context ofthe anthrax scares. It is for this reason that the 
shock to thought that this piece carries is rather short-lived, and soon devolves into 'mere 
opinion'. The postcards do not transmit affects and percepts that reactivate a problematic 
event that would make us think and go beyond our subjective perceptions- quite to the 
contrary, they rely on a subject who is able to make recognized connections between 
elements of content. The work gives an opinion of how we might solve the problem of 'oil 
imperial ism' and its associated violence. It is a playful attempt at jarring accepted thought, 
but once we have assimilated the different segments of content the piece looses force if we 
don't agree (or don't know if we want to agree, feel ambivalent) with the critique offered. 
In this regard, the postcards are much like Rosier's road pictures; more playful certainly-
and this is important, because less resentful -- but nevertheless acting only as a moment of 
critique that stands precariously against an actuality that opposes the utopian message 
given here, and makes it seem na'ive. Tactically it serves to strengthen an already formed 
subjective refrain, rather than question its limits. 
The innocence ofthe bicycle, and the simplicity of the message in this first work are 
troubled in the next two pieces, which are large acrylic paintings: Forbes.com, Reuters 
World News Highlights 1900 GMT, 119/04 and Newsday.com, bicycle bomb, 1/6/04. 
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Figure 6.5: Forbes.com, Reuters World News Highlights 1900 GMT, 119/04 (left) and 
Newsday.com, bicycle bomb, 1/6/04 (right) by Rainer Ganahl, 2004 
An Afghan soldier looks at a wrecked bicycle near a damaged truck 
Kandahar, Afghanistan, on Jan. 6. A bomb attached to the bicycle 
killed at least 13 people, most of them children. 
(AP/Noor Khan) 
Copyright © 2004, The ASSOciated Press 
Figure 6.6: Detail from Newsday.com, bicycle bomb, 116/04, by Rainer Ganahl, 2004 
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Figure 6.7 Detail from Forbes.com, Reuters World News Highlights 1900 GMT, 1/9/04, by 
Rainer Ganahl, 2004 
Ganahl calls these pieces 'news paintings ', for the obvious reason that they are paintings of 
news items as represented in the medium in which they are distributed, and at the time that 
they occur. The first thing that strikes the viewer is not the content of the news, but the 
size and colours of the image. These paintings have an aesthetic value that does not 
simply reproduce the web page, but also beautifies and memorializes; a web page is 
normally a fleeting and temporary image with rather harsh and crisp affects and percepts 
shining out of the screen. What' s more the news web page is usually scanned by the 
viewer distractedly for items of interest, and lasts only until the viewers click to the next 
link. Once again, Ganahl has subverted a high-speed medium and made it his own through 
a simpler (low-tech) technology. Here the image takes on more depth and permanence, its 
vivid colours and size is a sign of greater importance and permanence (or at least curiosity) 
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-the instant that would normally pass within duration is now memorialized as History, and 
it invites the viewer to linger. But linger over what? The content of the news item is about 
a suicide bombing that took place in Afghanistan using a bicycle. Ganahl (2004a) writes 
in the exhibition statement: 
The bicycle is usually associated with non aggression and environmental 
friendliness. In these paintings, bicycles are involved in the most horrific 
and unsetteling [sic] crimes that parade our news horrizons [sic] in these 
days. The (suicide) bombings that have become so frequent in the last 
couple of years are associated with issues of religious fundamentalism, the 
Middle East, national self-dertermination [sic] and oil. The interpretion [sic] 
and representation of this theatrics of death and total distruction [sic] in the 
media is as contested as the complexity of the political, economic, social, 
religiouis [sic], historical and ideological problems that create the context 
for these incomprehensible and self-annihilating acts of absolute violence. 
As it is the case with all of my news releated [sic] art works, I only 
reproduce mains [sic] stream news reports as they are fludding [sic] us, the 
active and passive consumers of media. I see this freeze framing of news 
content that changes on the internet by the second and on the news stand by 
the day in the tradition of European history paintings. It is ironic that the 
taste of "Old Europe"'s for history paintings partially coincided with the 
onset of its imperialist interests and colonial actions. 16 
Ganahl uses a very welcoming and familiar aesthetic to draw the viewer in (his image 
stand somewhere between painting, comic book and corporate logo), but then confronts 
them with a very troubling content- the suicide bomber and our relation to this violence. 
The complexity of the situation that gives rise to these 'acts of absolute violence' is 
symbolized in the advertisements and windows that surround and clutter the text of the 
news article (including a car advertisement), which is notably taken from the website of the 
financial magazine Forbes. In relation to the bicycle, the image disrupts the innocence of 
the bicycle, because it is now associated with a context that draws attention to the viewers 
relative wealth and privilege. 17 In this regard, we see the politics of car vs. bike as a 
reflection of a privilege that is in part afforded by the inequity and control of global 
16 All ofGanahl's texts are filled with spelling errors. It is likely that this is not an accident, but serves to 
highlight his interest in communication across languages (English is not his mother tongue) and his interest 
in communication in fast-paced environments. The spelling errors do not take away from the content of the 
message, but they raise questions about the universality of the writing medium when dominated by one 
language. See www.ganahl.info for more on his work on language. 
17 In the context of riding his bike in Tirana, capital of Albania (poorest country in Europe), Ganahl writes in 
the exhibition statement: "In some countries poverty can make people with bicycles look priveledged [sic]." 
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capitalism; the viewer's relation to a system that in the postcard piece seemed so 'easy' to 
step outside of is now more vexed. What's more, unlike the postcards, where the postal 
medium allowed a direct engagement and subversion, the internet and the barrage of news 
media draws attention to a much more difficult medium for individuals to engage with as 
other than just passive observers. The act of painting the website works as a kind of 
'witnessing', which also reflects its weakness and inability to intervene. In switching 
medium between digital flux and painting, memorializing and so freezing the instant, 
Ganahl is drawing attention to the high-speed axiomatic dynamic of contemporary 
capitalism and its technologies of control, presenting them here as a problem for us to 
consider. In recording these images as they are 'flooding' us, Ganahl is subverting the 
tradition of the historical painting, which was meant to glorify the acts of colonial power 
once they were completed and accepted as historical 'fact'; Ganahl's paintings intervene in 
the middle of the act in an attempt to disrupt and question the inevitability of imperial 
power, and to expose its violence. 
We can pause again, and consider how these images work. Once again, much of what the 
viewer sees here relies on the content of the paintings- text and symbolism. However, the 
first thing we can note is that Ganahl is not providing us with a concrete message or 
opinion, but simply re-presenting the messages we see on our screens every day (the 
explanatory text above is taken from the exhibition statement and is not displayed with the 
images). The viewer, then, has no immediate answer as to what to make of these painted 
web pages. Second, what draws us in are the affects and percepts of the painting - its 
colours, shapes and size which act as signs of both accessibility and importance (or at least 
curiosity). The viewer is therefore drawn to linger in front of this painting, and in the 
disjunction between the accessibility of its aesthetic, and the seriousness of its content, the 
viewer is perhaps drawn towards sensing a relation that is 'intolerable' and 'shameful' in 
our contemporary existence-- not only the trivialization of violence, but the way in which 
the subject is caught up within an assemblage where such violence becomes mundane. 
This 'spark of sense', however, is perhaps too weak, and is potentially overshadowed by 
the literal content of the piece, which perhaps means that it is simply experienced as a 
cliched statement on the horrors of war and global capitalism. 
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In all ofthe above examples, Ganahl's art points towards the need to engage in the 
assemblages through which we learn and connect with others, and in so doing engage in 
repeated moments of subjectification. Ganahl's work brings together the technologies and 
forces that create moments of subjectification, but he does so in a novel fashion; and while 
these first three examples do not perhaps connect the viewer to what is 'outside' our 
subjective refrains, and engage us in a block of becoming, they still require the we think 
for a moment about our opinions and what we believe. They slow us down by making us 
re-play moments of subjectification that we undergo at many points and times in our daily 
routine, but usually in an unconscious, or at least unreflective manner. 
The two pieces discussed above can be seen to be in tension -on the one hand a more 
hopeful, perhaps naive celebration ofthe bicycle, on the other, a more troubling 'news 
paintings' that questions how the viewer could ever meaningfully intervene in the 
relationships that have been problematized. Into this tension, I would like to insert a final 
video piece called bicycling. Here we return more directly to the problem of the road as it 
was represented in the photographs above, and discussed in relation to the car/bike 
opposition in Toronto. But rather than simply representing the actual road, Ganahl 
reactivates the hidden (constrained) potential ofthe road as a place of movement (the video 
can be viewed at www.ganahl.info/videos.html, where it is stored under the title bicycle-
51st street). In this piece, I will argue, Ganahl succeeds in moving fully beyond opinion 
and creating a block of becoming with his audience. 
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Figure 6.8: Still shots from bicycling by Rainer Ganahl, 2004 (it is advised to view it in 
motion) 
In this video the viewer is looking straight down on a pedestrian crossing that runs at slight 
angle across the screen. It is a bright sunny day. Streams of car-traffic, dominated by the 
bright yellow of taxicabs, move in from the bottom, and bottom-right, of the screen and are 
interrupted at intervals by the crossing of pedestrians. In background we hear the constant 
ambient hum of traffic. Into this scene, indeed even before the first pedestrians cross, a 
wobbly bicycle skirts the edge of the frame and then loops in to the centre; the bike 
continues this erratic and playful looping in and out of the frame for the remainder of the 
video. The cyclist is dressed somewhat festively in bright red trousers, with a yellow hat 
and green shirt (this in Ganahl), and on his handlebars sits another person, with their legs 
stretched forward. This somewhat reckless duo weaves dreamily between the traffic and 
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pedestrians, only occasionally having to stop briefly so as not to hit a pedestrian, or be hit 
by a car. For brief moments they are alone in the frame, at others they are crowded and 
forced to make dizzying turns, at others they are forced out of the frame all together. 
Rarely does a car honk, never does a pedestrian get upset. 
Ganahl says very little about this video in his artist's statement, other than to marvel with a 
child-like glee at the indifference ofNew York traffic to his antics, but the video is one of 
several 'playful' bike videos that one can find on www.ganahl.com/videos; they are found 
under the heading "something is driving me ... with this bicycle thing" and indeed there is 
something very compelling, yet difficult to articulate, when we watch bicycling. Perhaps 
the reason that Ganahl says little about this video is that, unlike his other pieces, it has no 
overtly politically content, and works primarily on an aesthetic plane. The video works at 
the conjunction of three different speeds, which effortlessly weave together and are 
animated by the erratic and playful path of the cyclists- the cyclist provides a rhythm that 
runs between the regular meter of traffic. This movement, in conjunction with the bright 
colours, works to create a compelling pattern that can be watched simply as abstract 
movement independent of any human interpretation. However, when we stop to consider 
what is going on, the video becomes even more compelling, because we are always 
wondering when the cycling duo is going to get knocked down, yelled at, or fall down. 
But much to the viewer's delight they avoid these fates, sometimes narrowly, and keep 
tumbling through the frame, sometimes disappearing, only to reappear from a different 
vantage point. The whole effect is dream-like. 
What I find compelling about this piece is that it takes the viewer beyond easy judgment, 
even more so it suspends judgment as the viewer is taken up in the movement on the 
screen. The aesthetics of the video takes the viewer beyond themselves, and so reactivates 
a moment of becoming (or at least it can, you can reach it). We need to consider how this 
works and what it accomplishes. The video creates what Deleuze calls, in his analysis of 
modern cinema, a time-image (Bogue 2003a). A time-image is one in which the irrational 
cut disrupts the familiar sense of time as unfolding in a progression through space, forcing 
the viewer to try to create connection between disjointed images or different takes on the 
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same image. This is not just a matter of assembling these moments into a coherent flow, 
but the fact that there is no necessary connection between them, so that they can always be 
combined again and differently- they are problematic. The time-image is a 'crystal-
image' of time, in which all oftime is present within the frame ofthe camera as a series of 
'planes' presented in succession, overlapping, or melting into one other etc.(Anseii-
Pearson 2002 p.l80; Bogue, 2003a). In Deleuze's analysis of the time-image he presents it 
as composed of a series of 'signs', which reflect different ways that directors have sought 
to combine these 'planes ofthe past' within the film to create affects and percepts. The 
sign that is relevant here is the 'chronosign' which Deleuze argues renders indiscernible 
the distinction between true and false, and so evokes the power of 'falsity' (Bogue, 2003a). 
The chronosign does this by presenting a series of incompatible (or in the Spinozist 
terminology adopted by Deleuze- incompossible) images. These are images that cannot 
all be true at the same time. For example, an image of someone getting murdered, and 
then the same scene with the murderer arrested in the act, are two images that cannot both 
be 'true' at the same time. In this fragmented space and time, images lose their reference 
to being true or false, and become by default not necessarily true- i.e. truth is 
indiscernible. 
Deleuze argues that the indiscernablity of truth in the chronosign engages the viewer in a 
block of becoming in which we become aware of, "on the one hand, the unthinkable 
within thought, which would be at once its source and its barrier; on the other, the presence 
to infinity of another thinker within the thinker, who shatters every monologue of a 
thinking self'' (Deleuze quoted in Bogue 2003a p.l77). The other thinker within the 
thinker is made present by providing a number of different views on the same set of 
circumstances, while the unthinkable within thought is that which was not visible within 
the habitual and possible, but which becomes visible when non-compossible images are 
juxtaposed. In this way the viewer is taken beyond their own thoughts and connected to an 
'outside'- i.e. to the chaos of forces, the virtual realm, that is the very condition of 
thought. The viewer senses the presence of the outside because they are continually taken 
up into the image as part ofthe presentation ofthe unfolding of events in particular plane, 
and then jarred out of the scene by irrational cuts that make the viewer aware again of their 
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position watching a film. In this moving in and out of comprehension, the viewer senses 
an impersonal force in thought beyond their control, an awareness of an inhuman 
dimension that forces the subject to think (or which lulls them into not thinking). In this 
way, then, the time-image reactivates becoming, and makes the viewer aware of the 
necessity to choose, because what is impossible to reconcile (a world of incompossible 
realities), must be decided in action through a necessary choice (the dice throw). The 
viewer is led to a belief (a belief grounded in sensation) in a world that is not stable, nor 
completely comprehensible, but eventful and continually in a process of becoming. This 
belief in the world as becoming, Deleuze argues, is central to ethical political action, 
because it affirms the possibility for intervention without premising it on truth or 
transcendental criteria, or the certainty of success. In this belief one is led to affirm a way 
of being in which one is forced to choose, and where one no longer seeks the false 
protection of transcendental certainty, or the self-satisfied and cynical retreat into nihilism. 
This is certainly a tall order to place on a short video installation, but we can see the 
outlines of the chronosign in bicycling, and it is this which makes it so compelling. First, 
we can note that camera angle is one that sits outside the subjective perspective of 
someone in traffic, whether it is that of the pedestrian, cyclist or car driver. As a result, we 
are already taken out of the habitual, and presented the world through the eye of the 
machine. Second, rather than seeing the video as a single shot, we can view it as a series 
that repeats the same scenario from different perspectives- these are the planes, or sheets, 
of the crystal oftime, and we see a new sheet each time the cyclist leaves and then re-
enters the frame of the video. We can see at least five different perspectives on this scene. 
The first, in which there is no bicycle at all, no pedestrians either, just a smooth and fast 
stream of traffic. Here the car dominates. In the second cars, pedestrians and the bicycle 
all intermingle effortlessly (e.g. at I min 38 sec in the video). This is a transportation 
utopia, but the flow is a bit awkward and stilted at times. Third, there is another utopia, 
were the cyclist and his passenger are all alone on the road for brief moments making large 
looping circles, and evoking a playful nostalgic past of children and bicycles ( e.g.2 m in 05 
sec). Fourth, there are those moments when the cyclist is forced out of the frame by 
oncoming traffic, sometimes moving at very high velocity (e.g. 2min 33 sec). Here the 
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cyclist is a marginalized road user. Finally, and fifth, there is the cyclist as 'reckless' road 
user, forcing cars to stop suddenly, or pedestrians to move out of the way as the cyclist 
forces his way into a crowded cross-walk (e.g. 2 min 53 sec). None of these perspectives 
on the urban cyclist are necessarily true, and indeed some of them are strictly 
incompossible (e.g. the first utopia oftraffic harmony is incompossible with the foUith and 
fifth takes where cyclist is marginalized and reckless). These multiple planes make the 
'truth' ofthe virtuous cyclist undecidable, and instead draw us towards a sense of the 
necessarily problematic control of mobility in the city- we sense that we must try to 
maximize what a body can do in the transportation infrastructure, but that we are still 
falling short. Finally, the rhythm, bright colours, and hushed lull of the video draws us 
into movement at times completely, in a dream-like fashion in which our own memories of 
cycling can come to the foreground of our thoughts, only to have the smooth motion 
suddenly changed by a the cyclists precariously wobbling, or even having to put a foot 
done to stop falling, or being suddenly pushed out of the frame by a rush of speed. In these 
jarring juxtapositions, pulling us in and out of the frame, we sense the inhuman in thought, 
we are connected to the outside. 
For all these reasons, I would argue that bicycling creates a block of becoming with the 
viewer. It composes and presents affects and percepts in such a way that the viewer is 
drawn into the scene, and actualizes different subjective responses to the traffic encounter, 
none of which can capture totally the different 'planes' ofthe crystal image. The viewer is 
pulled beyond their subjective refrain, and 'forced to think' about the problematic nature of 
mobility and control in the contemporary urban infrastructure. In the gallery space, with 
video technologies that are becoming increasingly common, Ganahl creates a public 
assemblage, and engages in a politics of becoming. However, the real genius ofthis piece, 
is that it leaves the viewer with the sense of why one would want to engage in 
experimenting with transportation reforms and subjectivities; while it makes visible 
something 'intolerable' in the existing control, it also evokes the joy and playfulness of 
free movement, and hence the desirability oftrying to go beyond what is in the name of a 
perhaps impossible goal (a goal for a people to come). Therefore, if the postcards and 
newspaintings are primarily critical in intend, judging the actions of those in power, raising 
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awareness of a problematic situation and pointing to the need to experiment with the 
assemblages within which we live, this latter piece is less overtly political, working instead 
to transmit a sense of joy, or what Nietzsche would call 'great health' of those who want to 
experiment as opposed to the merely 'good health' of those who have accepted their fate-
bicycling encourages experimentation. 
CONCLUSION 
The formation of a public, and its attendant subjectivities, is an event that can actualize in 
the briefest of moments. The challenge for any engagement in the public sphere is to 
intervene in this moment, or better re-create it and sustain it, through the circulation of 
claims. Like the public it hopes to actualize, the claim is itself is an assemblage between 
expression and content, an assemblage that it is hoped can re-activate the intensity of the 
event it addresses and so open the subject again to the potential of becoming, and to the 
desirability of experimenting with new ways of going on. The images and artwork 
reviewed here are examples of how a person might create such texts. The expressive 
components are those that release and transmit sensations- relations between colour, form, 
volume, movement-- while the content are those elements such as written text and 
recognizable objects. In the conjunction between these two assemblages the artwork hopes 
to make visible something 'intolerable' or 'shameful' that provokes the viewer to think 
again, and think differently, about the situation being presented. The spark of sense will 
also hopefully open the subject to the 'outside', i.e. to the reality of a subject's existence as 
part of a complex assemblage that goes beyond the subjective will and perception, beyond 
any particular form ofthe possible. This is a moment that is both problematic, because we 
sense something excessive that we cannot fully control or know, but also humbling. The 
challenge in this regard is to transmute this problematic moment into a joyful affirmation 
of necessity of choice, the need for the dice throw in which one acts into indeterminacy. 
In this chapter I have evaluated a series of images for their potential to intervene in the 
debates around transportation reform in Toronto which can at times descend into hard 
oppositions. When we compare, on the one hand, the images taken by my participants, and 
the kinds of claims they might be used to animate, and on the other hand, the art work of 
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Rainer Ganahl, we can see that it is not enough to simply represent, and confront, the 
subject with the world in which they live, it is also necessary to re-present that world in a 
novel way. Ganahl's work is successful because it forces us to relive a moment of 
subjectification in a novel fashion. There is not just a moment of critique, but also a 
moment of diagnosis that makes visible the problem of how else a subject might engage in 
the assemblages in which they live and think. The content of Ganahl's work, focussing on 
the politics of oil and the reflecting on the status ofthe bicycle as a socially and 
ecologically benign alternative, is augmented by an aesthetic that is at once playful and 
problematizing. One the one hand, the images draw the viewer into them through their 
composition of affects and percepts, but this accessibility is jarred by the content of the 
work. In this uneasy disjunction the viewer is forced to think again about what they 
believe and how they come to believe. The artwork also works by providing an example 
of experimentation with existing networks and practices in which subjectivity is formed 
(e.g. communication through the post and the Internet, commercial mass media, 
transportation). However, it is in Ganahl's video bicycling that I find his art to be most 
effective in re-activating the sensation of the event of encounter between different modes 
oftransportation in the city. In this piece he not only problematizes control, but he also 
transmits a sense of the joy of movement and so encourages a desire to experiment with 
the limits of what exists, of going beyond the possible. In this regard his video is very 
much directed at 'a people to come'. 
While I have focussed here on images and visual art, it needs to be stressed that words and 
sounds are also crucial elements to reactivating the event- literature and music, no less 
than cinema or the visual arts, can provoke us to think again about how to create effective, 
and affective, claims in the public sphere. It is perhaps true that in contemporary control 
dynamics images and the sounds (and perhaps even smells and touch) are more important 
than the word in maintaining a predictable subjectivity, especially given the dominance of 
television and the Internet in the public sphere. In a fluid and navigational space we are 
continually bombarded with images, and it is necessary to evaluate how we might use 
images to get past cliche, and to encourage experimentation and reflection. The value, and 
the challenge, ofthe image is that unlike the written text it takes less time to assimilate, but 
238 
it may have an effect (and affect) that lingers and can provide a hook around which 
becoming can be reactivated. However, I do not want to suggest that the image has 
priority because of its 'instantaneous' character, as if intervention in the public sphere had 
to take place on the fly, as ifthought had been reduced to impulsive reflexes. No doubt 
there is an element that works in this way (e.g. billboards), but as we have argued in 
chapter two, a society infused with speed is not one that is characterized by a universal 
'fast' speed. All routines are characterized by a rhythm of fast and slow timespaces, and a 
claim/text can be tailored to intervene in both of these- we may create books or posters, 
symphonies or sound bites. As we saw in chapter two, texts and the assemblages they 
actualize, have a temporality of circulation- they create time. However, in all cases what 
is important is that the text re-activates a sensation associated with a moment of disruption 
within routine, and in so doing make it available to repetition and to thought. 
Becoming is not recognized, but sensed at the limits of recognition and representation, and 
therefore a politics of becoming cannot avoid an engagement with an aesthetic dimension. 
If, as has been argued throughout, we are dealing subjectivities that exist only in repetition, 
and within often mobile and fluid assemblages, then the force of affect and percept 
(sensation) becomes increasingly important in understanding how we 'make sense', and so 
how a political claim will gain or loose legitimacy. This is not to say that content does not 
matter, but it is to say that content only makes sense against this backdrop of sensation- a 
spark of sense that exceeds the content of the claim. The subject is opened to becoming in 
the briefest of intervals between sensation and perception, and a politics of becoming must 
seek to experiment with how to create claims that will pry open this interval and re-activate 
the charge of the event. What makes this task possible is that the disruptions ofthe event 
are repeated, and it is in their repetition that they develop a kind of ambiguous familiarity 
that can be oddly compelling and pull the subject into becoming. What will make this 
task successful, is if the claim is able to compose affects and percepts in such a way as to 
create a sensation that resonates and reactivates memories ofthe event, but in a new 
context that provokes the subject to think again, and differently, about recognized and 
familiar claims circulating in the public sphere. The aim is to try to impart a sense of a 
world that is becoming and so affirm the necessity to choose to act into indeterminacy- to 
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throw the dice or experiment- in an attempt to influence the becoming of the world. 
However, creating claims that work on this register is necessarily experimental, because 
while a person can evaluate how they think a claim works, it is only in the event- when it 
actually does something- that we can say our evaluation was correct. 
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CONCLUSION 
[The] bizarre (some would say absurd) result [ofthe critique of mobility and 
speed] is to describe the processes of reality in such a way that at first all that 
remains is that 'nothing needs to be done'- insofar as all those who are ready 
to leap into action will make fools of themselves when faced with what has to 
be done first, namely to hesitate, to step back into a more attentive perception, 
to cease doing what has always been done in some ways, to become 
imperceptibly free for the right movement. One can be sure that anything else 
will result once more in blind mobilization, no matter how splendid the 
slogans. 
Peter Sloterdijk (1998 p.51) 
There is no singular objective speed that can characterize society, nor any qualitative 
experience of speed that is shared by everyone. We live in a world of multiple 
temporalities, and it is untenable to suggest that we have today, because of the 
proliferation of technology, reached a singular 'new' speed after which critical 
political debate finds itself in crisis. Concerns about speed and politics have long 
lineage in political thought and, as is the case today, the concerns focus on the loss of 
the self-present political subject, whose critical will can direct and legitimate political 
discourse. It is the hope of sustaining such a subject that has been eroded by speed, in 
particular through an apparent erosion of the grounds that are argued to support a self-
present and critical subjectivity (the city, the community, public space). While the 
concerns about the character and control of public space are certainly to be taken 
seriously, it is less clear that we should attach these concerns to a loss of political 
subjectivity and an erosion of public debate. Instead, I have followed a path that tries 
to understand how a public, and its implied subjectivities, are maintained 'at speed', as 
a person moves through the multiple timespaces of the contemporary city. A public 
formed of subjects on the move is one that we cannot assume is self-present, not least 
of all because that which is moving eludes representation- it is by definition that 
which is becoming. Moving away from premising critique on the will of a self-present 
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subject (individual or group), I have been working with theory that allows us to 
understand how a public, and its attendant subjectivities are 'assembled' within 
movement, within the circulation oftexts/claims in the public sphere. The analysis 
developed here does not deny a place for individual/group will, but this will is 
understood to be only one force within an assemblage, and so a force that is in no way 
determining. This changes the focus of political analysis, for we are no longer 
primarily focussed on ideal-normative conditions and the critique of ideology, but on 
exploring the limits of the assemblage in which a particular claim is sustained and 
given legitimacy. It is for this reason that I agree with Peter Sloterdijk in the above 
quote when he says that the bizarre outcome of a critique of speed and mobi I ity is that 
'nothing needs to be done'- there is no need for a 'new politics' if by this we mean 
some kind of radical departure from what we have done before. What is needed 
instead is the addition of a critique that encourages experimentation with recognized 
political identities, so as to 'cease doing what has always been done in some ways, to 
become imperceptibly free for the right movement.' However, while Sloterdijk uses 
words such as 'hesitate', and 'step back', I would stress that such an experimental 
critique has nothing to do with 'slowing down'. It is instead a call for a renewed 
engagement in understanding the processes that create and maintain identity, and the 
potential this creates for new identities to emerge within the public sphere. 
In concluding, then, I will review the steps that were taken in transforming the 
concerns about speed and politics into an exploration of the assemblage of publics and 
the intensity of becoming, and how this conceptual framework was then used in 
relation to the smog-event in Toronto. Rather than critique the loss of ideal-normative 
grounds for critical intervention, the argument here began by acknowledging that 
speed is an ambivalent quality in politics, both creating a potential to open debate to 
new identities, and posing the risk that appositional politics will stall in hard 
oppositions, or in a failure to recognize that which is truly novel in an event and which 
may take us beyond recognized identities. Both of these risks require that recognized 
identities begin to 'leak', and become open to a world whose potential exceeds the 
permutations of the possible. However, in order to see how this might happen, and 
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how we might intervene in the process, it is necessary to de-centre the focus on the 
subjective will at the centre of political analysis. Therefore, I argued that the concept 
of the public sphere provided a useful bridge between, on the one hand, concerns with 
the presence of certain ideologies and subjectivities, and on the other, how these are 
related to a subject's experience of 'speed' in a world of temporal complexity. In 
particular, the focus was on the mediation of the public sphere, because it is here that 
we begin to appreciate that the political subject does not pre-exist the circulation of 
texts within the public sphere, and that this circulation is in turn characterized by the 
indeterminacy associated with the iterability of all acts of communication. Within this 
framework, we begin to see that the subject emerges at the conjunction between a text 
and context, a conjunction that exists only in repetition. 
If the public and its subjectivities exist at a conjunction and in repetition, the next 
move was to understand how 'speed' impacts this process. Rather than a singular 
speed, we approached speed as a proliferation oftimespaces. Here speed was 
transformed into intensity through an examination of time as duration. The 
quintessential question that speed raises for social analysis (and so subjective 
understanding) is 'what happened?' The conceptualization of speed as duration shows 
that this momentary disruption can be understood as existing in repetition, and so the 
disorienting question 'what happened?', changes into a more affirmative and 
problematizing question: 'what is happening?', or the anticipation associated with 
'what is about to happen again?' The crucial point, is that time as duration turns 
critical focus to the interval between a virtual event, and its actualization in a 
particular state of affairs. Through habit and repetition we close the interval between 
the virtual and the actual, but the disruption re-activate the potential for a person to 
once again enter into the interval. 
In relation to the public sphere, it was argued that rather than understanding publics as 
existing in time, we can understand publics as duration- a time of the public. The 
public is an assemblage whose repetition fabricates time. Therefore, it was necessary 
to review how the event gets transformed into an assemblage; here we reviewed three 
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synthesis of the event that lead to a public assemblage- the connective synthesis that 
gives rise to a repeated disruption, the disjunctive synthesis that codes the disruption 
in knowledge, and the conjunctive syntheses that leads to a moment of subjectification 
in the actualization of a public. A public emerges in the conjunction between 
statements and visibilities, or expression and content, and it is in this moment that a 
person can also sense the limits of recognized subjectivities and so become open to 
reflecting on the limits of the assemblages the create them. A critical public sphere, 
then, is one that keeps this excessive dimension visible, because the overcoding of the 
capitalist state is always seeking to contain the becoming of subjectivity so that it 
remains manageable and predictable within existing assemblages. The dynamics of 
axiomatic and interactive control are increasingly replacing those of older forms of 
place-based discipline. Under such conditions, the subject is most 'radical' when 
imperceptible, when moving away from coding within a singular-collective becoming 
that questions the limits of control. 
Having developed this theoretical framework, the second half of the thesis provides 
examples of how theoretical concepts can be used to open the recognized identities of 
appositional politics to a sense of their limits and to becoming. These chapters 
engaged with air quality politics in Toronto, because smog not only provides an 
example of an event whose disruptions is controlled by speed, but also an event that 
continues to be disruptive after its capture, thus providing an example of how a public 
forms, and enters in to becoming, in relation to a repeated disruption. The first move 
was to understand how political identities come into being within an assemblage, 
which required an engagement with how the molecular (virtual) reality of smog is 
transformed in to molar actuality as a measure of air quality. It is through the concept 
of air quality that the smog-event can be made to repeat as a recognizable identity, an 
identity in relation to which a person can adopt recognized, and (ir)responsible subject 
positions. However, even while the argument charted the technical difficulties 
associated with this translation, it was stressed that for political analysis, which seeks 
to understand how particular claims about air quality are sustained, or become 
dominant, it is not sufficient to suggest that we need to 'recognize' the uncertainty 
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associated with constructing and measuring air quality (i.e. as in the ecological 
precautionary principle). The molecularity of smog that becomes visible in the 
tracking of the smog-event, also makes visible the molecularity of the urban 
population and practices that produce air pollution, often as a result of action distant in 
space and time. Therefore, to sustain a particular approach to controlling air pollution 
depends on being able to legitimately sustain control of the molecular population, 
which requires the assemblage of a public in which individuals will accept the 
subjectification that control implies. 
An example of such an event, were the reforms in Britain in the wake of the Great 
Killer Smog of 1952; what is interesting about that event is the extent to which speed 
allowed the problem to be solved through a distancing in space and time of the sources 
of pollution. However, such a strategy is undermined by the long-range transport of 
pollution, and so mitigation efforts today seek a different form of control through 
speed, which relies on the interactive monitoring and disciplining of a heterogeneous 
set of practices. This raises questions about what kind of control is both technically 
feasible and socially desirable, questions which need to be addressed in relation to 
particular contexts and decisions. In this regard, the construction and circulation of a 
measure of air quality (however flawed) plays an important role in marking a direction 
for political action -towards cleaner air- but it does not provide final grounds on 
which to legitimate a particular course of action. The recognition of air quality as a 
problem still leaves open the challenge of creating a public whose practices will 
legitimate a particular course of action for mitigating air quality. To fail to affirm the 
need to create a public around the quasi-object of air quality plunges political analysis 
into undue urgency, by implying that 'the public' lacks information or are being 
wilfully selfish. At present in Toronto, dominant claims about air quality tend to be 
reformist and conservative, reflecting what is possible to do in the short-term given the 
existing networks and assemblages in which subjectivities are formed, and so a 
politics of becoming seeks to explore how the current assemblage creates a potential 
that can be used to push beyond the recognized limits ofthe reasonable and the 
possible. 
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The potential to move beyond the possible and recognizable is sustained in the 
circulation of claims about air quality, and in particular the moral overcode to 'be 
efficient'. Chapter five presented this potential by discussing subjectivity in terms of 
a refrain, viewed both as body-without-organs (BwO), open to its milieu, and as a 
territorial refrain in which the subject experiments with the limits of the reasonable. In 
the first pass, the routine passage through space is disrupted by the changing 
intensities of the smog-event. The subject as body-without-organs, develops different 
practices for sensing and coping with these different intensities, which may or may not 
reach the level of conscious reflection, but which regardless create a 'rhythm of 
passage' through the coded milieu. In repetition this rhythm forms into an intensity, 
or plane of consistency. A BwO is an intensity that creates desire, but not desire 
understood as a lack (desire-for), but desire that seeks to add to the refrain only 
practices that will intensify and sustain the refrain. Desire seeks to augment the force 
of intensity, the desire of the BwO is a potential that opens the body to certain kinds of 
experiences, while closing it down to others. The smog-event enters this intensive 
refrain as a new force, a disruption of intensity, and it is an open question as to 
whether it will trigger a more intense folding of the BwO that turns away from the 
smog-event, or whether it will trigger experimentation and transformation that is open 
to the new intensities ofthe smog-event. 
In order to better sense this potential, the second pass explores how the subject 
engages with the smog-event as it is assembled and circulated as the moral overcode 
'to be efficient'. In addition to the moments of subjectification associated with the 
folding of intensity in the BwO, there are also moments of subjectification that take 
place when the forces and intensities of the milieu become expressive and form a 
territory. A territory is defined by recognized 'motifs' and 'counterpoints', i.e. 
relations among recognized elements and practices that define a subject as acting 
responsibly in relation to recognized norms. However, these territorial motifs and 
counterpoints are not fixed, but emerge in relation, such that there is a continual play 
as to which practices are considered reasonable and acceptable in different contexts. 
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A recognized subject forms within a territory, and creates a style that makes the 
territory more or less open to experimenting with new combinations, more or less 
open to de-territorialization. However, because the demands of any moral 
proscription are always infinite, the subject is never good enough, the territory that 
forms in relation to the moral overcode is initially reactive, seeking to defend itself 
against further demands. Therefore, it was argued that rather than judging a territorial 
refrain against the infinite demands ofthe moral overcode, it is necessary to evaluate 
the potential that inheres in a particular refrain- whether it be that of the 'masochistic' 
cyclist, or the more ironic refrain of a person who professes concern about air quality 
and drives a 5.0 L mustang, the point is not to focus only on what people do, but what 
it can allow them to become. 
The smog-event opens the body-subject to a problematic situation, a need to re-
evaluate the refrain. This in turn means that a subject is opened to becoming-
minoritarian, to questioning and probing the connections that can be made at the limit 
of the refrain. A becoming-minoritarian does not involve recognizing minorities, or 
imitating 'radical' alternatives, but is instead a process of becoming-imperceptible, or 
discovering a singular-collective becoming that is appropriate to one's circumstances. 
Sensing becoming is not a wholly conscious exercise, and it can lead to a reactive turn 
away from the new forces that have been introduced, but it can create a potential for 
an opening of the refrain to experimentation with the possibilities of new refrains, and 
with the limits of control. A politics of becoming will seek to nurture this second 
possibility. 
A subject open to becoming creates an ambivalent potential for political practice, there 
is nothing inherently progressive about becoming. The challenge for a politics of 
becoming is to encourage movement beyond the reactive position of the territorial 
refrain, to encourage experimentation with what is possible to see and do today. This 
requires that a claim circulating in the public sphere re-activates the problematic 
moments of disruption, when a subject can sense the limits of recognized identities. It 
also requires that this re-activation be presented in such a way that it imparts the 
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necessity of choice, the necessity to take a leap beyond judgment to try and actualize a 
different possibility. This is necessarily an experimental process, both for those 
circulating the claim and for those who must in turn experiment with the limits of their 
subjective refrain. Becoming is not a process that can be strictly represented and 
recognized, it is instead sensed at the edge of what is recognized, and so re-activating 
becoming requires a necessary engagement with an aesthetic dimension. 
Following a Deleuzian critique of aesthetics, we can say that sensations are re-
activated through the compositions of affects and percepts; compositions of form, 
colour, volume, movement etc, that create signs that re-activate the sensation of the 
event (as distinct from recognized symbols that must be interpreted and which read the 
event as a version of what existed before). There is always a need to evaluate how 
well the claim, through images, sounds or texts, is able to re-activate the sensation of 
the event. As an example ofthis process, I examined different approaches to how 
visual art might engage in the politics of transportation reform in Toronto in order to 
encourage de-territorializing transportation-based subjectivities. 
I began by comparing photographs taken by participants in the study with the 
photography of Martha Rosier as presented in Rights of Passage. It was argued that 
these road scenes, largely devoid of human presence, and taken at odd angles from 
behind windshields and with a cramped perspective (e.g. blocked by rear-view 
mirrors, the frame of the car, or road infrastructure) conveyed the sense of a body 
trapped and so 'out of control'. In Martha Rosier's work this was explicitly connected 
to a critique of ideologies of progress and freedom associated with the road, critiques 
which argue that this mode of development no longer (if it ever did) serves 
progressive ends. However, against a context ofthe dominance of the automobile, it 
was suggested that such claims say 'too much', because they fail to acknowledge the 
pleasure and freedom still associated with the car, and 'too little' because in this 
critique there is no diagnosis of how a subject might move beyond the 'end of the 
road'. Therefore, a public called into being with these images and texts, would risk 
sliding into disillusionment, or a reactive condemnation. It is necessary to not just 
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represent disconcerting moments within everyday urban experience, but re-present 
such moments in a way that encourages- i.e. re-activates the desire --to experiment 
with the limits of transportation infrastructure that restricts what a body can do. 
The confrontation in congestion between car and bicycle-based subjectivities in 
Toronto was given as an example of an everyday encounter that might be productively 
re-presented by a pal itics of becoming. In practice these moments of confrontation 
often actualize in hard oppositions, in which the struggle is over who is being 
(ir)responsible, and who has a right to the road. This in turn re-surfaces in political 
conflicts discussing re-distribution of road-resources, for it is argued that redistribution 
would be unnecessary if road users simply behaved responsibly. The upshot of such 
oppositions is to slow down the pace of transportation reform in Toronto, and to limit 
the degree of experimentation with alternative forms of transportation. As an example 
of an intervention that tries to break open this appositional dynamic, I turned to the 
work of Rainer Ganahl in his exhibition Bicycle. While Ganahl celebrates the bicycle 
as an alternative to the car, and in particular in relation to the global violence 
associated with the politics of oil, he refuses to simply embrace the bicycle as a 
socially and ecologically benign alternative. Instead, his artwork places the bicycle 
within a much larger set of social and technical relations, which forces the viewer to 
re-live moments of subjectification, which in turn makes us think again, and perhaps 
think differently, about the potential for intervention. However, the composition of 
these pieces, and in particular his video bicycling also imparts a sense of the potential 
to experiment with these moments of subjectification, as well as a desire to 
experiment, a desire to go beyond what is recognized as possible and reasonable 
today. 
Each of the chapters that examined the assemblage and circulation ofthe smog-event 
tried to impart a sense ofthe continued disruption of the smog-event as it was 
translated and circulated in the public sphere. If successful, these examples will have 
imparted a sense ofthe potential that exists for intervention into a public sphere whose 
assemblage relies on speed, but which is opened to becoming through repeated 
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disruptions. At the same time, these examples make clear that any such intervention 
will require an evaluation of conditions that cannot be defined and described in 
advance, an affirmation of the need for an experimental intervention. When we talk of 
potential, a note of caution is in order, so as not to leave the reader with the impression 
that the undue urgency of the narratives of speed can simply be countered with a vital 
and affirmative optimism and experimentation. In order to avoid this reading, we need 
to conclude with a brief review of the distinction between the possible and potential, 
and for this we will need to return to the discussion of time as duration, since both the 
possible and potential describe a relation to the future (Massumi, 2002 P.92-99). 
In chapter two, we saw how duration can be considered as a movement that closes the 
interval between an open and closed multiplicity, between the actual and the virtual. 
The actual can be represented as a series of networks whose repeated connections 
create multiple timespaces. The possible is a term we can use in discussions of the 
future when we limit the discussion to the actual; the possible describes permutations 
of actual existing objects and relations that make up a timespace. As we saw in 
chapter two this is what allows us to imagine and predict a linear extension of the 
present into the future, assigning different possibilities their own probability. 
However, it was also argued that time cannot be adequately described in this way, 
because there is always something unexpected, a 'schiz' or swerve, that can introduce 
a new possibility, something completely novel, and we must also account for this 
potential. lt is here that the concept of the virtual was introduced; the virtual as an 
open multiplicity that exceeds any actualization. Potential, refers to this excessive 
dimension of the virtual, a dimension oftime that is only ever sensed within the 
moment of actualization, but which is nevertheless crucial for problematizing 
recognized identities, for sensing their limits and so opening thought beyond the 
possible. The challenge of working with potential is to make visible the interval 
between the virtual and its actualization. 
While this works conceptually, it is necessary to respond to those who would ask what 
good such a potential is if we are in practice limited to what is possible. In response 
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we can say, first, that while the pragmatic goal of political action is to achieve what is 
possible to do today, the pragmatic goal of a politics ofbecoming is to make visible 
why a person would want to go beyond what exists today. Hence its importance in a 
critique of speed concerned with a reduction of political discourse to the hard 
oppositions of recognized identities, or the failure of appositional politics to be open 
to novelty. In a world where the control of time and space- in part through high-
speed technologies- is often used to severely limit the possible, this potential 
becomes an important source for revitalizing politics. Second, and related, it is 
important not to see the possible and the potential as unrelated. This is because a 
sense of potential informs our choices with regard to the possible -e.g. the smog-
event can make visible the excess of molecular populations, and informs our choice of 
what kinds of social and technical control are not only feasible but also desirable. The 
choices made in turn feedback into potential, changing it- hence Deleuze's 
Nietzschean criteria that 'whatever you will, will in such a way that you also will its 
eternal return.' 
What we can do tomorrow is informed by the potential that is kept visible by a politics 
of becoming and its experimental critique- i.e. what we can do is informed by a sense 
of the almost limitless range of things a person might imagine doing. This sense of 
openness and excess reminds us of the necessity to create a public, to affirm one's 
choice, and to realize that this affirmation will always require a 'leap of faith', or 
gamble, and that success or failure is indeterminate prior to the event of actualization. 
What's more, it reminds us that 'success' is always an event that is sustained in 
repetition, and that we must be mindful of building potential (becoming) within 
repetition even if nothing has yet actualized. It is therefore important to stress again 
that the style of critique presented here is not in opposition to a dialectical critique, but 
differs from it and is complementary to it. 
A politics of becoming seeks to nurture the potential for a novel actualization of the 
event that is created by its repetition and circulation in the public sphere. Therefore, 
an experimental critique must stand back from any particular actualization with the 
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aim of foregrounding the potential that exceeds them. The challenge for the 
researcher in presenting an experimental critique, is to evaluate how far one should 
follow the event towards its actualization in any given state of affairs. Ifwe stay too 
far from any actualization, we risk creating a text that is overly speculative and 
normative, a vague potential. If we follow the event too far towards its actualization 
in a particular state of affairs, we risk falling into a description of a singular case that 
has no resonance to other contexts. One risks loosing a sense of potential, which is 
replaced with a sense of causal relation and determination between the virtual and its 
actualization. In addition, getting too close to any actualization would draw us into 
judging between possible options, which might risk suggesting that there is something 
to be 'recognized' in the virtual potential that informs what we should do. However, 
such a choice cannot be determined in advance, it will require an ethical evaluation in 
the event, and what will transpire will depend on the success in assembling and 
maintaining a public assemblage. The challenge of presentation, as was argued in 
chapter three, is one of how much detail to give, and what details, in order to make 
visible the kinds of relations that need to be tended to in order maintain the 
assemblage, as well as the intensity and becoming that exceeds the assemblage. 
Implicit in this challenge is a question about how to present the limit of what textual 
and analytical work can do, and make visible the need to carry action beyond the text. 
The analysis of becoming should bring us to a sense of openness and potential, just as 
the analysis of opposition shows us a demarcation of the possible. Closing the interval 
between potential and a particular possibility, or allowing the thought of new 
possibilities to enter politics, will be an event that will take place, as Deleuze says, 'in 
the midst of events that have nothing to do with books'. 
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